The discursive shaping of intellectual ownership: the case of James Watt and Josiah Wedgwood by Corso, Matteo
  
Università degli Studi di Cagliari 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA
Discipline 
loso
che
Ciclo XXVII
TITOLO TESI
The discursive shaping of intellectual ownership: the case of James Watt
and Josiah Wedgwood
Settore/i scienti
co disciplinari di afferenza
M-STO/05; M-FIL/06
Presentata da: Matteo Corso
Coordinatore Dottorato  Prof. Andrea Orsucci
Tutor Prof. Giancarlo Nonnoi
Relatore Prof. Giancarlo Nonnoi
Esame 
nale anno accademico 2013 – 2014
Matteo Corso gratefully acknowledges Sardinia Regional Government for the financial support of
her PhD scholarship (P.O.R. Sardegna F.S.E. Operational Programme of the Autonomous Region of
Sardinia, European Social Fund 2007-2013 -  Axis IV Human Resources, Objective l.3, Line of
Activity l.3.1.)
The discursive shaping of intellectual ownership: the case of
James Watt and Josiah Wedgwood
Matteo Corso

Contents
Introduction               1
Part One 
Securing inventions: James Watt's rhetoric on patents
and the contemporary libertarian justifications of 
Intellectual Property rights.                              
James Watt, a brief outline of his life 7
James Watt and the problem of intellectual appropriation 22
Watt's “old and well tried friends”                                                                            29
                                                                       
A lonely infant: staging an individualistic conception of  
inventive work               35
Converging  goals: private interest and public justice                                              47       
Conclusions 59
Part two
Securing originality outside the patent system:
Wedgwood's protection of  design before design.
                       
Ars Etruriae Renascuntur: Josiah Wedgwood's life and
 achievements 60
From Engines to Vases, a shift in the context of intellectual 
ownership 71
Who has the secret of porcelain? Wedgwood's opposition
 to Cookworthy's patent 80
Imitators of imitations: Wedgwood's competitors 
and copyists 85
Suborned workmanship and the problem 
of limiting the circulation of knowledge 90
Patronage, branding and a blurred distinction between
invention and imitation. 109
Historiographical appendix 
Selfish entrepreneur or modern “scientist”? 
Twentieth-century historians of science look 
at Josiah Wedgwood.
Introduction 121
The first reaction to a “scholarly attack” 126
What did science owe to ethics?  
Josiah Wedgwood the craftsman 131
The nominalist camp: reconnecting technical 
and scientific matters. 137

Introduction
When Steven Shapin inquired after the 'literary technology' which moulded Robert
Boyle's  natural  philosophy1,  the  tradition  of  studies  known  as  Sociology  of
Scientific Knowledge (SSK) was still relatively young and had just received new
inputs from the so called 'Strong Programme', a new methodological manifesto
which opened up history of science to the social constructivist perspective.
As  Shapin  himself  would  point  out  in  2010,  this  challenge  to  Whiggish
historiography, realism, and positivism was at first perceived as a manifold 'heresy'
against the traditional characterization of science. In fact, the Strong Programme
opposed any historiographical trend which depicted science, and men of science,
like entities eradicated from their social and human needs, thereby contributing to
the image of science as a universal, neutral, objective, and disinterested type of
knowledge. 
Rather,  science  was  to  be  understood  as  a  kind  of  knowledge  situated  in  its
historical  moment,  which  belongs  to  a  place,  which  is  not  one,  unified  and
indivisible and does not depend upon a single and coherent Scientific Method.
Science, Shapin continues, is not the only existing source of Truth and scientists
are not “morally and constitutionally diverse specimens of humankind”, although
they belong to a narrow group which can exercise a very specific kind of authority
in modern and contemporary societies.2 
Finally,  scientific  knowledge  is  not  pure  thought,  but  a  set  of  practices  and
performances.3
1 Steven Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle's Literary Technology”, Social Studies
of Science, 14 (1984), 481-520.
2 Shapin, 2010, p. 5.
3 Ibid.
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The literary technology which Shapin investigated in his 1984 paper on Boyle's
experiments with the air-pump was then analysed as a discourse in this thread of
practices.  Shapin  argues  that,  whilst  the  production  and  the  communication  of
knowledge  are  usually  regarded  as  different  activities:  “speech  about  natural
reality is a means of generating knowledge about reality.”4 He shows that there is
no  difference  between  discourses  about  Nature,  which  aim  to  be  neutral  and
objective and more abstract discourses about the way we achieve valid knowledge.
The two practices are intimately intertwined, so that scientific knowledge appears
to be embedded in Boyle's metaphysics, epistemology and ultimately in the whole
form of life we define as 'experimental philosophy'.
The theoretical basis of Boyle's science was thus the fundamental belief that, in
order to be incontestable, a scientific claim had to refer to something external and
physically  observable,  that  is  a  'matter  of  fact'.  Experimental  philosophy,
nevertheless, was a system of beliefs which leaned upon a material technology, a
social technology and a literary technology. The complexity of the 'technologies'
which  were  employed  in  the  making  of  Boyle's  natural  knowledge  would  be
explored  at  much  greater  length  in  Shapin  and  Schaffer's  landmark  work
Leviathan and the air-pump, which was published in 1985.5 
The production of natural knowledge, according to the experimental agenda, relied
upon very expensive pieces of machinery, such as the air-pump, which made it
factually impossible to extend the witnesses of experiments beyond a close circle
of wealthy gentlemen of science.
4 Shapin, 1984, p. 482.
5 Steven  Shapin,  Simon  Schaffer,  Leviathan  and  the  air-pump:  Hobbes,  Boyle  and  the
Experimental Life, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985.
Shapin and Schaffer shed light on the way matters of facts were produced. Rather than being
pure observable data mirroring objective aspects of natural phenomena, matters of fact had to
be generated, and the consent over them had to be procured and maintained. Leviathan and the
air-pump shed  light  on  the  controversy  between  Hobbes  and  Boyle  over  the  reliability
experimental method. Their claim is that this contest needs be understood amid the context of
Restoration society and politics. In fact,  argue Shapin and Schaffer,  by shifting attention to
matters of fact and treating theories and philosophies less dogmatically, experimental science
could  serve  as  an  instrument  of  cultural  reunification  and  pacification  of  the  English  elite
following the heated years of the Civil War.
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On the other hand, argues Shapin, what made observable matters of fact certain in
the  utmost  degree  was  the  virtually  universal  assent  of  which  they  could  be
assured. This consent about the experimental results which emerged from the use
of  Boyle's  air-pump,  was  procured  by  means  of  literary  expedients  and  the
mobilization of the relevant community of natural philosophers. Therefore, Shapin
focuses upon the way witnesses multiplied and matters of fact were ascertained.
What mattered in the construction of this 'universal' consent about the indisputable
datas which grounded Boyle's natural knowledge, was the authoritative testimony
of  the  Royal  Society,  the  use  of  public  spaces  such  as  laboratories,  the
representation of experiments as if they could be reproduced far from their original
occurrence, and the literary device of 'virtual witnessing'. 
Virtual witnessing was assured by means of Boyle's skilfully crafted scientific text.
Prolixity  and  circumstantial  details  served  as  communicative  styles  aimed  at
producing  in  the  readers'  mind:  “such  an  image  of  an  experimental  scene  as
obviates the necessity for either its direct witness or its replication.”6 Furthermore,
as  the  actual  direct  observers  of  Boyle's  experiments  were  very  few,  virtual
witnessing implied a relationship of trust between the narrator of those organized
and codified  experiences  and his  readers.  Shapin  argues  that  Boyle's  scientific
texts contributed to the author's moral self-fashioning. In order to earn his reader's
trust, Boyle deployed a series of literary devices such as displays of modesty. He
also adopted  a  plain,  puritanical  style  of  writing which might  be  perceived  as
simply  functional.  He  showed  himself  eager  to  report  in  detail  any  failed
experiment,  and   made  sure  to  assume  the  “appropriate  moral  postures,  and
appropriate  modes  of  speech”  for  the  treatment  of:  “epistemological  items  on
either side of the crucial boundary that separated matters of fact from the locutions
used  to  account  for  them:  theories,  hypotheses,  speculations,  and  the  like.”
Shapin's 1984 article is only one of the works which contribute, from the point of
view of social constructivism, to our understanding of the intimate relationship
6 Shapin, 1984, p. 491.
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between  scientific  knowledge  and  discursive  practices.  In  Making  natural
knowledge. Constructivism and the History of Science, Jan Golinski dedicates a
whole chapter to this branch of study within SSK. He points out that much of what
scientists  can  be  observed  to  do  relates  to  their  'linguistic  behavior'  and
communicative acts.7 They publish discursive accounts of their experiments, take
part  in  conferences  and  give  lectures.  But  they  also  seek  out  grants,  procure
political connections, and debate each other's merits.
Whilst  their  work  is  also  placed  in  the  material  dimension  of  laboratories,
scientific instruments and many different kinds of 'inscriptions',  scientists:  “live
much of their lives in a world of words.” Consequently, no constructivist analysis
could  consider  the  linguistic  dimension  of  science  as  if  it  was  merely
epiphenomenal.8
As a result of growing awareness of the rhetorical aspects implied in the making of
scientific  knowledge,  Rhetoric of Science is  now a distinct field of study.9 The
scholars who engage in this discipline are generally concerned with the topoi and
the  rhetorical  figures  which  stand  out  in  a  scientific  text,  but  they  do  not
necessarily subscribe to the theoretical framework of constructivism. Nevertheless,
their  work,  along  with  that  of  the  sociologists  of  science,  contributes  to  the
dismissal of an old prejudice, that is, the neat contrast between rhetoric, the art of
persuasion, and logic, which compels assent  by means of neutral and objective
lines  of  reasoning.  Hence,  even  the  'plain'  style  of  scientific  texts  should  be
considered  as  a  rhetorical  artefact,  aimed  at  gaining  the  assent  of  a  precise
audience.  However,  any rhetorical  analysis  of  science  achieves  little,  from the
point of view of history of science, as long as scientific modes of speaking and
7 Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge. Constructivism and the History of Science, Chicago
University Press, Chicago, 2005 (1998), p. 103.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. pp. 104-105; Lawrence J. Prelli,  A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse,
University  of  South Carolina Press,  Columbia,  1989;  Alan Gross,  The Rhetoric of  Science,
Harvard  University  Press,  Cambridge  MA,  1990; Leah  Ceccarelli,  Shaping  Science  with
Rhetoric:  The Cases of  Dobzhansky, Schrödinger,  and Wilson, University of  Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2001; Alan G. Gross,  Starring the Text. The Place of Rhetoric in Science Studies,
Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2006.
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writing  are  not  situated  against  the  background of  available  cultural  resources.
The literary devices employed by Boyle, for example, need to be understood as
components  of  a  whole  system of  meaning and as  rationalizations  of  concrete
material and social needs. Hence Shapin and Schaffer's book broaden the focus of
rhetorical studies by focusing upon Boyle's scientific apparatus and on the societal
dynamics which underpin the affirmation of the Royal Society as one of the most
authoritative knowledge-makers in modern Britain.
Greg Myers'  work on the use of dialogues in scientific  texts,  and Peter Dear's
studies of the structure of experimental reports in the 17th century offer further
examples  of  how the  analysis  of  discursive  practices  might  be  relevant  to  the
constructivist approach to history of science.
This work is also concerned with discursive practices and literary technologies.
However, we shall not engage here with scientific treatises, essays or dialogues.
Rather, we shall focus upon a number of informal primary sources, mainly letters
and notes by two of the most iconic inventors-cum-entrepreneurs of the Industrial
Revolution: James Watt and Josiah Wedgwood. My aim is to focus upon Watt and
Wedgwood's  justifications  of  their  intellectual  ownership  hence  outline  their
conceptions of invention and inventive work. I shall show that these notions were
entrenched with their discourses on the inventor's ethical profile.
Part one is concerned with Watt's defence of his rights as patentee. My claim is
that  natural-law  and  utilitarian  arguments  provided  a  powerful  set  of  cultural
resources  for  Watt's  understanding of  invention and progress.  In  particular,  his
proposal  for  a  reform of the patent  system includes a  thick narrative which is
useful if we wish to understand how Watt conceived the social role of inventors
and his individualistic conception of techno-scientific progress.
As Watt's defence of his monopoly over the separate condenser represents a vivid
case-study for those concerned with the contemporary debate around intellectual
property rights, I will draw some parallels between Watt's justification of patents
as a means of rewarding the inventor's toil  and the arguments and assumptions
deployed by contemporary libertarians who debate the very merits of the patent
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system.  This  analysis  will  show  the  current  cultural  significance  of  Watt's
discourse on intellectual property.
In the second part of this work I will turn my attention to Wedgwood's artistic and
technical innovation in British pottery so as to enucleate his notions of originality,
imitation, and authorship. I shall provide an insight into his fluid demarcation of
the dividing line between imitation and invention, which, I claim, is related to the
lack of effective institutional protection of designs. As a result of his failure to
legally  secure  intellectual  property  by  means  of  the  patent  law,  Wedgwood's
discourse on intellectual ownership leans upon less formalized cultural resources
which were available to 18th century entrepreneurs. One of these was industrial
paternalism,  a  rhetorical  attitude  which  Wedgwood  also  employed  when  he
addressed  the  problem  of  suborned  workmanship  and  attempted  to  limit  the
circulation of knowledge.
What was once again at stake was the need to materially, socially and discursively
construct the moral integrity of Wedgwood's claim to the authorship of his pottery,
which  involved  the  expertise  and  artistic  talent  of  many  'invisible'  artists  and
technicians.
Finally, in the Historiographical Appendix I shall outline Wedgwood's scientific
reputation in British 20th century historiography. I shall  claim that  Wedgwood's
admission into the pantheon of great men of science was influenced by abstract
assumptions  on  the  moral  disinterestedness  of  his  research  and  by  broader
considerations of the relationship between science and technology.
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PART ONE
Securing inventions: James Watt's rhetoric on patents and the contemporary 
libertarian justifications of Intellectual Property rights 
Le discours, en apparence a beau  être
bien peu de chose, les interdits qui le
frappent révèlent très tôt, très vite, son
lien aven le désir et avec le pouvoir. Et
à cela quoi d'étonnant: […] puisque –
cela,  l'histoire  ne  cesse  de  nous
l'enseigner  –  le  discours  n'est  pas
simplement ce qui traduit les luttes ou
les  systèmes  de  domination,  mais  ce
pour  quoi,  ce  par  quoi  on  lutte,  le
pouvoir dont on cherche à s'emparer.  
M.  Foucault,  L'Ordre  du  Discours,
1970, p. 12. 
James Watt, a brief outline of his life
In one of his essays, with his usual optimism Ralph Waldo Emerson approaches
the themes of progress, technology and art.
While espousing a profoundly Romantic world-view, “the prophet of American
religion”10 describes the artistic and technological harvest gathered throughout the
triumphant  history  of  human  creativity,  arguing  that  geniality  is  always  the
manifestation of one single notion,  Reason: “There is one mind common to all
10 Harold Bloom, The American Religion, Chu Hartley, New York, 1992, p. xii.
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individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same, and to all of the same”. Every
artistic  and  scientific  work  stems  from  this  “eternal  Reason”,  which  is
recognizable in the laws of Nature and identifiable with God Himself.
Thus  the  whole  creative  history  of  humankind  is  organically  coherent:
“Herein is the explanation of the analogies which exist in all the arts. They are the
reappearance of  one mind, working in many materials to many temporary ends.
Raphael paints wisdom; Handel sings it, Phidias carves it, Shakespeare writes it,
Wren builds it, Columbus sails it, Luther preaches it, Washington arms it,  Watt
mechanizes it.”11
Hence, according to Emerson, Watt had the extraordinary merit to give Reason a
mechanical body.  His  sharp  intellect  empowered  the  Industrial  Revolution,
marking the beginning of one of the most memorable steps forward in modern
history.  As  the  American  philosopher  points  out  in  The Conduct  of  Life,  the
inventor from Greenock embodied progress, being endowed with the divine talent
of  turning  brute  natural  forces  into  power  at  the  disposal  of  human  kind:
“Steam was, till the other day, the devil which we dreaded […] But the Marquis of
Worcester, Watt, and Fulton bethought themselves, that, where was power, was not
devil, but was God; that it must be availed of, and not by any means let off and
wasted. Could he lift pots and roofs and houses so handily? He was the workman
they were in search of.”12
Indeed, particularly for Watt,  energy optimization would become an intellectual
challenge:  one  which  required  resources,  experiments,  and  determination.
However, sooner or later, Watt thought, he would be repaid for his toil.
Everything began in the winter of 1763-64, when he was appointed by Professor
John Anderson to repair a model of a Newcomen engine. 
Anderson taught Natural Philosophy at Glasgow College, where James Watt, aged
28 and, already an experienced instrument maker, had obtained accommodation
11 Ralph W. Emerson, Art, in Civilization, Art, Eloquence and Books, Tokio Publishing Company,
Tokyo, 1886, p. 31. My italics.
12 Ralph W. Emerson, The Conduct of Life, Ticknor and Fields, Boston, 1860, p. 28.
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and a workshop. 
His job consisted mostly in repairing scientific instruments for the academic staff.
Glasgow intellectual life was animated by some of the most progressive students
in Britain, especially natural philosophers, prophets of the Baconian credo, who
collaborated  to  produce  an  earthy,  practically  oriented  kind  of  knowledge.
Anderson had begun just started to deliver “anti-toga lectures”, mainly addressing
local artisans and mechanics, while, besides Watt, the College hosted within its
premises painters and type-founders.
In such an environment it is not surprising that the mechanic from Greenock, the
son  of  a  shipwright  and  a  hard-working  Presbyterian,  soon  achieved  a  good
reputation. In 1756 Watt arrived to Glasgow and shortly after met John Robison, at
that time a brilliant undergraduate, and Joseph Black, who had just been appointed
to the chair of Botany and Anatomy.13
Much later, Robison would remember his first acquaintance with Watt: “After first
fisting my Eyes with the view of fine instruments, and prying into every thing I
conversed  with  Mr.  Watt.  I  saw  Workman  and  expected  no  more  –  but  was
surprized to find a philosopher, as young as myself; and always ready to instruct
me.”14
It  1759  Robison  persuaded  Watt,  in  1759,  to  investigate  some  profitable
applications of steam.15 Thomas Newcomen's machines were already widespread,
but  the  imagination  of  these  young  men  was  bolder  and  looked  beyond  the
ordinary atmospheric pumps and engines: would it be ever possible to realize a
steam-carriage? 
At that time Watt did not know much about steam and its properties.
The first steam engines were realized long before by Thomas Savery, a military
13 Ben Marsden, Watt's Perfect Engine. Steam and the Age of Invention, Icon Books, Cambridge,
2002, pp. 19-20.
14 “Professor  Robinson's  Narrative  of  Mr.  Watt's  Invention  of  the  improved  Engine  versus
Hornblower and Maberley, 1796”, in Eric Robinson, Albert E. Musson,  James Watt and the
Steam Revolution. A Documentary History, Augustus M. Kelley, New York, 1969, p. 23. 
15 Marsden, 2002, p. 27.
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engineer, who in 1698 took out a patent for a “Fire Engine”.16 His engine was
designed to help the adventurers of the mining districts to raise water, so as to
exploit mines at greater depths. 
Savery was probably influenced in his study by the earlier research of the Maquis
of Worcester, outlined in his book Century.17
In 1699, when his patent was obtained and the related Act was passed, Savery's
engine was brought before the Royal Society for a demonstration. It was the 14th
June and  the  minutes  recorded  that:  “Mr.  Savery  entertained  the  Society  with
showing his engine to raise water by the force of fire. He was thanked for showing
the  experiment,  which  succeeded  according  to  expectation,  and  was  approved
thereof.”  Savery  also  provided the  Society  with  a  drawing  of  his  contrivance,
which was printed and described in the  Transactions.18 This first “Fire Engine”
consisted of two large cylindrical vessels, alternatively filled with steam from the
adjoining boiler and with cold water from the well of the mine out of which the
water had to be raised.
However,  when the engine was used to force up a high columns of water,  the
pressure required was very high. As was the risk of an explosion. Owing also to
the  imperfection  of  early  boilers  and  receivers,  the  number  of  incidents  led
eventually to its discontinuation. 
The application of this model of early fire-engine would be circumscribed to the
pumping of water in fountains, while the task of providing the mining districts
with  a  proper  engine  was  undertaken  by  Thomas  Newcomen.  Newcomen,  a
blacksmith and ironmonger from Dartmouth, was assisted by John Calley, a glazier
who eventually became his partner in the engine-business.19 Dickinson offers a
clear and brief description of Newcomen's engine, which will serve our purpose:
“a piston working in a cylinder is attached by a chain to a beam or lever rocking on
trunnions, to the other end of which a pump rod is hung. Steam at atmospheric
16 Samuel Smiles, Lives of Boulton and Watt, Nonsuch, Chalford, 2007 (1865), p. 54.
17 Ibid., p. 53.
18 Ibid., p. 54.
19 Ibid., p. 66.
10
pressure,  generated in a boiler below, is  admitted into the cylinder  and the air
present is blown out through the snifting valve. The piston being overbalanced by
the weight of the pump rod is at the top of its stroke. A jet of water is turned on in
the  cylinder  to  condense  the  steam  to  form  a  vacuum  The  pressure  of  the
atmosphere on the piston forces it down and in doing so it lifts the pump rod and
with  it  water  from  the  mine.  With  the  readmission  of  steam,  the  cycle
recommences.”20
When the young Watt received a broken model of Newcomen's engine, he soon
realized the inefficiency of its mechanics and began pondering how it could be
improved. The main reason for its malfunction, he thought, had to be sought in the
fact that the cylinder, where the steam acted on the piston to push it up, was cooled
at every stroke, therefore losing its high temperature. Thus when injected with new
hot steam, a part of it was immediately condensed by the cool metal inside the
cylinder, which implied, of course, a dispersion of energy and a consequent waste
of coal.
Moreover, the steam condensed, forming a deposit of water in the bottom of the
cylinder, which limited the stroke produced by the atmosphere acting upon the
piston and pushing it downwards. The only solution was to keep the cylinder as
hot  as  the  steam and let  the  latter  condense  elsewhere.  In  other  words,  Watt's
solution had to be a  separate condenser. Therefore, he conceived the idea of a
separate vessel,  connected  with the  cylinder,  where steam would flow into  the
cylinder, be condensed into water and disposed of. While the cylinder could be
kept hot, so as to optimize the quantity of steam necessary to push the piston up,
the separate condenser would be immersed in water and thereby kept cool.
When the valve connecting the two vessels was open, the steam flew from the
cylinder  to  the condenser,  condensation would create a vacuum and due to  its
elasticity the whole quantity of steam contained in the cylinder would stream into
the condenser.
20 Henry  W.  Dickinson,  James  Watt,  Craftsman  and  Engineer,  Cambridge  University  Press,
Cambridge, 1936, p. 33.
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Watt came up with this simple and brilliant idea in 1765. It took him three years to
turn his  first  intuition into a contrivance  which would be eligible for a patent.
However, rather than a machine, what he actually decided to patent was a method,
one he entitled: “A New Method of Lessening the Consumption of Steam and Fuel
in Fire Engines”.21
This patent, one of the most debated intellectual properties of modernity, was to be
integrated with a specification. No drawing was enclosed, and his final draft did
not include a detailed description of a concrete piece of machinery.
As Joseph Bramah would polemically comment in 1796, the effect of lessening the
consumption of steam: “did not depend on nothing but the principles of proportion,
and organization of the Engine; and that it  might and ought to have been fully
described in words, by drawings and references in the usual way.”22
Watt's elusiveness could be interpreted as the attempt to enlarge the umbrella of
patent  protection.  But  it  could  also  be  motivated  by  the  decision  to  balance
institutional protection, which implied the disclosure of the new contrivance, with
secrecy and discretion. Moreover, elusiveness was also prompted by the timing of
his submission. In fact, much to Bramah's disdain, an organized machine was not
available yet to be accurately described, and this exposed Watt to the accusation of
having  patented  the  future.  The  Scottish  inventor,  argues  Bramah,  was  either
reluctant to disclose the details of his contrivance, or simply unable to provide a
complete description at the moment he took out his patent: “Whether they could
not,  or  would not  describe this  Engine,  is  then the question.”  Should the  first
hypothesis have been true, then: “Mr. Watt took his patent not for what he had
invented, but for what he might invent in the future.”23
21 The document is included in Robinson and Musson, 1969, p. 56.
22 “A letter to the Rt.  Hon. Sir  James Eyre,  Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas;  on the
subject of the cause Boulton and Watt versus Hornblower and Maberley: for infringement on
Mr. Watt's Patent of an Improvement on the Steam Engine. By Joseph Bramah. Engineer.” Ibid.,
p. 207.
23 Ibid. The problem of the right timing for registering a patent would have been perduring, and
reveals how difficult it was to determine the exact moment when a new idea was developed
sufficiently  to  be  secured.  Therefore,  for  example,  John  Taylor's  testimony  to  the Select
Committee  on  the  Law  relative  to  Patents  for  Inventions on  8  May  1829,  indicates  an
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Before  filing  his  much-contested  specification,  Watt  inquired  of  his  scientific
friends, William Small and Matthew Boulton, as to how much of his invention
should have been disclosed. Notably, both of them recommended discretion:
“Mr. Boulton and I have considered your paper, and think you should neither give
drawings nor descriptions of any particular machinery, (if such omissions would
be allowed at the office) but specify in the clearest manner you can, that you have
discovered some principles, and thought of new applications of others, by means
of both which  joined together,  you intend to  construct  steam engines of much
greater powers, and applicable to a much greater number of useful purposes than
any which hitherto have been constructed […] As to your principles, we think they
should be enunciated (to use an hard word) as generally as possible, to secure you
as effectually against piracy as the nature of your invention will allow.”24
 This  advice  was  taken  and  the  choice  led  to  lasting  consequences  that  Watt
himself, and his friends, could hardly foresee. 
William Small  had met Matthew Boulton,  a young and ambitious  industrialist,
through  a  common  American  friend:  Benjamin  Franklin.  Small  soon  became
Boulton's physician and introduced him to Watt in 1768. In 1762 Matthew Boulton
had established with his partner John Fothergill a successful ornamental metalware
underwritten sensitivity to this highly speculative issue: “Is not the first idea of an invention
often very imperfect? - Certainly.
Does it not often happen that the inventor makes great alterations and improvements in his
invention, between the time of his making application for his patent, and that of enrolling his
specification? - Yes.
Supposing  between  the  time  of  his  taking  out  his  patent  and  the  period  for  enrolling  his
specification, he should discover very considerable improvements in his invention, what course
is he obliged to take? - The title must include the whole invention; as the law now stands, every
inventor tries to frame a title that will include every thing relative to his invention, and may, in
fact, make it rather a delusive title; for instance, a person taking out a patent for oil gas, may
call  it  a  patent for  a better  mode of  lighting,  or something else taking in the whole;  or  an
improvement in steam engines may have been put under the title of certain improvements in
machinery; and so on, by using very general words, taking the most ample form, so that the
invention may be clearly comprehended without pointing out particulars.” Taylor's interesting
testimony touches upon several other old issues, such a the opportunity to set up a commission
of  experts  to  evaluate  the  sufficiency  of  specifications  and  the  problem of  how to  protect
inventors during their preliminary public experiments which were essential to convert an early
idea into a working machine.  Report from the Committee on the Law relative to Patents for
Inventions, ordered by the House of Commons, 12 June 1829, p. 7.
24 W. Small to J. Watt, 7 February 1769, in Robinson and Musson, 1969, p. 54.
13
factory in Soho, about two miles north to Birmingham, on the Wolverhampton
road.
Small, Boulton and Erasmus Darwin, a physician from Lichfield and grand-father
of  Charles  Darwin,  constituted  the  core  of  one  of  the  most  studied  scientific
societies of the 18th century: the Lunar Society of Birmingham. 
This extraordinary coterie of entrepreneurs, natural philosophers and practitioners
included personalities such as Watt, Joseph Priestley,  James Keir, Thomas Day,
Richard  Lovell  Edgeworth,  John  Whitehurst,  William  Withering  and  Josiah
Wedgwood. Given the iconic importance of the manufacturers who took part in
this  scientific  society,  and the  influence  of  its  natural  philosophers,  the  Lunar
Society  of  Birmingham  has  gained  historiographical  preeminence  among  the
students of the Industrial Revolution.25
With the lunarticks, as the members of this club cheerfully called each other, Watt
established  a  network  of  solid  friendships,  scientific  correspondence  and
commercial cooperation.
When Watt visited Boulton's Soho premises in 1768, six years after its foundation,
he could not but be entranced. During that period the Scottish inventor was still
striving to realize his first large-scale engine, which would be erected at Kinneil
the  following  year.  Boulton  would  replace  Watt's  first  business  partner,  John
Roebuck, when the latter went bankrupt. The year 1775 marked the beginning of
this legendary partnership. Boulton acquired a share of Watt's rights as patentee, as
25 Robert  E.  Schofield  claimed  that:  “In  the  long  run,  the  most  adequate  evaluation  of  the
achievement of the Lunar Society is to be made by setting them against the development of the
Industrial Revolution.” Robert Schofield, The Lunar Society of Birmingham. A social history of
provincial science and industry in eighteenth-century Britain, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963,
p. 438.
Francis  Klingender  would later  argue that  the  Lunar  Society played the  role of  “a  kind of
scientific  general  staff  for  the  Industrial  Revolution.”  Francis  D.  Klingender,  Art  and  the
Industrial Revolution, 1968, p. 34.
More recently Joel Mokyr stressed the role of the Birmingham group as a kind of market of
knowledge in which scientific research and technical expertise was exchanged, sold, and bought
thanks to the patronage of pioneer industrialists: “Within the Lunar Society and other societies,
a main objective was the creation of channels through which existing knowledge could flow to
those who were best situated to use it productively.” Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy. An
economic history of Britain 1700-1850, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 171.
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a compensation for Roebuck's indebtedness to him. However, as six years of the
14 for which the patent was originally issued had already elapsed, before investing
on the engine Boulton wanted to obtain an extension of their exclusive privileges.
Therefore, in the beginning of 1775 Watt paid a visit to his patent agent in London,
Mr.  Wedderburn,  to  confer  with  him  about  the  best  means  of  extending  his
exclusive rights. They finally agreed to apply to Parliament for an Act. According
to Smiles this decision was motivated by merely economic considerations, a new
patent costing 20l. more than an Act.26
Watt petitioned Parliament in February 1775, and shortly after a Select Committee
was summoned to consider the matter. Many of the commissioners were Boulton's
friends.27 The petition encountered stern opposition from the Cornish adventurers,
represented in Parliament by Edmund Burke, who in April 1775 wrote to Robert
Smith,  Master  of  Merchants'  Hall  in  Bristol:  “I  enclose you a printed  Bill  for
Securing to Mr Watt an exclusive property in his Fire Engine for a Term of Years.
This Bill at its first appearance seemed to me very exceptionable. A Mr Blakey
petitioned against  it,  and  was to  be  heard  by  Counsel  on the  Bill;  but  having
suddenly withdrawn his petition, the Bill got a step forward, almost unknown to
most of the house, and particularly to the Members of the Mine Counties, on our
making  a  strong  representation  to  those  concerned  in  carrying  it  on,  he  has
consented to my amendments which you see in Manuscript; which amendments
remove  most  of  my  Objections.  But  as  others  may  remain,  I  wish  to  have  it
communicated to such Gentlemen in Bristol as may be affected and to know their
sentiments as soon as possible.”28
After a draining political contest, in May 1775 an Act extended Watt's 1769 patent
until 1800. Thus, finally relieved by this success, on 8 May 1775 Watt wrote to his
father: “After a series of various and violent Oppositions I have at last got an Act
of Parliament vesting the property of my new Fire engines in me and my Assigns,
26 Smiles,  2007,  p.  186;  Eric  Robinson,  “Matthew  Boulton  and  the  Art  of  Parliamentary
Lobbying”, The Historical Journal, 7:2 (1964), 209-229, p. 214.
27 Marsden, 2002, p. 96.
28 Robinson, 1964, pp. 214-215.
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though out Great Britain and the plantations for twenty five years to come, which I
hope will be very beneficial to me as there is already considerable demand for
them.”29
Almost a year later Boulton rejoiced: “the well doing of Willey Engine [erected for
John Wilkinson's blast-furnaces at New Willey, Staffordshire] as I now hope and
flatter my self that we are at the Eve of a fortune.”30
However, it was only in 1778 that the Birmingham partners could finally rely upon
an engine to their satisfaction, although Watt kept improving it,  taking out five
more patents between 1780 and 1785. 
Such contrivances included the double-acting engine, the sun-and-planet gear, the
parallel  motion and the 'governor',  a device meant  to regulate and stabilize the
engine's strokes. Despite his expertise in issues concerning patent law and whilst
he  and  his  partner  had  won  the  1775  parliamentary  confrontation,  Watt  and
Boulton had to defend their intellectual property rights until shortly before their
expiration.
Towards the end of 1780, the new generation of Cornish miners was prone to
avoiding the burden of the royalties due to Boulton & Watt. In Dickinson's words,
this  widespread  reluctance  occasioned,  in  Dickinson's  words,  a  “magnificent
outburst” on Watt's part: “They charge us with establishing a monopoly, but if a
monopoly, it is one by means of which their mines are made more productive than
ever  they  were  before.  Have  we  not  given  over  to  them  two-thirds  of  the
advantages derivable from its use in the saving of fuel, and reserved only one-third
to ourselves, though even that has been further reduced to meet the pressure of the
times? They say it is inconvenient for the mining interest to be burdened with the
payment of engine dues; just as it is inconvenient for the person who wishes to get
at my purse that I should keep my breeches pocket buttoned. It is doubtless also
very inconvenient for the man who wishes to get a squire's land that there should
29 J. Watt to his father, 8 May 1775, Robinson and Musson, 1968, p. 80.
Robinson defined the extension of Watt's patent as: “the most important single event in the
Industrial Revolution”. Robinson, 1964, p. 209.
30 M. Boulton to J. Watt, March 1776, Robinson and Musson, 1968, p. 81.
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be a law tying it up by an entail. Yet the squire's land has not been so much of his
own making as the condensing engine has been of mine. He has only passively
inherited his property, while the invention has been the product of my own active
labour and of God knows how much anguish of mind and body...Why don't they
petition  Parliament  to  take  Sir  Francis  Bassett's  mines  from  him?  He
acknowledges that he has derived great profits from using our engines, which is
more than we can say of our invention; for it appears by our books that Cornwall
has hitherto eaten up all the profits we have drawn from it, as well as all that we
have got from other places, and a good sum of our own money into the bargain.
We  have  no  power  to  compel  anybody  to  erect  our  engines.  What  then  will
Parliament say to any man who comes there to complain of a grievance he can
avoid?”31
This was only the beginning of a long contest over Watt's privileges as patentee,
which culminated in the trials of, first, Edward Bull and later Jabez Hornblower
later. The case against the latter proved particularly uncertain, and was only settled
at the King's Bench, in 1799. Marsden estimates that legal costs amounted to over
£6000.  
When Boulton and Watt decided to take legal action and give a signal to their
many  plagiarists,  they  did  so  after  much  hesitation,  exhausted  by  what  they
considered a continuous infringement of their intellectual property. Moreover, in
1779 Watt was convinced that his first idea of resorting to the crank to inaugurate
the  first  rotative  engines  had  leaked  to  James  Pickard,  probably  through  an
incautious worker. However, there is no evidence that Watt himself would have
patented the crank, as he believed it was not patentable and probably he did not
think it effective. Yet the Scottish inventor became furious when he discovered that
he could not use that gear because Pickard, had already taken out a patent.32 On
this occasion Watt chose not to allow any collaboration with Pickard and preferred
instead to circumvent the latter's exclusive rights by means of the so called sun-
31 31 October 1780, reported in Dickinson, 1936, p. 121. My italics.
32 Ibid., pp. 125-127.
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and-planet gear.  Holding a patent, however,  was not automatically sufficient to
ensure  property  rights  over  an  invention,  if  one  did  not  have  the  necessary
readiness to defend it. Trials were expensive and uncertain, but they also had a
scaremongering  effect  in  keeping at  bay  the  “tribe  of  pirates”.33 Writing  about
Hornblower and his business partner Maberley in March 1796, Watt would state:
“The rascals seem to have been going on as if the patents were their own […] We
have tried every lenient means with them in vain and since the fear of God has no
effect upon them, we must try what the fear of the devil can do.”34 
Until the very end of the trial at the King's Bench, the pivotal objection to Watt's
monopoly fundamentally echoed Bramah's criticisms, that is the specification of
1769 was flawed by the fact that it described only approximately a method, rather
than an organized device. Hence, in his case for the plaintiffs in error Serjeant-at-
Law Le Blanc, counsel of Hornblower and Maberley claimed that: “ if he [Watt]
had waited till he had brought to some degree of perfection his invention – of
lessening the consumption of steam and fuel in Fire Engines till he had formed his
Machine he would then have put the public in possession not of those mechanical
principles but of those pieces of mechanism by which this method of lessening the
consumption of steam and fuel in Fire Engines was to be carried into effect – any
person  would  then  have  had  an  opportunity  of  purchasing  that  which  is  the
invention and afterwards they might have employed their inventive faculties in
making an additional improvement upon that which he had so given to the public –
but in taking his Patent in the manner he has done for a method of lessening the
consumption of steam and fuel in Fire Engines and giving to the public nothing
more than the  principles  in  which his  method consists  he takes  to  himself  the
monopoly of the whole of the method without giving any particular mechanical
construction by which that method is to be carried into practical effect and by that
means no person can improve hereafter upon that method without being guilty of
an infringement of his Patent.” “To have the sole property secured by means of a
33 Marsden, 2002, p. 145.
34 Dickinson, 1936, p. 175.
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Patent”, Le Blanc argued, the invention “must have some corporeal existence at
the time.”35 In spite of this last strenuous defence by their counsel, Hornblower and
Maberley lost their case, as all the judges who formed the court decided for their
opponents. Jabez Hornblower surely paid dearly his infringement, as he spent two
years at the King's Bench prisons of Southwark, before leaving the British isles to
work in the continent.
Legal expenses apart, Watt's steam engine only actually became remunerative only
after 1787, that is more than ten years after the partnership was born. On the other
hand, the Birmingham partners retained a considerable share of market. Marsden
points out that the Birmingham firm produced about 30% of all the steam engines
made in Britain between 1775 and 1800. In fact, the two partners had  to turn a
niche  product  into a  source  of  factory  power  which  could be  applied  to  most
branches of industry36 For this to occur, some innovations from the 1780s were
fundamental,  the  sun-and-planet  gear  made  it  possible  to  convert  the  vertical
movement  of  the  piston  into  the  rotation  of  the  wheel,  thereby  extending  the
market of the engine to the textile industry. The earliest rotative engine was built in
June 1785 for a cotton mill in Nottinghamshire. To promote the diffusion of their
engines Boulton and Watt  also built  their  own mill  in London.  They named it
Albion Mill. It was situated next to the Thames, at the foot of Blackfriars bridge.
Its construction took place in 1786, under John Rennie's supervision. Rennie, who
had worked for Boulton&Watt for two years, would later be appointed as one of its
managers.
With its 50-horsepower, the mill double-engine rapidly became as sort of tourist
attraction. But its existence was short-lived. On 3 March 1791 the mill was burnt
down.  Erasmus Darwin,  who had sung the  praises  of  this  fascinating piece of
machinery in his  Botanic Garden (1791), had to update his  poem with a bitter
footnote: “The Albion Mill is no more; it is supposed to have been set on fire by
35 “Hornblower  v.  Boulton  &  Watt,  Argument  in  the  King's  Bench  25th January  1799,
of Serj. Le Blanc and Judgement of the Court”, B. R. L. MS 3219/4/227/18. My italics.
36 Marsden, 2002, p. 178.
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interested or malicious incendiaries, and is burnt to the ground. Whence London
has lost the credit and advantage of possessing the most powerful machine in the
world!”37 
Apparently, the Albion Mill had attracted the antipathy of those who believed that
steam-powered mills would exacerbate technological unemployment: “It seems the
millers are determined to be masters of us and the public. Putting a stop to the fire-
engine mills because they come into competition with water-mills, is as absurd as
stopping  navigable  canals  would  be  because  they  interfere  with  farmers  and
waggoners. The argument also applies to wind and tide mills or any other means
whereby corn can be ground. So all machines should be stopped whereby men's
labour is saved, because it might be argued that men were thereby deprived of a
livelihood. Carry out the argument and we must annihilate water-mills themselves,
and thus go back again to the grinding of corn by hand labour!”38 
While engaged in a fierce defence of their commercial interests, Watt and Boulton
were no less active within their coeval philosophical community. 
 David Philip Miller has recently reassessed Watt's  contribution to 18th century
natural  philosophy,  particularly  chemistry,  showing why Watt's  reputation  as  a
chemist had been overshadowed by the early 20th century by his more consolidated
characterization as engineer and craftsman. One of the reasons for Watt's dismissal
from  the  pantheon  of  natural  philosophy  was  his  adherence  to  the  phlogistic
theory, which would later lose  credibility in favour of Lavoisier's paradigm and
redefinition  of  'oxygen'.  Moreover,  the  1820s  controversy  between  those  who
supported Watt's priority in the discovery of the composition of water and those
who defended the merits of Cavendish would crucially reward the latter. As Miller
points out: “the campaign that the Watt camp mounted […] and in particular the
recontextualization  of  Watt's  chemistry  that  it  elicited  from  opponents  of  his
claims, were eventually to prove fatal to Watt's chemical reputation. The 'archaic'
37 Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden, Part I, J. Johnson, London, 1799, p. 292. See also James
C. McKusick, Green Writing, Romanticism and Ecology, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010.
38 M. Boulton to Matthews, 30 April 1784, in Smiles, 2007, p. 355.
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chemistry thus revealed could not, of course, in all its deficiencies be granted any
significant role in Watt's real achievements.”39
Nevertheless, argues Miller, even Watt's engine ought to be seen as a  chemical
device.40 Watt's  chemical  credentials  were  recognized  by  Humphry  Davy  and
Thomas Hodgskin, who pointed out that: “Mr. Watt was not only a mechanic, he
was also a chemist; and we are proud of the opportunity to hold up the honours
bestowed to him, as an encouragement to our youthful readers. As was happily
explained at the Meeting by Sir Humphrey Davy, Mr. Watt's 'Discoveries were not
owing to chance, but were founded on delicate and refined experiments connected
with the discoveries as to heat, of Dr. Black. He was equally distinguished (he
said) as a natural philosopher and a chemist; his first important discoveries were
made  in  chemistry;  and  his  first  invention  was  an  application  of  chemical
principles  to  steam-engines.  His  great  mechanical  improvements  in  them only
began at a later period. In 1769, he took out a patent for lessening the consumption
of fuel in steam engines; and it  was not till  1780 that  he found the method of
applying the movement of the pistons in straight lines to wheels and mill work.”41
Testimony for Watt's early reputation as a natural philosopher is also borne by a
series of fellowships and acknowledgements in life. In 1784 he was elected fellow
of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and a year later also of the Royal Society of
London. In 1787 he became a member of the Batavian Society for Experimental
Philosophy and two years later joined the Smeatonian Society of Civil Engineers.
He was also made honorary Doctor of Laws by the University of Glasgow and
Foreign Associate to the French Academy. 
Scientific investigation went on in the 1790s, when both Boulton and Watt began
to ease off from their business affairs and to prepare the generational transition.
After 1800, their firm passed into their sons' hands - Matthew Robinson Boulton
and James Watt Jr -, with their respective sons James and Gregory. Their loyal
39 David P. Miller, James Watt, Chemist: Understanding the Origins of the Steam Age, Pickering
& Chatto, London, 2009, p. 52.
40 Ibid., p. 9.
41 Reported in Ibid., p. 35.
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employee, William Murdock, the accredited inventor of gas-light, soon became a
partner and the firm grew prosperous.
James Watt  died on 25 August  1819, at  the age of 83, ten years later than his
business  partner  and  friend  Matthew  Boulton. Both  of  them  were  buried  in
Handsworth Parish Church.
James Watt and the problem of intellectual appropriation
In  his  1972 article  on  James  Watt  and  patent  law,  Eric  Robinson  stresses  the
renewed interest in the economic effects of the patent system. Notwithstanding this
revived scholarly attention, he claims, students still failed to properly investigate
the historical development of the British patent system during the late 18th century.
Watt's patent for the separate condenser seemed to Robinson a good case-study
through which to understand more about a stage in history when patent law may
have borne “crucial importance” for technological and economic progress.42 After
all, according to Robinson, the Scottish innovator of the steam engine could be
considered “probably the best-informed authority of his time on the patent law”
and “the most imaginative and creative source of ideas” about the ways patents
should be reconsidered and the patent system reformed.43 Watt's views on patent
law are  still  significant,  as  his  proposals  seem to  “anticipate and  even  extend
beyond most of the reforms that have taken place in the English law of patents
until the present day.”44 Thus Robinson highlights both the historical importance of
Watt's patent and its topicality for the contemporary debate.
Since 1972, the gap in our knowledge of the 18th  century patent system has been
substantially  filled by a number of  scholars,  including Dutton (1984),  McLeod
42 Eric Robinson, “James Watt and the law of patents”, Technology and Culture,  Vol. 13, No. 2
(1972), 115-139, p. 115.
43 Ibid., 118.
44 Ibid., My italics.
22
(1988), Van Dulken (1999), Mokyr (2008a, 2008b, 2009), and Bottomley. (2014).45
On the other hand, James Watt's patent for the separate condenser has retained a
central role in our understanding of the history of the steam revolution, of Watt's
own  life-story,  and  remains  a  paradigmatic  example  of  how  patents  could
influence technological progress and economic growth. Recent references to James
Watt's patents have been accordingly diverse in aims and perspectives.
 As we shall see, the Watt Affair has crossed the boundaries of History of Science
and  recently  fuelled  a  lively  exchange  between  economists,  following  the
publication of a book by the economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine. In
Against Intellectual Monopoly, James Watt is portrayed as a stereotype rent-seeker,
his success resting more upon his astute exploitation of the legal system, and broad
network of patrons, than upon superior innovation.46 
Moreover,  the  authors  argue:  “The  monopoly  over  the  'separate  condenser,'  a
useful innovation, blocked the development of another equally useful innovation,
the  'compound engine',  thereby retarding economic growth.  This retardation of
innovation is  a  classical  case  of what  we shall  refer  to as intellectual-property
inefficiency.”47
I shall take the opportunity given by the publication of this book to focus more
45 Harold I. Dutton,  The patent system and inventive activity during the Industrial Revolution,
1750-1852, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984; Christine McLeod,  Inventing the
Industrial  Revolution;  the  English  patent  system,  1660-1800,  Cambridge  University  Press,
Cambridge, 1988; Stephen Van Dulken,  British patents of invention, 1617-1977: a guide for
researchers, British Library, 1999; Christopher May, “Antecedents to intellectual property: the
European pre-history of the ownership of knowledge”, History of Technology, 24 (2002), 1-20;
Joel Mokyr, “The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution” in Elhanan Helpman (ed.),
Institutions and Economic Performance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008; Joel
Mokyr, “Intellectual property rights, the Industrial Revolution, and the beginnings of modern
economic growth”, American Economic Review; Papers & Proceedings, 99:2, 2009, 349-355;
Joel  Mokyr,  The  Enlightened  Economy.  An  Economic  History  of  Britain  1700-1850,  Yale
University  Press,  2012,  Sean  Bottomley,  The  British  patent  system  during  the  Industrial
Revolution 1700-1852, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
46 Michele  Boldrin,  David  Levine,  Against  Intellectual  Property,  Cambridge University  Press,
Cambridge, 2010 [2006], p. 3. 
47 Ibid.,  p.  4.  Accordingly,  many  historians  have  argued  that  Watt's  success  in  defending  his
monopoly  hindered  technological  innovation.  See  for  example  Marsden,  pp.  138-141  and
Jennifer  Tann.  “Mr Hornblower  and His  Crew: Watt  Engine Pirates  at  the  End of  the 18 th
Century”, Read at the Science Museum, London, on 9 January 1980. 
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upon Watt's defence of his rights as patentee, through the lens of the contemporary
debate on patents and Intellectual Property rights.
I will  not,  however,  draw conclusions about the merits of Watt's much-debated
monopoly. In fact, I claim that any stance in this debate relies chiefly upon the
acceptance of one of the metaphysical paradigms I wish to expose. Understanding
Watt's eventful struggle over patents might also be a way to shed light upon the
manner  in  which  we  act  and  speak  of  intellectual  property  today.
It is significant that the authors decided to begin a programmatic book, with their
(controversial) exposition of the Watt case. Interestingly, the first chapter, entirely
focused upon Watt,  has  been the  pivot  of  a  continued diatribe  with  two other
libertarian economists, George Selgin and John Turner.48 
This prolonged exchange between the economists  also indicates  the  rift  within
libertarianism  over  the  benefits  of  patents  and  the  legitimacy  of  Intellectual
Property at large. This debate revolved around an old controversy around whether
Watt's 1769 patent was detrimental to economic progress or not. Watt is portrayed
as an emblematic patentee, while his patent for the separate condenser embodies
the  very  essence  of  modern  intellectual  monopolies.  Therefore,  broader
considerations on patents,  on their  legitimacy, and more specifically,  given the
utilitarian context of this debate, on their economic effects, lay behind Boldrin and
Levine's historical reassessment of Watt's case.
Commenting  on  Boldrin  and  Levine's  book,  Selgin  and  Turner  contested  the
central arguments contained in  Against intellectual monopoly, through a detailed
criticism of the  chapter on Watt.
That is to say, if one fails to understand the economy of Watt's patent, they draw
faulty conclusions about the whole economy of the patent system.
48 George Selgin, John Turner, “James Watt as intellectual monopolist: comment on Boldrin and
Levine”, International Economic Review, 47:4 (2006), 1341-1348; George Selgin, John Turner,
“Watt, Again? Boldrin and Levine still exaggerate the adverse effect of patents on the progress
of steam power”. Prepared for the Center for Law, Innovation & Economic Growth Conference
on “The Economics and Law of Innovation”, Washington, University School of Law, 2-3 April,
2009, and George Selgin, John Turner,  “Strong steam, weak patents, or,  the myth of Watt's
innovation-blocking monopoly, exploded”, Journal of Law and Economics, 54 (2011), 841-861.
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Thus  Selgin  and  Turner,  in  their  critique  of  the  second  edition  of  Against
Intellectual Property, concluded: “Boldrin and Levine’s new telling of Watt’s story
is hardly more persuasive than their original version. Although they have corrected
some  of  their  earlier  errors,  their  account  remains  inaccurate  and  one-sided.”
Consequently, their study of Watt and his patent should not be taken “as a source
of  reliable  inferences  concerning  the  general  merits  and  shortcomings  of  the
patent system.”49
In their 2010 paper, Selgin and Turner declared their intention: “to make a small
contribution  to  the  larger  debate  concerning  the  desirability  of  patents”,  by
showing that Watt's patent did not act as a break in the development of superior
technology.50 Ergo, what seems clear is that James Watt's entrepreneurial story and
his relationship with patent law is still a crucial case-study with which to draw
some parallels between the past and the present. 
Moreover,  the great  majority of the contemporary sources cited in this chapter
conceive the justification of intellectual property rights (or critique thereof) as a
threefold enterprise, grounded on natural law arguments, utilitarian theories, and
(Hegelian) theories  of personality.  Therefore,  two of the three traditions  which
have  shaped  the  arguments  for  and  against  intellectual  property  draw  from
philosophies which were already well rooted in the 18th century cultural scene.
Watt was well-acquainted with Adam Smith,51 thanks to their common attendance
at the “Anderston Club”, a learned informal society which includes:  “Professor
Millar. Dr. Robert Simpson, the mathematician, Dr. Adam Smith, Dr. Black, and
Dr. Cullen”. As Watt would later recall: “Our conversations then, besides the usual
subjects with young men, turned principally on literary topics,  religion,  belles-
lettres, &c.; and to those conversations my mind owed its first bias toward such
subjects,  I  never having attended a college,  and being then but  a  mechanic”.52
49 Selgin and Turner, 2011, p. 843.
50 Ibid.
51 Jenny Uglow,  The Lunar men. The friends who made the future,  Faber and Faber,  London,
2002, p. 33.
52 Robert E. Schofield,  The Lunar Society of Birmingham. A social history of provincial Science
and Industry in eighteenth-century England, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 62
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Sharing such learned company, therefore, Watt enjoyed the opportunity of more
abstract and “literary” exchanges with some members of the Glasgow intellectual
elite.  Adam  Smith  proposed  a  proto-utilitarian  justification  of  patents-related
privileges as the price that the public had to pay to foster innovation and encourage
the  disclosure  of  new  know-how.53 In  any  case,  looking  at  Watt  against  the
theoretical  background  of  utilitarian  and  natural-law  arguments  on  intellectual
property is a way of placing him in the philosophical context of his times. 
This section will focus particularly upon the philosophical assumptions and
argumentative  styles  which  underpin  James  Watt's  defence  of  his  rights  as
patentee. I shall argue that Watt's ideas about patents can be read as an interplay
between utilitarian rhetoric and natural law principles. These two argumentative
styles, and a combination thereof, represent the philosophical context for much of
the  current  debate  over  I.P.  rights,  particularly  within54 libertarianism.  Hence  I
shall  identify  a  series  of  topoi and  arguments  in  Watt's  claims which  are  still
present in contemporary debate.
I argue that his discussion opens up another dimension of Watt's significance in
that debate. Watt's relevance derives not only from his heroic role in the narrative
of  the  Industrial  Revolution,55 from his  patent,  arguably the  most  debated  and
discussed  in  history,56 but  also  from  the  modern  flair  of  his  discourse  on
intellectual property.
Insofar as it is possible for an 18th century inventor, Watt's discourse about patents
53 Dutton, 1984, p. 19. Witztum and Young have critically re-assessed the relationship between
Smith and Utilitarianism, questioning Smith's adherence on this tradition, in Amos Witzum ad
Jeffrey T. Young, “Utilitarianism and the role of utility in Adam Smith”, European Journal of
the History of Economic Thought, 4:20 (2013), 542-602.
54 See  Stephan  Kinsella,  “Against  intellectual  property”, Journal  of  Libertarian  Studies,  15:2
(2001), 1-53, 8-19; Peter S. Menell, “Intellectual property and the property rights movement”,
Research and Development, 2007, 36-43, pp. 37-39.
55 On  the  construction  of  James  Watt's  scientific  reputation  in  the  nineteenth  century,  see:
Marsden,  2002,  pp.  183-201;  Clare  Pettitt,  Patent  inventions.  Intellectual  Property and the
Victorian novel,  Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 9; Christine McLeod,  Heroes of
Invention: technology, liberalism and British identity, 1750-1914, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2007, pp. 91-153, and Miller, 2009, pp. 11-59.
56 Robinson,  1972; David.  P. Miller,  “Watt in court:  Specifying steam engines and classifying
engineers in the patent trials of the 1790s”, History of Technology, 27 (2006), 43-76, p. 43.
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crucially foresees many of the principles contemporary scholars still use to morally
justify intangible properties.
Before  raising  my  main  topic,  however,  I  shall  address  a  possible  issue  of
anachronism. Is it anachronistic to approach some 18th century texts with reference
to the concept of Intellectual Property? With regard to this problem, it should be
noted  that  several  recent  works  have  already  set  relevant  antecedents.  Recent
research,  from the standpoint of different disciplines, indicates the loosening of
this methodological cliché. For example, in Enlightened Economy Mokyr mentions
“intellectual property” twelve times, twice while analysing critically some recent
works, and ten times with regard to facts, authors, institutions, events situated in
the 18th century. Hence, when discussing Smith's ideas about patents, Mokyr states
that:  “In  his  Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,  Adam  Smith  argued  that  intellectual
property rights were 'actually real rights' and admitted that the patent system was
the one monopoly (or privilege as he called it) he could live with, because it left
the decision on the merit of an invention to the market rather than to officials”.57
Similarly, in her study of the British patent system, McLeod argues that Smith's
justification  of  patents  indicates  that  “this  “new concern  for  invention  and  its
appropriate  reward”  was  contemporary,  and  often  informing  “a  novel
conceptualization of it as 'intellectual property'.”58
 In her study of intellectual property in the Victorian novel, Clare Pettitt argues
that: “the eighteenth century continued to supply the vocabulary for discussions of
intellectual  property in  the  nineteenth century”.59 Thus Pettitt  suggests an ideal
continuity in the way of thinking and speaking about intellectual property between
the  eighteenth  and  the  nineteenth  century.  Furthermore,  Pottage  and  Sherman
define the “prehistory of intellectual property” as “the history of a period in which
literary and artistic productions were construed as material things rather than as the
embodiments  of  intangible  works”,  an  age  which,  according  to  the  authors,
57 Mokyr, 2009, p.1149 (digital edition, EPUB)
58 McLeod, 1988, p. 197.
59 Pettitt, 2004, p. 11.
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overlapped with Roman and Medieval history. Following Madero's study of the
tabula picta, Pottage and Sherman argue that the analysis of property rights carried
out  by  medieval lawyers  has  generated  a  material  reality:  “that  was  relatively
autonomous from reality as it was conventionally understood”60 
In his classic work on industrial espionage in the 18th century, Harris refers to Watt
as: “the owner of the outstanding  intellectual property of the age, the improved
steam engine”,61 while Pamela O. Long goes much further when she claims that
“although some of the  components  of  the  notion of  “intellectual  property” are
evident  in  antiquity,  the fully  developed concept  first  emerges in  the medieval
period around the 12th or 13th centuries.”62
No 18th century writer would ever write literally in terms of intellectual property
and yet several contemporary authors frequently read enlightenment debates on
patents or copyright as if the object of contention was  intellectual property. The
common  assumption  in  these  studies,  which  I  will  also  espouse,  is  simple:
concepts, facts, and problems do not coincide entirely with words. Therefore, it is
at least plausible to do history using contemporary language and whenever we do
so we mean to establish more or less tacit  analogies between the past  and the
present.
Nevertheless, whenever we use the term “intellectual property” we should bear in
mind that this expression originated in the 19th century and became widely used
only  during  the  1900s.  As  a  result  of  this  more  recent  coinage,  “intellectual
properties” have encompassed some types of intangible properties which did not
exist, or did not have any legal formalization, during Watt's time, such as industrial
design rights and trade secrets.
After introducing the topic and briefly discussing some recent critical literature, I
60 Brad Sherman and Alain Pottage, “On the prehistory of intellectual property”, Howe, Griffiths
(eds.)  Concepts  of  Property  in  Intellectual  Property  Law,  Cambridge  University  Press,
Cambridge, 2013 p. 13.
61 John R.  Harris, Industrial  Espionage and Technology  Transfer:  Britain  and France  in  the
Eighteenth century, Ashgate, 2000, p. 493.
62 Pamela  O.  Long,  “Invention,  Authorship,  'Intellectual  Property',  and  the  Origin  of  Patents:
Notes toward a Conceptual History, Technology and Culture, 32:4 (1991), 846-884, p. 848.
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will  propose  a  recollection  of  utilitarian  and  natural-law  instances  in  Watt's
rationalization  of  his  rights  as  patentee.  I  shall  finally  try  to  understand  what
makes  Watt's  defence  of  his  patents  a  relevant  case-study,  now also  from the
philosophical point  of  view,  for  the  contemporary  justification  of  intellectual
property. 
Watt's “old and   well tried friends”
As we have briefly anticipated, Watt's experiences with the patent system began in
1768, when he finally decided to take out a patent for the separate condenser. On
that occasion he went to Berwick-upon-Tweed in order to describe the nature of
his  invention  before  a  Master  in  Chancery.  That  was  the  beginning  of  an
unnerving, sluggish procedure which would bring him to London in August.
Watt's epistolary exchange with his wife intimates his low-spirits at the time: “I
beg that you will not make yourself uneasy, though things should not succeed to
your  wish.”63 Meanwhile,  his  business  partner,  John  Roebuck,  showed  less
comprehension and insisted more and more upon executing the invention as soon
as possible. In October Roebuck once again urged his melancholic partner: “You
are now letting the most active part of your life insensibly glide away. A day, a
moment,  ought  not  to  be lost.  And you should  not  suffer  your  thoughts to  be
diverted by any other object, or even improvement of this, but only the speediest
and most effectual manner of executing an engine of a proper size, according to
your present ideas.”64
His  first  patent  was obtained on 5 January 1769,  granting to  the  patentee,  the
exclusive  right  to  use,  make,  and  sell  a  “New  Method  of  Lessening  the
Consumption of Steam and Fuel in Fire Engines”.
63 Reported in Smiles, 2007, p. 133.
64 Ibid.
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The  principle of action or  method of the separate condenser now had an owner,
and became a property in the form of an exclusive monopoly on the invention for
14 years.
 Watt  was now expected to  submit  a  specification,  the document by means of
which,  according  to  Marsden,  he  “greedily  captured  practically  every  possible
steam engine with separate condenser.”65 Many years later, as reported by one of
his biographers, the Scottish inventor would refer to his specifications as his “old
and well-tried friends.”66
Miller draws attention to the way Watt and his lawyers defended his specification
from those who deemed it incomplete or inaccurate. In fact, the validity of the
1769 specification was the key-focus of the legal procedure undertaken by Watt
and Boulton against Bull, Hornblower and their respective partners.
Was  Watt's  specification  sufficiently  informative  to  enable  a  skilled
mechanic to reproduce his engine? The final verdict was for the plaintiff, that is:
Watt's specification was valid,  ergo Watt's property rights to his invention had to
be defended. The partners from Birmingham had fought a long court battle which
was to finish only around a year after the expiration of their patent, following the
final verdict of the King's Bench. Miller argues that the only way to understand the
judgement  at  the Court of Common Pleas in  1796 and the  final verdict  at  the
King's Bench is by looking at the effects of what he calls the “Patent Specifier's
Regress”. The author refers here to Harry Collins' sociology of calibration and to
his definition of the “Experimenter's regress”.67 According to Collins, whenever
there is a dispute over the existence of a phenomenon, we first need to define the
working experiment which could resolve the controversy.
However, for those who believe that the phenomenon does not exist, the working
65 Marsden, 2002, p. 80. 
66 James P. Muirhead,  The Life of James Watt: with Selections from his Correspondence, John
Murray, London, 1853, p. 314
67 See  Harry  M.  Collins,  Changing  Order:  Replication  and  Induction  in  Scientific  Practice,
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1985,  and  Harry  M.  Collins,  “A strong  confirmation  of  the
experimenter's regress”, Studies in history and philosophy of science part A, 25:3 (1994), 493-
503. 
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experiment will be that which proves its non-existence. Whereas if we assume that
the phenomenon exists, then the working experiment will be defined as that which
proves its existence.
For Collins, this vicious circle suggests that the solution of a controversy as such
will be found  outside a naturalistic perspective. It will be rather a “sociological
resolution” which implies a definition of new criteria for credibility.68
 Similarly, in the case of the trials over Watt's specification, the solution to the
question of its validity was “based in a contest over the classification of types of
patent and, second, competing hierarchies of expertise.”69
Anticipating this conclusion, Miller previously argued that the decision to join the
Royal Society taken by Watt and his friends at the Lunar Society of Birmingham,
including  his  business  partner  Matthew  Boulton,  can  be  seen  as  a  measure:
“connected  with real  and anticipated battles  concerning patents  and patent  law
reform.”70 The credentials “FRS”, it was understood, may have assisted Watt and
Boulton's credibility, since the most important scientific society in the kingdom
was a natural pool of authoritative, “impartial” testimony to the completeness of
his specification and the originality of his invention.71
Summing up, Miller demonstrates that the diatribe on the sufficiency of Watt's
specification was resolved through a redefinition of the terms of the problem, that
is: the question was not  whether the specification was per se complete, but rather
who  was  entitled  to  provide  the  expert  testimony.  Thus  the  definition  of  the
relevant  expertise  was  co-produced with  the  judgement  on  the  validity  of  this
document. In this respect, argues Miller, since specifications were written to be
understandable by skilled mechanics: “a key relation was that of skill – who, with
what skills,  was the patent written for; who, with what skills,  could realize the
68 Miller, 2006, p. 45.
69 Ibid.
70 David P. Miller, “The 'Usefulness' of natural philosophy: the Royal Society and the culture of
practical utility in the later eighteenth century”, The British Journal for the History of Science,
32:2 (1999), 185-201, p. 193.
71 Ibid., p. 196.
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invention from the specification?”72 Without doubt, the importance of testimony is
evident in Watt's own words. In a detailed document from 5 October 1796 we find,
scrupulously reported, some: “Considerations upon the measure most proper to be
adopted in the present state of affairs with Maberley”. The document is in Watt Jr's
hand and clearly organizes, into two columns, the pros and the cons of finding a
settlement rather than engaging in a new legal contest.
Towards the end of the “Arguments for a Trial”, we find: “3. The Respectability of
the  Witnesses we  have  to  adduce,  the  clearness  of  their  testimony  and  their
intelligence of the subject 4. […] We know their [Hornblower and Maberley's]
Witnesses who are either ignorant, interested or malicious. We can prove one or
other upon all of them. They will get no man of character to assist them. 5. It may
perhaps not be impossible to adduce proof of the combination by which Maberley
is supported, particularly if he goes to Cornwall.”73
Moreover, the role of testimony, and authoritative testimony in particular, could be
amplified  by the patent  system's inability  to  provide  a  certain  and stable legal
grammar. In 1795 Chief Justice Eyre, who was sitting on the case of Boulton and
Watt  v.  Bull,  voiced  this  lack  of  a  clear  legal  framework:  “patent  rights  are
nowhere that I can find accurately described in books.”74 Similarly James Watt
himself would lament: “the want of determinate laws, ascertaining the duties and
rights of Patentees”. If these laws were amended: “the number of lawsuits on these
subjects would be fewer, and Men of ingenuity wou'd be better employ'd in finding
out new arts than in endeavouring to deprive their Neighbor of the benefit of his
invention.”75 Jurisprudence concerning patents, on the other hand, could not but
grow proportional with the increasing number of letter patents which sprang up
72 Miller, 2006, p. 46.
73 Jennifer Tann (ed.), The selected papers of Boulton & Watt, Volume 1: The engine partnership,
1775-1825,  MIT Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 136-138. My italics.
74 William S. Holdsworth, A History of English law, Little and Brown, Boston, 1922-72, p. 425.
75  James Watt, Thoughts upon patents or exclusive privileges for new inventions, British reference
library MS 3147/2/30. The manuscript was printed in: Eric Robinson and Albert Musson (eds.),
James Watt and the Steam Revolution. A Documentary History, Augustus M. Kelley, New York,
1969, p. 213-228, p. 226.
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only between the end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century.76
Following  Miller's  achievements,  is  there  still  scope  to  study  James  Watt's
rhetoric77 concerning his rights as patentee?
Miller showed that the completeness of Watt's specification, which was a main
pivot in his legal struggle at the Court of Common Pleas, could not be ascertained
“naturalistically”.  As his specification was to be read by skilled mechanics,  the
question of whether the specification was sufficient or not had to be answered  by
those who were accredited as skilful testimonies.
Therefore, the recruitment of disinterested, authoritative witnesses played a key
role in the resolution of this controversy. Insofar as the  sociology behind Watt's
success in court is concerned, Miller's conclusions seem persuasive. Nevertheless,
Watt's defence of his rights, as well as the judgements concerning the validity of
his patents, were also interwoven with a broader narrative. 
As Miller himself states in his conclusion: “the willingness of judges and jury to
accept the arguments on specification made by Boulton and Watt's counsel […]
was undoubtedly conditioned by a perception of how justice might be done”.78
Watt's  discourse  had  some  agency  in  the  way  his  rights  were  perceived  and
reckoned as compatible with the public interest. As Boulton wrote: “We [he and
Watt] have  truth,  justice,  honour,  power and  Law of our side.”79 Indeed, all the
resource in Boulton and Watt's hands were inevitably combined and blended, each
being closely related or even embedded in the others. Therefore, power was never
brute domination, but needed to convert itself into a persuasive discourse. And the
76 Christine  McLeod  and  Alessandro  Nuvolari,  Patents  and  industrialisation.  An  historical
overview of the British case, 1624-1907, A report to the strategic advisory board for intellectual
property policy (SABIP), p. 10. 
77 I refer here to Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's definition of rhetoric:
“Rhetoric is  synonymous  with  meaning,  for  meaning  is  in  use  and  context,  not  words
themselves.  Knowledge  and  belief  are  products  of  persuasion,  which  seeks  to  make  the
arguable seem to be natural, to turn positions into premises – and it is rhetoric's responsibility
to reveal these ideological operations.” My italics.
Patricia  Bizzell,  Bruce  Herzberg  (eds),  The  Rhetorical  Tradition:  Readings  from Classical
Times, St. Martin's, Bedford, 1990, p. 15.
78 Miller, 2006, p. 70. My italics.
79 Tann, 1981, p. 81.
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perception of justice to which Miller refers, must be grounded in some accepted
assumptions. I intend here to address Watt's well-documented effort to convert his
political  and  economic  power  into  a  meaningful  discourse,  drawing  upon
philosophical  styles  and contents  which  were  available  at  the  time and would
survive throughout modernity as recurring modes of I.P. rights' legitimation.
James Watt was deeply engaged in refining his strategies to defend his patents,
studying  and  collecting  information  about  antecedent  cases,  finally  arguing  in
favour  of  the  patentee's  right  in  general,  thereby  mobilizing  some abstractions
from  his  personal  interests  to  the  very  philosophical  principles  underpinning
property rights over inventions.
However,  probably  owing  to  the  absence  of  a  treatise  or  essay  specifically
dedicated to the origins of intellectual appropriation, contemporary historiography
seems to have disregarded the philosophical  contents and assumptions  that lay
behind Watt's defence of his rights.
But if Watt's rationalization of his rights as patentee mattered to some extent, as
Miller acknowledges,  there is  scope for a study of Watt's  discourse concerning
patents,  a  study which  is  meant  to  complement and  not replace  a  sociological
approach.80 Moreover,  unlike Miller in his  2006 article,  I  will  not  engage here
directly with the forensic rhetoric and strategy employed by Boulton and Watt's
counsels.  Rather,  I  will  analyse  a  renowned  first-hand  sample  of  Watt's  own
rationalization and justification of his rights as patentee.
After a brief historical contextualization of the pivotal manuscript for my position,
I will deal with some of the broader arguments which shaped Watt's rhetoric on
intellectual property and will look into some examples of the success that some of
his general positions enjoy in the contemporary debate. 
80 See Gross, 2006, Ch. 11, “Compatible insights between Sociology and Rhetoric: priority as a
social norm”, p. 165.
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A lonely infant: staging an individualistic conception of inventive work
 
Following the introduction of the fustian tax during Pitt's administration in 1784,
British manufacturing interests began to organize themselves on a more permanent
basis.
Commercial  committees  were  set  up  in  several  industrial  towns  such  as
Manchester,  Sheffield,  Norwich,  and  Glasgow,  leading to  the  formation  of  the
General  Chamber  of  Manufactures.  The  main  purpose  of  the  Chamber  was  to
oppose  Pitt's  proposal  for  a  free-trade  with  Ireland.  During  the  1780s,  British
manufacturers reached a peak of organization, resulting in a growing capacity to
exert political pressure on Parliament.81 
In June 1785, a number of patentees from all over the country gathered in London
with the aim of petitioning the Irish Commercial Treaty. They feared that Pitt's Bill
would allow inventions patented before 1785 to be used and made in Ireland and
freely imported to be sold in England.82 
James Watt and other patentees sternly opposed the Irish Bill, while a letter was
sent out to many inventors urging the formation of a Patentees' Association. 
On 20th July 1785 Watt wrote to Matthews saying that the Patentees' Association
was meant to “unite in defence of their respective rights and to agree upon a mode
of application to Parliament for the better security of their invention”, in fact: “a
vast number of opulent manufacturers have agreed to use very beneficial patent
inventions and have subscribed large sums to attack the same by writ  of  Scire
facias.”83
The patentees, including Watt, were also prompted by the threat posed to Richard
Arkwright's  patent  by  Manchester  cotton  industrialists  who  had  gained  the
81 John Gascoigne, Science in the service of Empire. Joseph Banks, the British State and the uses
of Science in the Age of Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 75.
82 Dutton, 1984, p. 36; McLeod, 1988, p. 189, Ann Finer and George Savage (eds.), The Selected
Letters of Josiah Wedgwood, Cory, Adams and McKay, London, 1965, pp. 279-306.
83 J. Watt to Matthews, 20 July 1785, in Dutton, 1988, p. 36.
35
endorsement of the government.
During this strife, Watt began working on his own proposals to reform the patent
system. The most complete  document reporting the  guide-lines of these never-
realized  proposals  is  Thoughts  upon  Patents  or  exclusive  Privileges  for  new
Inventions. An earlier manuscript, entitled Heads of a Bill to explain and amend
the laws relative to Letters Patent and grants of privileges for new Inventions, was
read and annotated by Arkwright himself and elaborates the same proposals better
formalized in Thoughts upon Patents.
The latter is a significant document for an investigation on Watt's rationalization of
his own interests in patents. It also narrates more general philosophical thesis upon
the nature of invention.
 As we shall, at stake was a rather abstract and disembodied description of the
inventive work and its inherent risks, but also a general analysis of the character of
the “man of ingenuity”. This more discursive part is followed by a more overtly
utilitarian  justification  of  patents,  and finally,  a  list  of  proposals  to  amend the
patent system which are generally better known.
Thoughts  upon  Patents  was  conceived  as  a  normative  document,  aimed  at
reforming  the  patent  law  in  the  sense  of  strengthening  the  protection  of  the
patentees'  interests.  However,  this  manuscript  is  much  more  than  a  schematic
memorandum of the technical aspects to amend in the regulation of patents. It is
rather a narration on the social portrait of the inventors and on the very moral and
philosophical  grounds  of  their  claims.  The  positive  part,  which  gives  form to
Watt's proposals, is firmly rooted in a thick description of the inventive work and
the inventor's role in the social world. These anthropological and philosophical
axioms constitute the pillars of Watt's  discourse over patents and still offer the
theoretical reference system for the contemporary justification of I.P. rights within
libertarianism. 
The  introductory section  of  Thoughts  upon patents prepares  the  reader  for  the
proposals which constitute Watt's plan to reform the patent system. 
As stressed by Watt, the aim of the patent law is to: “stimulate ingenious men to
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improve the mechanical and chemical arts”.84
This incentive is a particular requirement because the “ingenious man” is said to
be  peculiarly  exposed  to  the  risk  of  impoverishment,  alienation,  and  social
exclusion: “few men of ingenuity make fortunes, or even can keep themselves on a
footing with the tradesman who follows the common tracks, and who possesses no
other merit than that of attending solely to his immediate interest without suffering
himself to think seriously whether the article he manufactures might, or might not
be Improved.”
“Men of good sense, and of limited fortunes” argues Watt, would not: “throw away
their time and their money to bring an art of invention to perfection, unless they
had a prospect of being amply repaid by making greater profits that they cou'd do
in the common course of their business.”85
In other words, patent protection is necessary to mobilize inventors from every
social class, opening up a career and, as we shall see, a whole style of life, which
would otherwise be risky at best. 
In this sense, the patent law is here presented as a potential social elevator. These
claims  are  not  extraneous  to  contemporary  literature.  In  1988  Hughes  would
deploy a similar argument,  stating that social  justice provides a stronger moral
justification for the enforcement of intangible property rights than for traditional
notions of property.86 In his view, if “inheritance and capital appreciation are only
additional characteristics of traditional notions of property that tend to stabilize
social stratification” and do not depend only upon merit: “intellectual property is
far more egalitarian”.87 Being a kind of property which always has a “built-in
sunset”,88 and  being  obtainable  by  anyone,  it  can:  “be  seen  as  a  reward,  an
empowering instrument, for the talented upstarts”.89
84 Thoughts upon Patents is reported unabridged in Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 214.
85 Ibid, my italics.
86 Justin Hughes, “The philosophy of intellectual  property”,  77  Georgetown Law Journal,  287
(1988), 296-314, p. 298.
87 Ibid, my italics.
88 Ibid, p. 305.
89 Ibid, p. 298.
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Nevertheless, for James Watt there were also further moral arguments to support
his demand for better protection of the inventor's work: “the man of ingenuity in
order to succeed in the object he takes in hand, must seclude himself from Society,
he must devote the whole powers of his mind to that one object”. “By seclusion
from the world”, argues Watt, “he becomes ignorant of its manners, and unable to
grapple with the more artful tradesman, who has applied the powers of his mind,
not to the improvement of the commodity he deals in, but to the means of buying
cheap and selling dear.”90
Both these “genres of men” have their  own utility in a social system based on
commerce, but one of them, the “ingenious man”, needs public protection more
than the other.
According to Watt, the inventor: “must be considered as an Infant,  who cannot
guard  his  own Rights,  and he  has  purchased his  inventions  with  his  time,  his
money and his ingenuity, and often also at the expense of his health and peace of
mind.” “Is it not just”, the inventor asks rhetorically: “that the exclusive privilege
of using them shou'd be secured to him in such manner as either to enable him to
dispose  of  his  privilege,  or  to  associate  himself  with  others  who  are  more
hackneyed in the ways of the World?”91
The inventor is described here as anthropologically different from the merchant,
but nevertheless he is an investor and if the state should encourage investment in
research and innovation, then the inventor's property must be protected.
Describing  the  inventor  as  an  “Infant”,  James  Watt  claims  a  sort  of  parental
protection from the State,  the  kind of  protection which,  as  Locke  put  it  while
distinguishing  the  paternal  power  from the  political: “parents  have  over  their
children,  to  govern  them for  the  children's  good,  till  they  come to  the  use  of
reason,  or  a  state  of  knowledge,  wherein  they  may  be  supposed  capable  to
understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their
country, they are to govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as
90 Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 215.
91 Ibid.
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several others, who live as freemen under that law.”92 The analogy used by Watt is,
therefore, useful to describe the inventor as a defenceless member of society who
needs to be assisted in the protection of his rights because he is not sufficiently
acquainted with the risks of commercial enterprise.
Although his historiography would focus amply upon his powerful connections
and  his  social  astuteness,93 Watt  contributes  here  to  the  myth  of  the  socially
isolated man of science.  In fact,  as  amply shown by Bargar,94 Robinson,95 and
Miller,96 by the time of Watt's petition to obtain an extension of his patent in 1775,
the partners from Birmingham could count on a solid network of patrons, relying
on their “many friends of great interest”97 and many acquaintances of their friends,
notably the lunarticks Erasmus Darwin and John Whitehurst.98   
Provided  that  Watt  himself  was  far  from  being  socially  isolated,  we  can
nevertheless try to understand the strategic origins of this rhetoric of isolation.
My  argument  is  that  this  initial  moment  of  his  narration  is  central  both
ideologically and as a rationalization of his contingent political strategy as patentee
during those tense summer months of 1785.
As we shall see, isolation was one of the narrative features which Watt used to
depict the inventive work. In fact, isolation as the mode of life of inventors was
associated  with  Watt's  conception  of  technological  progress  as  the  outcome of
individual achievements. In other words, the rhetorical instance of isolation and
seclusion from the world underpins his individualist metaphysics of the ingenious
work.
But before narrowing the focus on Watt's discourse,  I shall briefly describe the
92 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, printed for Whitmore and Fenn, Charing Cross, p.
336.
93 Robinson, 1972, p. 135.
94 D.  Bargar,  “Matthew  Boulton  and  the  Birmingham  petition  of  1775”,  William  and  Mary
Quarterly, 1956, 26-39.
95 Robinson, 1964; 1972, p. 127.
96 Miller, 1999, p. 192.
97 J. Watt Jr. to J. Watt, 8 May 1775, reported in Robinson, 1964, p. 224.
98 See Robinson, 1964 p. 224 ,for a list of those who were solicited for support during the 1775
lobbying manoeuvre.
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political context of Watt's proposal of an amendment to the patent law and the
reasons  why  he  considered  it  important  to  represent  the  inventors  as  isolated
defenceless individuals.
As we have seen, throughout the early 1780s, Arkwright encountered  persistent
opposition to  his  patent.  His  opponents  were  the  cotton  manufacturers,  led by
Robert Peel, one of the leading British textile industrialists of the time.
In 1785 Peel set up a campaign to bring Arkwright's patent down, relying upon the
support of the Committee for the Protection and Encouragement of Trade. As a
result,  many  inventors  felt  the  need  to  organize  themselves  and  prevent  the
“invasion” of their patents.
As usual, Watt was peculiarly fretful: “I have no doubt”, he wrote to Matthews,
“but we shall next be set up as a mark to be shot at and be ruined if possible.”99
In the same letter,  he argued that maybe: “A[rkwright]'s cause was determined
before it came into court, and by the same kind of law and testimony any patent
may be over-thrown. I had a suspicion at the time that A[rkwright] was given up as
a  sugar  plum by the  M[iniste]r  to  the  men  of  M[a]n[cheste]r  to  slacken  their
opposition to the Irish proposition.” He would conclude disconsolately: “you see
how much we are in the power of these rascals.”100
Nevertheless, what  is interesting here is the way Watt reacted to this frenzy of
associationism and lobbying manoeuvres.
On  the  one  hand,  he  took  side  with  Wedgwood  in  the  agitation,  led  by  the
Chamber of Manufacturers, against the Irish Bill proposal.
On that  occasion,  he  struggled alongside several  other  manufacturers,  some of
them holding one or more patents, some less interested or even averse to the patent
system.
Their  concerted  opposition  proved  fruitful  and  in  August  1785  Wedgwood
congratulated  James  Watt:  “and  every  friend  to  the  manufacturing  interest  of
G[rea]t  B[ritai]n upon the disposal  of the intended treaty with Ireland.  It  is an
99 Watt to Matthews, 20 July 1785, reported in Dutton, 1984, p. 37.
100Ibid.
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epoch in our commercial history, & a very flattering one to our infant institution of
the Chamber of Manufacturers, & I trust will open the eyes of those who have
hitherto kept them shut to the utility not to say necessity of such an establishment
& now is certainly the time in which its members & friends should by every means
in their power recommend it to the notice & protection of the public.”101
On the other hand, Watt seemingly had never been so positive about this new-born
organization.  Part  of his  disillusionment  is  manifest  in the tone of his  reply to
Wedgwood:  “I  am  favoured  with  yours  of  yesterday  &  being  a  good  deal
indisposed  could  not  go  out,  nor  do  I  know  that  anything  I  can  say  to  my
townsmen will  have  much effect.  I  shall  however  try  if  I  can get  one  or  two
leading ones to call a meeting, which if they had had any sense of public honour
ought to have been done before now.”102
This is only one of the several letters in which Watt writes of his manufacturer
colleagues in derogatory terms.
A month earlier, on 23 July, he had written to Wedgwood: “I received yours of the
21st, and have applied concerning the meeting and find that none can be called or
rather that none will be called, and as every body here seems so quiescent in the
measure I must follow their example and let them alone but I will write to our
friends at Coalbrookdale and apply to some few others on the subject of finance
but I do not expect that this Town will collectively do any thing handsome fair or
honest in that line; but if they do not I hope I shall never be foolish enough to be
their delegate again nor attend their meeting here, but when my own Interest leads
me, but this entre nous.”103
He would express similar feelings in other letters from July 1785, in particular
when he wrote as a patentee:
“Any combination of patentees to support one another would be irregular and […]
however willing we may be to espouse the interest of any man of ingenuity we
101J. Wedgwood to J. Watt, 23 August 1785. B. R. L. MSS 3219/4/128.
102 J. Watt to J. Wedgwood, 24 August 1785, B. R. L. MSS 3219/4/128. My italics.
103  J. Watt to J. Wedgwood, 23 July 1785, B. R. L. MSS 3219/4/128. My italics.
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cannot  think  of  making  ourselves  obnoxious  to  the  public  by  supporting  the
patentees whether they are right or wrong.” On 25 June several patentees met at
the Crown and Moll tavern in Chancery Lane. Although he was invited, Watt did
not attend. His thoughts are clearly expressed in a letter to Matthews of 20 July
1785: “At the last meeting of patentees I saw much of a motley crew of projectors
and madmen, some of which I thought it a disgrace to keep company […] I would
far less associate with them.” He also laments that they “managed matters so ill,
that if they do no better”, he claims, “they will get nothing but disgrace.”104 Hence,
given the modest allies and the risk of public exposition, Watt concluded that silent
lobbying by some influential individuals could achieve more than noisy protests.
The  rhetoric of solitude105 of  Thoughts upon patents, which Watt began to write
precisely in July 1785, is perfectly consistent with the strategy he chose to pursue
during  the  political  contest  between  the  government,  some  members  of  the
industry, and the group represented by the patentees.
By deploying the metaphor of the “Infant”, Watt meant to emphasize the need of
public protection, whereas depicting the inventive activity as one which entails the
risk of  alienation and isolation  from the  world,  he  prepares the  ground for  an
individualistic theory of intellectual appropriation. The inventor's alleged seclusion
sets up on a firm moral base the very logic of his claims over the fruits of his
labour.
Hence, in granting a patent, argues Watt, “the state gives nothing; if the invention
is not found an improvement, people will soon cease to use it, and the inventor will
be punished for his presumption by the very means by which he hoped to acquire
money; if on the other hand the inventor acquires a fortune by it, is not that a proof
that the public have found their advantage for it? For otherwise they wou'd not
104  J. Watt to Matthews, 20 July 1785, reported in Dutton, 1984, p. 37.
105For insightful considerations of the topos of seclusion and the image of the man of  science in
the 17th century, see Steven Shapin, “'The Mind in Its Own Place'”, in Never Pure. Historical
Studies  of  Science  as  if  it  Was  Produced by  People  with  Bodies,  Situated  in  Time,  Space,
Culture,  and  Society,  and  Struggling  for  Credibility  and  Authority,  The  Johns  Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 2010, pp. 119-141.
42
have used it; and is not the person who has by his ingenuity and industry put the
public  in possession of such an advantage justly entitled to the money he may
acquire by it?”106
As  it  illuminates  this  passage,  this  position  vis-à-vis  intellectual  property  in
general and the patent system in particular, would constitute an influential current
within the libertarian tradition.
In  his  much-fêted  work of  1974,  Robert  Nozick  offers  a  brief  but  influential
interpretation of the principle underlying the patent system against the background
of the Lockian theory of appropriation. After offering his interpretation of Locke's
proviso, he states that: “the theme of someone worsening another's situation by
depriving him of something he otherwise would possess may also illuminate the
example  of  patents.  An  inventor's  patent  does  not  deprive  others  of  an  object
which  would  not  exist  if  not  for  the  inventor.”  This  reading  echoes  Watt's
assumption that, in granting a letter patent, the state gives nothing. Nevertheless,
for Nozick this kind of appropriation is compatible with Locke's proviso only as
long  as  the  attribution  of  the  patent  to  the  original  inventor  is  rendered
unquestionable.  In  fact,  patents  would  represent  a  breach  of  the  proviso  with
respect to independent inventors.107
We can now isolate the very philosophical principles underpinning Watt's moral
justification of his rights as inventor and patentee.
First of all it is clear that Watt considered inventions as essentially tied in with the
work of individuals.
Property derives from labour and intellectual property rights need to be enforced
because the inventive work is inherently risky, potentially marginalizing inventors.
The public is never at a disadvantage when the State grants a patent, since what is
protected would not exist if it was not for the inventor's labour and investment.
These fundamental tenets lay behind most libertarian legitimation of intellectual
property rights which espouse the Lockean theory of appropriation.
106Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 215.
107Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974, p. 182.
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One  of  the  contemporary  individualist  thinkers  par  excellence,  Ayn  Rand,
considered patents and copyrights as: “the legal implementation of the base of all
property rights: a man's rights to the product of his mind.”108 Her justification of
property  rights  over  intellectual  products  is  grounded  on  Locke's  theory  of
appropriation  through  labour.  Every  type  of  productive  work,  Rand  argues:
“involves a combination of mental and physical effort.”109 On the one hand, the
mental  effort  deployed  to  perform  manual  labour  is  “minimal”,  on  the  other,
intellectual effort is predominant  if we consider: “the mind's  contribution in its
purest form: the origination of an idea.”110
This purely intellectual product is the object of copyrights and patent protection.
Rand also makes clear that, although any idea has to be given a material form in
order to be protected, the very object of protection is not its material embodiment,
but the idea itself.
She goes on to explain why a discovery cannot be secured while an invention must
be protected. In this regard, she argues that a discovery is not a creation of her
discoverer, thus implying that an invention is a creation, a very effective piece of
rhetoric with which to emphasize the role of individuals in the inventive activity.
Patents and copyright, claims Rand, pertain to: “the creation of a specific object
which did not exist in nature – an object which, in the case of patents, may never
have existed without its particular originator; and in the case of copyrights would
never have existed.”111
James Child offers a good example of this creationist view, which was a recurrent
topos within the libertarian tradition throughout the 20th century. In his 1990 article
he attempts to explain why intellectual property can be perfectly consistent with
the Lockean theory of appropriation.
The author describes a man's idea as a “creation ex nihilo”. Intellectual property is
108Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal,  A Signet book, 1967 [1964], p. 130. 
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. 
111Rand, 1967, p. 131.
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created, he argues, “out of nothing but mental labor.”112
Furthermore, the enforcement of natural rights over I.P. does not infringe Locke's
proviso, as ideas are not affected by a zero-sum condition.113 Therefore, one might
have a piece of property from which one can exclude everyone else, but as there
will always be an unlimited amount of available property, there will be “enough
and as good” properties for all others.114
Child claims that the total stock of ideas which can be appropriated is not affected
by the condition we usually refer to as  rivalry of consumption. In fact,  human
ingenuity “can multiply the effective quantity of a given resource many times”,
through  a  reallocation  of  resource  and  bolstering  efficiency  in  the  production
process. Thus when it comes to patents and copyright, fulfilling the condition of
“exclusion” does not lead to the effect of worsening the lot of the excluded.115 
Similarly,  in  Thoughts  upon Patents,  Watt  argued that  those who believed that
patents cramped ingenuity by confining ingenious men to the use of those arts
which belonged to the public, had in fact: “too narrow notions of the powers of
human mind, and of the objects on which it can exert itself.”116 
According to Watt, “the improvements which have been made within the last 50
years surpass all which ever have been done in an equal period of time, and we are
far  from  finding  that  we  approach  to  the  ne  plus  ultra  of  invention”,  on  the
contrary: “the field is surely wide enough.”117
 If  intellectual  property  is  created by  a  man through  his efforts,  then  we can
understand why, in protecting the rights over this property, the state gives nothing.
Rand  would  come  to  the  same  conclusions  as  Watt's,  and  from  very  similar
112 James W. Child, “The moral foundation of intangible property”, The Monist, 73:4 (1990), 568-
600, pp. 588, 589. 
 For a criticism of this notion by other participants in the debate see, for example: Edwin C.
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assumptions. In Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal, she argued that the: “government
does not 'grant' a patent or copyright, in the sense of a gift, privilege, or favor; the
government merely secures it – i.e., the government certifies the origination of an
idea and protects its owner's exclusive right of use and disposal.”118
From this point of view, there is no difference between properties in ideas and
tangible properties. For Rand, patents and copyright are the formal equivalents of
registering a title or a deed.119
Turning back to Watt, a clear statement of his natural law conception of intellectual
property can be found in the opening of a document written to oppose Jonathan
Hornblower's  attempt  to  extend  the  duration  of  his  own  patent,  which  the
Birmingham partners conceived as piracy: “There are two Points in which B & W
hope for success in their Opposition to this Bill – Public Justice and Public Favour.
To the first they urge that their natural Rights to their inventions in Steam Engines
[…] were considered by them as a full Security for the quiet Enjoyment of those
Rights during the Term granted them.” Pleading “Public Favour”, they state that
their  claim over their  invention: “appears to be greatly  strengthened when it  is
considered  that  they  have  actually  succeeded  in  making  very  important
Improvements  and  on  those  Engines  & in  the  Application  of  them to  various
branches of the national Industry.”120
This document offers an example  of the interaction of a utilitarian framework,
which  implies  a  broader  political  perspective  and  defines  patents  as  bargain-
privileges to reward progress, and some fundamental natural law principles which
provide the metaphysical background of this exchange. Since the atomic part of
technological  progress,  the  invention,  is  generated  by individuals  through their
own labour, the latters has a natural right over their invention.
Hence the public, conforming to the most elementary principle of “Public Justice”,
118 Rand, 1964-1967, p. 131.
119 Ibid.
120 In Opposition  to  Hornblower  in  the  House  of  Commons, B.  R.  L.  MS  3782/12/109/29.
There was no formal opposition to Jonathan Hornblower Jr (brother of Jabez), nor was he ever
taken to court by Boulton and Watt. 
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has to enforce these rights and the protection of these rights corresponds with the
national interest in encouraging technological and economic progress.
Individualism is  a  fundamental  philosophical  tenet  in  Watt's  justification  of
property rights over ideas: it is mirrored in the idea that inventions are the fruits of
somebody's labour, ingenuity, or economic investment. Secondly, since inventions
can be singled out from the continuum of knowledge and referred to the work of
isolated men, even from a social and moral point of view, a State which wants to
promote  technological  progress  needs  to  protect  the  major  agents  of  progress,
namely the men of ingenuity.
Converging  goals: private interest and public justice
After restating that letter patents bring no losses for the State, “because it has only
secured the patentee in the possession of a thing which in respect to the state was a
non entity”, Watt argues that the enforcement of the inventor's natural rights is
even beneficial to the public. In fact, he claims: “the public gains by having a new
Art added to the stock, or an old one improved, human labour is abridg'd or the
value of its productions encreased, and this without any expence to the public.”121
Hence Watt's perspective shifts now from the private point of view of the inventor,
to the standpoint of  public interest.  
According to McLeod,122 during the 18th century a sort of “happy coincidence”
between  rewarding  the  inventor's  toil  and  furthering  the  national  interest  was
assumed rather than critically analysed. But how was this coincidence theorized
and established? In Watt's age, advocates of the patent system would support the
conciliation between private and public interests mainly through two arguments:
121 Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 216.
122 McLeod, 1988, p. 183.
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the monopoly-profit-incentive and the reward-by-monopoly thesis.123
The latter claim was based upon the principle that inventors were to be rewarded
for their  contribution to  the national  wealth and that  such a reward was a just
compensation  for  their  work.  On  the  other  hand,  the  first  thesis  explicitly
concerned the public usefulness of patents as incentives to stimulate research and
development. In other words, patents could be either justified according to some
sort  of  “public  favour”,  in  Watt's  own  terms,  or  they  could  be  theorized  as
instruments of economic policy. 
Of course,  both of  these  arguments,  as  well  as  the  natural-law thesis,  may be
deployed simultaneously as they do not emerge from contradictory assumptions.
On the contrary, they can considerably strengthen each other, and this is certainly
the  case  with  Watt.   The  Scottish  inventor  assumed  a  labour-based  theory  of
intellectual appropriation and, as we read on the document bearing the reasons for
his opposition to Hornblower, he explicitly refers to his prerogatives as patentee
and to his  natural rights. Meanwhile, he also argued that patents were the best
instruments to foster innovation and, as we shall see, he claimed that they were
also the just rewards for something as socially indispensable, however  risky and
expensive,  as  the  inventors'  work.  In  a  1988 article,  Hughes  seems to  offer  a
perfect  contemporary  sample  of  this  manifold  flow  of  arguments,  which  ties
together  consequentialist  utilitarian  criteria  with  natural  law  principles.  For
Hughes,  these  two  lines  of  argument  can  be  seen  to  stem  from  different
interpretations of Locke's theory of property: “One interpretation is that society
rewards  labor  with  property  purely  on  the  instrumental  grounds  that  we  must
provide rewards to get labor. In contrast, a normative interpretation of this labor
theory says that labor should be rewarded.”124
Unlike  Moore,  who  argues  that  deontic  moral  justifications  and  consequential
justifications are not compatible within the same legal system,125 Hughes affirms
123 Dutton, 1984, p. 20.
124 Hughes, 1988, p. 296.
125 Adam D.  Moore  “Intellectual  property,  innovation,  and  social  progress:  the  case  against
incentive based arguments.” Hamline Law Review 26, no. 3 (2003): 602-630, p. 630.
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that one of his article's: “fundamental propositions is that property can be justified
on either  the  labor  [in  both his  deontic  and instrumental  forms,  see  above]  or
personality theories and that it should be justified with both. Properly elaborated,
the labor and personality theories together exhaust the set of morally acceptable
justifications of intellectual property.”126
Moreover,  the author also acknowledges what is perhaps the most fundamental
assumption  which  underpins  a  labour-based  theory  of  ideal  appropriation:  “A
society  that  believes  ideas  come  to  people  as  manna  from  heaven  must  look
somewhere other than Locke to justify the establishment of intellectual property.
The labour-based theory of property does not work if one subscribes to a pure
'eureka' theory of ideas”.127 Interestingly, the latter seems to be exactly Boldrin and
Levine's  assumption.  In  fact,  while  articulating  their  interpretation  of  Watt  as
intellectual  monopolist,  they  write:  “New  ideas  accrue  almost  by  chance  to
innovators while they are carrying out a routine activity aimed at a completely
different end. The patent comes many years after that, and it results more from a
mixture of  legal  acumen and abundant resources  available to “oil  the gears  of
fortune' than anything else.”128
No surprise that authors such as Hughes, Boldrin and Levine come to radically
divergent thesis on intellectual property. In fact, opposite metaphysics lay behind
their notion of who or what deserves to be deemed as the main agent of progress. 
My argument is that Watt consistently deployed an instrumental justification of the
inventor's rights which was firmly grounded on a set of “buried assumptions”,
namely a labour-based theory of appropriation, the individualistic conception of
inventive  activity,  and  an  embryonic  formulation  of  the  principle  of  labour
avoidance.129 
 From another perspective, Ryan pointed out in 1987, that utilitarian theories are
126 Hughes, 1988, p. 231. My italics.
127 Ibid., p. 9. My italics.
128 Boldrin and Levine, 2008, p. 4.
129 Alan Ryan, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarianism and Other Essays, Penguin,
1987, p. 67
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explicitly  consequentialist  while  natural  law  theories  usually  bear  “a  buried
utilitarian  assumption”.  These  assumptions  concern  the  realization  of  human
nature.
These  less  formalized  pillars  of  Watt's  discourse  consist  in  some  occasional
references to a natural law vocabulary (such as in Opposition to Mr Hornblower's
Bill) and, in the case of the main object of our analysis, namely Watt's  Thoughts
upon patents, these fundamental principles are manifest in his  topos of seclusion
from society and in the  description of the inventor's labour. 
The typically utilitarian, consequentialist, calculation of the best means to provide
the  fullest  satisfaction  to  the  largest  number  of  people  rested  firmly  upon  the
deontic principle that labour must be rewarded, as it is source of property and that
the condition of ingenious work is isolation. Hence, for example, the possibility of
stressing the social origin of ideas was never at stake in Watt's  Thoughts upon
patents. Rather, technological progress would be depicted as the accumulation of
individual contributions, which needs be secured.
The  avoidance  theory  of  labour  is  still  present  in  contemporary  debates.
Commenting  on  the  main  theoretical  problems  concerning  intellectual  labour,
Hughes  points  out  that:  “The  wide  acceptance  of  the  instrumental  argument
suggests  wide  acceptance  of  the  premise  that  idea-making  is  a sufficiently
unpleasant activity to count as labor that requires the inducement of reward.”130
Hughes' contemporary interpretation of the interaction of instrumental and labour-
based justifications is not dissimilar from Watt's use of these arguments. 
While switching to an utilitarian standpoint, Watt espoused an argumentative style
which was more adequate to the public forum131 and argued that letter patents were
surely harmless (as they do not cause any loss for the public) and could even be
beneficial for the State, because they increase the public stock of knowledge by
fostering innovation.
A key-thesis in  Thoughts upon patents is that patents should not be imagined as
130 Hughes, 1988, p. 231.
131 Dutton, 1984, pp. 17-18.
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bargain-privileges, as they are according to a contractualist framework. Thus the
specification,  according  to  Watt,  is  not  meant  to  secure  disclosure  of  the
invention's characteristics.
Watt's  reward-by-monopoly  thesis  is  clearly  enunciated  in  Some  observations
upon patents.132 He argues that patents should be intended as an instance of public
gratitude and as a means to reward inventive activity. 
“To argue that a patent is granted to an inventor merely upon the consideration that
his invention is a secret in his own breast which he may conceal or divulge at
pleasure,  and  therefore  a  Patent  is  granted  him  as  the  price  of  his  secret,  is
supposing [the] Government to act upon very narrow principles, & is not viewing
the  subject  in  its  proper  light.  Would  it  not  be  though  more  noble  and  more
becoming the dignity of such an opulent State as Britain is if Patents were granted
not as the price of a secret but avowedly as  rewards to men of merit for their
ingenuity, as the price of their labour & expence in bringing their inventions to a
patentable  state,  and  also  to  encourage  them  to  persevere  in  making  further
improvements  upon  them.  […]  Such  was  certainly  the  original  intention.  The
notion of their reverting to the public at the end of the term does not seem to have
had much weight anciently. The Marquis of Worcester had an act of parliament for
the sole use of his invention of the steam engine for 98 years. It seems that a patent
was then considered principally as a reward to a man for the benefit the public
might reap from the use or convenience of a new machine or manufacture which in
many cases is very great though the property of the invention should never devolve
on the public.”133
Adam Smith shared this way of thinking about patents, describing them both as
rewards and incentives. We find no evidence that Smith conceived specifications
as the means of an exchange between the inventor and the state.
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, the Scottish philosopher singled out patents and
copyrights as the two privileges that: “as they can do no harm and may do some
132 B. R. L.  MS3219/4/288.
133 Ibid.
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good, are not to be altogether condemned”. The first and original inventor of a new
contrivance: “has the exclusive privilege of making and vending that invention for
the space of 14 years by the law of this country, as a  reward for his ingenuity.”
However, states Smith: “the law granted him [an author of a book, introduced as
an example of those protected by the Statute of Monopolies, 1623] an exclusive
privilege […] as an encouragement to the labours of learned men.”134
Both Watt and Smith, then, provide similar justifications of I.P. rights, grounded on
both the monopoly-as-reward and the monopoly-profit-incentive thesis. 
By successfully encouraging inventions, argues Watt, the public is always the first
to gain: “as it must reap the principal part of the benefits which result from any
invention that is carried on within the realm, for does not the patentee thereby
become a Member of the State, if he was not so before? Do not he and all his
workmen  pay  taxes  to  the  state  and  also  contribute  by  their  consumption  of
provisions and manufactures to support other members of it?”135
Moreover, according to Watt, inventors were limited by competition and, therefore,
unable to raise the prices beyond the reasonable. He made this point clearly in
Heads of a Bill for explaining & amending the Laws relating to Patents for New
Inventions. In fact, whilst explaining why the State should be grateful to inventors,
Watt argues that:
“Patentees are genera[l]ly so bound in by other inventions or arts that they cannot
impose irreasonable terms. Can any man argue that in the instance of Sir Richard
Arkwrights invention,  that  if it  had never been laid open to the public that the
nation would have received no benefit from it? They certainly would, & did while
it was his undisputed property; for the price at which cotton yarn could be made by
the spinning Jinnie, & by other means prevented his charging exorbitant price for
his goods,  he produced the cotton twist  of  a superior quality  for certain uses,
enabled  the  manufacturers  of  Manchester  to  excell  all  others  in  Europe  and
134 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 1762-63, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1982, p. 83.  My
italics.
135 Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 218.
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supplied them with quantities which could not have been produced by other means,
a great and profitable trade was thus created. To the immense emolument of the
Sate!”136   
Watt deals here with one of the strongest arguments against monopolies: the effect
of granting such privileges, it was claimed, causes uncontrolled speculation. Not
only, he claims, competition among inventors and innovators helps preventing this
sort  of  problem,  but  the  profits  provided  by  new  trades  and  new  modes  of
productions accrue considerably the wealth of the State. Therefore, letters patents,
unlikely other kinds of monopoly, were perfectly compatible with public interest. 
These  conditions  which  constitute  Watt's  narrative  of  the  rights  of  inventors
justifies  his  views  concerning  how  far  the  specification  should  matter  in  the
context of litigation over patents.
In fact, we should emphasize that, for Watt, the need of a detailed specification
rests  solely upon the  necessity  to  distinguish inventions  one from another:  “If
therefore as is apprehended there is no statute law enforcing such disclosure, the
necessity rests solely on the proviso in the patent, which requires it, and in the
opinion  of  the  writer,  which  however  he  gives  with  due  deference  to  the
Gentlemen learned in the Law, it seems to have been originally intended not so
much as to secure the public in the secret of the invention, as to discriminate one
inventor's property from that of another.”137
Furthermore,  Watt  suggests that:  “no patent  to be set aside for want of a clear
specification after the Commissioners shall  have examin'd and approved of the
specification.”138 This  Commission  should  be  summoned  by  the  Attorney  or
Solicitor  General  and  composed  of  two  fellows  of  the  Royal  Society,
recommended by the Council  of that Society, and two “eminent Artists” in the
branch of the arts to which the patent pertains.
The strong role attributed to the Royal Society gives support to Miller's arguments
136 Heads of a Bill for explaining & amending the Laws relating to Patents for New Inventions , B.
R. L. MS 3219/4/287/6/5. My italics.
137 Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 217.
138 Ibid., p. 223.
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about one of the possible scopes of Watt's scientific accreditation. In the contest
over the validity of his patents, which was mainly focused on the sufficiency of the
related specification, being fellows of the Royal Society did not harm and could be
beneficial.139
Indeed,  the  Commissioners,  according  to  Watt's  proposal,  should  not:  “be
empowered to judge of the merits of the invention, the novelty or Utility thereof
but  simply  whether  or  not  the  patentee  has  specified  the  same  clearly  or
intelligibly”.140
The  role  reserved  to  the  Royal  Society,  as  theorized  in  Watt's  Thoughts  upon
patents, and in his Heads of a Bill for explaining & amending the Laws relating to
Patents for New Inventions,  is one of the most concrete and studied aspects of
Watt's reform proposal.
However,  all  the  points  Watt  touches  upon  in  his  reform  proposal  are  based
ultimately upon his  preliminary observations of the inventive work and the human
traits of the inventors.
Even his manifest utilitarian arguments would be void without the fundamental
principles of labour-based property rights, individualism and avoidance.
Commenting on the intersection between natural-law and utilitarian contemporary
justifications  of  I.P.  rights,  Palmer141 points  out  that:  “utilitarian  arguments  of
various sorts can either support or undercut claims for intellectual property rights.
Contingent  matters  of  fact  form an  especially  important  part  of  the  utilitarian
structure.” In other words, one of the problems of utilitarian justifications is that
wealth maximization is not the ultimate aim of law, the goal is Justice and Justice
demands giving each person their due.142 Boldrin and Levine's manifesto Against
139 David  P.  Miller,  “'Puffing  Jamie':  the  commercial  and  ideological  importance  of  being  a
'philosopher'  in  the case of  the reputation of  James Watt  (1736-1819)”,  History of  Science,
38:1=119 (2000), 1-24, p. 6.
140 Musson and Robinson, 1969, p. 221. My italics.
141Tom G. Palmer,  “Are patents  and copyrights morally justified? The philosophy of property
rights  and ideal  objects”,  Harvard Journal  of  Law & Public Policy,  13:3 (1990),  817-865,
p.820.
142 Kinsella, 2001, p. 12.
54
Intellectual  Property  does  not  engage  in  a  systematic  critique  of  modern
justifications  of  I.P.  rights.  Their  book  is  rather  focused  upon  the  detrimental
effects of intellectual properties for the economy. However, any economic model is
clearly based upon some general  assumptions  about  what  can licitly  constitute
property and other philosophical issues are relevant to any considerations of I.P.
For example, assumptions about the structure of techno-scientific progress and the
origin of invention.
Rather than engaging with these points,  Boldrin and Levine seem to implicitly
overturn Watt's fundamental premise, that is, individuals do not create anything
unique. Therefore, the most important agent of progress must be found elsewhere.
This elementary assumption in their analysis is clear in this passage: “Insofar as
inventors have unique ideas, it may make sense to reward them with monopolies to
make sure that we get advantage of their unusual talents. For example, if, in the
absence of James Watt, the steam condenser would not have been invented until
long after his patent expired, there is some justification for having awarded him a
monopoly”143 The latter, as we have seen, is exactly Watt's assumption. If it was
not for the inventor, the public would not enjoy his invention.
Moreover, as we have seen, that was not merely Watt's fundamental assumption,
but it was shared by influential 20th century libertarians such as Rand, Nozick, and
Child. 
But Boldrin and Levine reverse this individualistic philosophy of technology: “Of
course, if others were going to discover it in a few years anyway, then it scarcely
made  sense  to  give  him  a  long-term  monopoly.  As  it  happens,  simultaneous
discoveries tend to be the rule rather than the exception, and, in the presence of a
patent  system,  they  almost  always  lead  to  some  ugly  story.”144 Invention  is  a
collective, social effort, thus establishing priority and granting monopolies leads to
endless  disputes  and  unjustified  privileges.  Boldrin  and  Levine's  shift  in  the
attribution of intellectual property from heroic individuals to groups and society at
143 Boldrin and Levine, 2010, p. 202.
144 Ibid. My italics.
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large seems suitable to the way philosophy and history of science has developed
from its whiggish origins to the sociology of scientific knowledge. Yet their book
does  not  deal  with  philosophy  of  science  nor  with  theories  of  appropriation,
reducing both  issues  to  mere assertions  which  simply collide  with  Watt's  own
philosophical  assumptions.  On  the  contrary,  Hettinger  makes  his  point  more
explicitly, when he argues that: “Invention, writing, and thought in general do not
operate in a vacuum:  intellectual activity is not a creation ex-nihilo. Given this
vital dependence of a person's thoughts on the ideas of those who came before her,
intellectual  products  are  fundamentally  social  products.”145 The  author
acknowledges that this problem in the libertarian tradition is usually related with
more  or  less  inclusive  interpretations  of the  Lockean  theory  of  appropriation.
Having explained why intellectual property is not compatible with the Lockean
theory of property,146 he suggests that the issue over the enforcement of I.P. rights
necessarily turns upon considerations of social utility.
Of course, once again, such a utilitarian analysis could not but lead to envisaged
conclusions.  If  intellectual  products  are  essentially  social  products  and  if  the
Lockean theory of appropriation cannot be applied to the field of intellectual work,
then any utilitarian calculus would just conclude that, whenever the State grants a
patent, it pursues the interests of an individual at the expense of depriving society
of  its  share  of  merit  for  the  invention.  In  such  a  matter  as  intellectual
appropriation, the metaphysical conditions we set forth for the origin of ideas are
145 Hettinger, 1989, p. 38.
  Hettinger's thesis reminds us of Polanyi's statement, according to which patents tend “to parcel
up a stream of creative thought into a series of distinct claims, each of which is to constitute the
basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided
up into such sharply circumscribed phases”, M. Polanyi, “Patent reform”, Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, 1944, pp. 61-76. Polanyi's thoughts on patents have been analysed by A.
Johns, “Intellectual property and the nature of Science”, Cultural Studies, 20:2-3 (2006), 145-
164.
146 Ibid., p. 36. Hettinger claims that labour arguments in favour of I.P. run afoul of one of Locke's
provisos, namely the prohibition against waste or despoliation. 
A reassessment of the relationship between Locke's “waste proviso” and moral justifications of
I.P.  rights,  as  well  as  a  brief  outline  of  its  contentious  history  is  included  in Gordon Hull
“Clearing the Rubbish: Locke, the Waste Proviso, and the Moral Justification of Intellectual
Property”, Public Affairs Quarterly, 23:1 (2009), 67-93.
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fundamental to any subsequent conceptions of justice, including those grounded
upon an apparently  neutral utilitarian calculus.  The latter  is  usually an ex-post
artefact which simply reinforces some clear assumption by construing an aseptic,
peaceful convergence of interests between the private and the public spheres. 
Since Locke is an evergreen auctoritas within Libertarianism, many authors who
belong  to  this  political  and  philosophical  galaxy  deal  with  the  renowned fifth
chapter of The Second Treaty of Government.
Thus Locke comes to be a trumpeted ally in many libertarian works on intellectual
property.
This applies to many of the fiercest apologists of I.P. rights, such as Rand, Nozick,
Child, Hughes, as well as many of their critics.
Amongst the latter,  we should remember Palmer,  Hettinger and, more recently,
Kinsella  who published the influential  and articulate  paper  Against  Intellectual
Property.
 After presenting the libertarian spectrum of positions about Intellectual Property,
including an exposition of  natural-law and utilitarian arguments, Kinsella offers
his interpretation of the Locke's theory of property.
According to Kinsella, who follows Rothbard,147 Palmer,148 and Hoppe149 the very
basis of Lockean appropriation is not labour but scarcity.150
“The function of  property rights”,  argues  Kinsella:  “is  to  prevent  interpersonal
147 Murray  N.  Rothbard,  “Justice  and  property  rights”,  in  The Logic  of  Action One. Method,
Money and the Austrian School, Edward Elgar publisher, 1997 p. 274.
148 Palmer, 1990,  pp. 860-865.
149 Hans H. Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston,
1989, p. 235.
150 Thomas Jefferson argued three centuries earlier that: “If nature has made any one thing less
susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot
dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
himself  without  lessening mine;  as  he  who lights  his  taper  at  mine,  receives  light  without
darkening me.” Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813, Albert Ellery Bergh
(ed.),  The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the
United States, Washington D.C., vol. 13 pp. 333-35.
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conflict over  scarce resources, by allocating exclusive ownership of resources to
specified individuals (owners)”151 However, ideas are not naturally scarce. In fact,
I  can  communicate  my  ideas,  giving  them  to  someone  else  without  thereby
lessening my own stock. Therefore, by recognizing property rights over ideas, the
State creates scarcity where it did not exist before.
Patents and copyrights turn out to be unusual properties, as they: “don't arise out of
scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They are not a consequence of
scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute law.”152 Furthermore, according
to Kinsella, patents represent a violation of real property rights. In fact, a patent
can limit my control over my own material resources which cannot be worked to
conform to a patented contrivance.
Similarly,  Tom W. Bell  argues  that:  “By invoking state  power,  a  copyright  or
patent owner can impose prior restraint, fines, imprisonment, and confiscation on
those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet enjoyment of tangible property.
Because it thus gags our voices, ties our hands, and demolishes our presses, the
law of copyrights and patents violate the same rights that Locke defended.”153 It is
clear,  therefore,  that  the  natural  law tradition  and especially  Locke's  theory  of
appropriation  still  represent  a  set  of  assumptions  and  arguments  capable  of
exerting a significant influence upon the philosophical debate about I.P.. It does so
on both fronts of the ongoing contest. Utilitarianism, similarly, has provided a set
of still widespread arguments, and, perhaps more importantly, it also furnished an
argumentative  style,  a  reference  system which  can be  deployed again  by  both
positions. 
151 Kinsella, 2001, p. 20. My emphasis.
152 Arnold Plant, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for  Inventions”,  Economica, 1:1
(1934), 30-51,  p. 36.
153 Tom W. Bell, "Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law," in Adam Thierer and
Clyde  Wayne  Crews,  Jr.,  (eds.),  Copy  Fights:  The  Future  of  Intellectual  Property  in  the
Information Age, Cato Institute, Washington D.C., 2002, p. 4. My italics.
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Conclusions
This sort  of philosophical  continuity,  which of course is  not absolute,  deserves
further investigation, as it may tell us how much our present debate owes not only
to economists, legal theorists, and philosophers, but also to inventors such as Watt,
who  engaged,  more  than  occasionally,  with  the  articulation  of  coherent  and
sophisticated  discourses  on  I.P.  rights  in  the  attempt  to  rationalize  a  highly
competitive and individualist scientific and entrepreneurial ethos.
In  his Patent  reform,  the  philosopher  Michael  Polanyi  seeks  to  find  some
alternative to patents as a means of rewarding the inventors' toil. In his opinion, it
was time for a radical reform which would lead to the abolition of patents and their
replacement with public rewards paid by taxpayers. His proposed reform, which
was never realized, would have broken the  long continuity of the patent system,
which, he argued, misrepresented the nature of the inventive activity. He believed
that  the very principles underpinning our conception of I.P.  have not  sustained
significant changes from the modern age and that the Statute of Monopolies of
1627 “established the basis of all modern patent law”.154
Although this  position may seem outdated  to  the  modern reader,  much of  the
Anglo-Saxon debate on I.P. is still grounded upon two philosophical grammars, as
provided by utilitarian and natural-right theories of property. The traces of these
philosophies  are  retrievable  in  Watt's  own  observations  towards  patents,  with
striking similarities between the structure of his arguments and some contemporary
contributions to the debate over I.P. rights.
154 Polanyi, 1944, p. 62.
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PART TWO
Securing originality outside the patent system:
Wedgwood's protection of  design before design
Etruria! Next beneath thy magic hands
Glides the quick wheel, the plastic clay
expands,
Nerved with fine touch, thy fingers (as
it turns)
Mark the nice bounds of vases, ewers,
and urns;
Round each fair form in lines immortal
trace
Uncopied Beauty, and ideal Grace.
Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden,
p. 295.
Man is termed by Aristotle an imitative
animal; this propensity to imitation not
only appears in the actions of children
but in all the customs and fashions of
the world.
Erasmus Darwin, Zoomia, p. 201.
Ars Etruriae Renascuntur  : Josiah Wedgwood's life and achievements
“Mr Monkhouse our surgeon met to day with an insult from an Indian, the first
that has been met with by any of us. He was pulling a flower from a tree which
grew on a burying ground and consequently was I suppose sacred, when an Indian
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came behind him and struck him; he seiz'd hold of him and attempted to beat him,
but was prevented by two more who coming up seizd hold of his hair and rescued
their companion after which they all ran away.”155 It was the 13th June 1769 when
Joseph Banks, the botanist, one of the leading scientific figures of his age, wrote
this entry on  The Endeavour Journal. At the time, he was taking part in James
Cook's first expedition across the South Pacific. The company appointed for this
voyage  included  Daniel  Solander,  a  Swedish  botanist  who  had  studied  under
Linnaeus,  the  natural  history  draughtsmen  Sydney  Parkinson  and  Alexander
Buchan, a secretary, and four assistants.
In June this  party made landfall  in  Tahiti,  from whence they would decamp a
month later,  having as their destination New Zealand. Their task was to collect
informations about the various flora, fauna and the geography of those far lands,
bringing home detailed descriptions and drawings of many exotic wonders. Such
Indian  oddities  had  penetrated  western  imagery  and  were  reproduced  by  the
Baroque art,  along with Oriental  and Arab influences.  Thus after  Tenniers and
Lacret, Goya still depicted monkeys, parrots, exotic mise-en-scène and accessories
displaced in European scenarios. However, this rich and variegated artistic wave
from the 17th century was inexorably beginning to wane.
On the 13 June, while Joseph Bank annotated his Tahitian meetings, in a small
Staffordshire village, an artistic shift was being celebrated. It is a key-date for the
dawn of a new aesthetics which opposed Baroque and Rococo and looked back
with growing interest to the elegant simplicity of the classics. Josiah Wedgwood, a
38-year-old potter  from Burslem, had already surpassed his  fascination  for  the
exotic patterns. He had dismissed his early cauliflower teapots and his pineapple-
themed  earthenware, and  focused  instead  upon  re-creating  ancient  marvels,
according  to  the  latest  craze  for  'Etruscan'  vases.  Roman  and  Greek  beauties
arrived to England through a network of merchants, collectors and amateurs who
155 Endeavour Journal, 13 June 1769 (Series 03.291) 
http://www2.sl.nsw.gov.au/banks/series_03/03_291.cfm
Last accessed on 27.03.2015
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called themselves  virtuosi. This club was led by a learned diplomat, the British
Ambassador to Naples Sir William Hamilton, who worked relentlessly to collect
and catalogue the  graceful  patterns  which were unveiled by the excavations at
Pompeii and Herculaneum.
For Wedgwood, one of the protagonists of English Neo-classicism, the 13 June
1769 marked the beginning of a new entrepreneurial  venture.  He had carefully
organized the inauguration of his factory, which he named 'Etruria'. The choice of
the name was partly cause by the wrong belief that the finest surviving samples of
Greek vases had been retrieved from Etruscan tombs. The new factory covered
seven acres of land, traversed by a canal  and marked by the new Etruria Hall
where the Wedgwood family resided.  A feast  was had for Wedgwood's family,
workmen and friends. At sunset Josiah sat at the wheel and threw six copies of a
basalt Etruscan vase, before his admiring guests. These “First Day's Vases” were to
be dispatched to London to be decorated and enamelled at Wedgwood's laboratory
in Chelsea. They were copies of ceremonial bowls, with three classic figures on
one side  (the  “Meidias  Hydra”)  and a  legendary  inscription  on  the  other:  Ars
Etruria Renascuntur, “Etruscan Arts are reborn”.
Wedgwood belonged to that much-sung generation of artisans who grew up in the
green hills of the agricultural Midlands and contributed to turn this region into the
beating  heart  of  early  industrialization.  He  was  born  in  Burslem in  1730,  the
youngest of a family of twelve, from a four-generations-long tradition in pottery.
His  early  biographers  would  later  adorn  his  infancy  with  a  long  record  of
unverified  anecdotes,  as  it  happened  with  the  childhood  biographies  of  many
revolutionary players of their age. 
The major teller of these premonitory tales is one of his early biographers, Eliza
Meteyard, according to whom Josiah was a curious child, lively, good-humoured
and witty, a young boy who played like many children did but who also turned his
father's working shed “into a sort of museum, being decorated with fossil shells
and other curiosities”156. Samuel Smiles also remarks upon Josiah's early curiosity
156 Eliza Meteyard, Life of Josiah Wedgwood from his private correspondence and family papers,
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and talent: “soon after he left school he distinguished himself by his readiness to
imitate in clay whatever objects struck his fancy. He seems to have had a natural
bent towards modelling.”157
At fourteen this gifted boy began an apprenticeship to learn the Art of Throwing
and Handleing, but did not finish it.
In  1754  Wedgwood  entered  into  a  partnership  with  Thomas  Wieldon,  a  local
manufacturer whose reputation was already well-established. He learnt much at
Wieldon's  workshop  where  he  was  frequently  encouraged  to  test  new
improvements. However, in 1759, as soon as he had sufficient capital, Wedgwood
decided to found his own pottery works. The local industry at that time was still at
a  rather  primitive  stage.  To be  precise,  it  would  have been hard  to  guess  that
earthenware,  and British earthenware in  particular,  could ever  be conceived as
luxury goods. Moreover, Burslem potteries were isolated by the condition of the
roads, which prevented them from exploring new potential markets. Nevertheless
such averse conditions were about to change, as steam-power, canals and turnpikes
would project the village and its manufactures into an age of unforeseen growth.
Polite society drank coffee and tea but porcelain was still too expensive to enjoy
equal distribution. As he wrote in his Experiment Book, Wedgwood: “saw the field
was spacious, and the soil so good as to promise ample recompense to any who
should labour diligently in its cultivation.”158 Innovation would grow more intense
after Wedgwood's workshop moved the new premises at the 'Ivy house'. There, the
potter began building his first great success, the 'creamware'. This was a resistant
and versatile  ceramic  obtained by the  mix of  Cornish china  clay,  china stone,
ground flint and Devon clay which was covered in hard lead glaze. In a very few
years,  Wedgwood's  bright  and  solid  pottery  conquered  most  of  the  market
previously held by the old Dutch Delft and by pewter plates. In 1762 he injured his
leg and he had to spend several weeks in Liverpool to recover.
Hurst and Blackett, London, 1866, vol. I, p. 210.
157 Samuel Smiles, Josiah Wedgwood, F.R.S., John Murray, London, 1894, p. 20
158 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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This annoying circumstance offered Wedgwood the opportunity to meet Thomas
Bentley,  an  eminent  local  merchant  with  whom he would  establish a  life-long
friendship and a fruitful business partnership. By the time of his first meeting with
Bentley, Wedgwood had already established a good reputation in the potteries. In
1762  he  was  appointed  by  his  fellow  potters  to  be  their  spokesman  before
Parliament and prepare a petition to prompt: “an Act for making a Turnpike Road,
from the Liverpool and London Road at Lawton, to Stoke-upon-Trent;  there to
unite with the Newcastle and Uttoxeter Turnpike Road.”
The text of the petition testifies the growing political awareness of this branch of
manufacture: “In Burslem, and its neighbourhood, are near one hundred and fifty
separate  Potteries,  for  making  various  kinds  of  stone  and  earthenware:  which,
together, find constant employment and support for near seven thousand people.
The ware in these Potteries is exported in vast quantities from London, Bristol,
Liverpool, Hull,  and other seaports, to our several colonies in America and the
West Indies, as well as to almost every port in Europe”.159 As the most prominent
articulation  of  the  pottery's  interests,  Wedgwood's  lobbying  proved particularly
successful in the promotion of the Grand Trunk Canal scheme, which would to
connect the Potteries with Hull and Liverpool. Canalization was crucial to reduce
the number of breakages during transportation,  making it  possible  to lower the
price  and  conquer  wider  shares  of  the  market.  Wedgwood and  his  colleagues'
efforts  to  gather  political  support,  raise  money,  and  organize  petitions  and
assemblies led to the passage of an Act of Parliament which gave authorization for
the construction of a canal between the rivers Trent and Mersey. One of the key-
patrons of the project was the Duke of Bridgewater, duly solicited by Wedgwood.
After this political victory, Wedgwood was appointed treasurer of “The Proprietors
of the Navigation between the Trent & the Mersey”, who included the Duke of
159 John Ward, The Borough of Stoke-upon-Trent in the commencement of the Reign of Her Most
Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria comprising its History, Statistics, Civil Polity, & Traffic with
Biographical and Genealogical Notices of Eminent Individuals and Families, also the Manorial
History of  Newcastle-under-Lyme and Incidental Notices of  other  Neighbouring Places and
Objects, W. Lewis & Son, London, 1843, p. 28
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Bridgewater,  Earl  Gower,  Thomas  Anson,  Mr  Bagot  and  many  other  local
merchants,  landowners  and  industrialists.  The  year  1765  represents  another
landmark  in  Wedgwood's  career,  as  an  unexpected  commission  from  Queen
Charlotte gave him the opportunity to become “Potter to Her Majesty”. From 1767
Wedgwood would use this title in the attempt to target the aristocratic audience,
and his creamware were re-baptized Queen's Ware. Furthermore, in 1765 Josiah's
adored first child, 'Sukey' (Susannah), was born after his marriage to Sarah.
As we shall see, Wedgwood's attempts to win the favour of the aristocratic class
proved  successful  and  that  ensured  a  firm  grip  on  a  network  of  influential
sponsors. In fact, as Berg puts it, “the court and the salon provided the first cultural
context for luxury; the domestic interiors of the wealthy followed.”160
Commercial  success  was  based  upon  marketing  as  well  as  research  and
development. From 1763 and 1767 Wedgwood introduced the 'dicing' lathe, which
was used to incise chequered designs on ceramics and later the 'rose' lathe, which
made it  possible  to decorate pots with parallel  vertical stripes.161 Moreover,  his
constant innovation would be inspired and imitated the new classical design. As
Michael Vickers observed in 1987, this new artistic vogue was in part crafted by
means of a campaign aimed at sensitizing the learned and wealthy audience to the
valuable simplicity of  classical  pottery.  Among  the  pivotal  agents  of  this
revaluation of Greek and Roman aesthetics were the virtuosi William Hamilton
and the  French  art  historian  Pierre-François  Hugues,  Baron  d'Hancarville.  The
latter  had introduced Hamilton to  the Porcinari  family,  from whom the British
diplomat would buy a vast collection of antique vases. 
Hamilton would later sell this collection to the British Museum for 8,000 guineas.
This was the first major sale of classical pottery in modern times and the epilogue
of a long marketing operation of which d'Hancarville was the astute  éminence
grise. 
160 Maxine Berg,  Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2005, p. 40.
161 Robert Copeland, Wedgwood Ware, Shire, Princes Risborough, 2004, p. 10.
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In  the  first  volume of  his  Hamilton  Collection,  dated  1768,  when  it  was  still
uncertain  who  could  be  the  buyer  of  the  vases,  d'Hancarville  states  that  the
collection was “equally proper for the compleating of well understood Collections
of Prints and designs, or to furnish in a manner not only agreeble but useful and
instructive, the Cabinet of a Man of Taste and letters.”162 d'Hancarville puts great
effort  into  showing  how  Romans  conceived  vases  as  high-value  items.  For
example, he construes the myth of allegedly precious 'Murrhine vases' such as the
famous Portland vase, later copied by Wedgwood.
In fact as Wedgwood himself was to discover in 1785, the Portland vase was made
of glass. Nevertheless, d'Hancarville's strategy consisted in convincing the reader
that Romans used to pay extraordinarily high prices for pottery vessels. Needless
to say d'Hancarville's agenda was perfectly consistent with Wedgwood's interests:
“Wedgwood did not know of d'Hancarville's text to Hamilton's plates, but like him
realized  that  if  the  public  was made aware that  the  technique involved  in  the
manufacture  of  black-on-red  pottery was difficult,  then  the  value of  their  own
wares might be increased.” Therefore: “it was in no one's interest to dispel the
notion that Greek vases were valuable in antiquity.”163 As we shall see, Wedgwood
and Bentley's salesmanship was also rooted in the perception that their ceramics
were  priceless  status  symbols,  very  precious  and  proportionally  difficult  to
make.164 But  if  d'Hancarville  was  broadcasting  a  diligently  crafted  image  of
Roman  art,  consumption  style  and  values,  Wedgwood  strove  to  reconcile  the
imitation of the classics with the definition of his own designs and authorship. The
first  was  an  historian,  a  skilled  and  authoritative  narrator;  the  second  was  a
162 Michael Vickers,  “Value and Simplicity: Eighteenth-Century Taste and the Study of Greek
Vases”, Past and Present 116 (1987) 98-137, p. 104.
163 Vickers, 1987, p. 112.
164 On 7 December 1768 Bentley wrote to Cox, a dealer in rarities, in particular porcelain: “We
have at length got some Etruscan Vases in great forwardness, & shall send you several sets by
the next Carrier. If any of your Friends wonder why you have not got more & oftener, please to
give them to understand that it is very difficult to make fine and perfect things of any kind. How
often does our great Mistress Nature Fail, even in the finest  Order of her Productions! The
angelic Sex themselves are not all perfectly straight, delicate and beautiful, no more than our
Vases, and you may contrive to edge in the Natural Inference that every good Thing deserves a
good Price.” Eliza Meteyard, 1866, vol. II, pp. 98-99. Reported in Vickers, 1987, p. 124.
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craftsman and innovative entrepreneur. 
Wedgwood's  innovative  ingenuity  would  be  highly  praised  by  the  Victorian
cultural and political establishment. In 1862 Gladstone, the future Liberal Prime
Minister then Lord Palmerston's Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered a speech in
Burslem, on the occasion of the inauguration of the construction yard where the
Wedgwood  Institute  would  be  erected.  His  address  set  forth  as  an  encomium
Wedgwood's  liberal  iconography,  two  years  before  the  first  biographies  were
published. According to Gladstone: “Wedgwood was not only an active, careful,
clear-headed, liberal-minded, enterprising man of business – not only, that is to
say, a great manufacturer – but also a great man. He had in him that turn and
fashion of true genius which we may frequently recognize in our great engineers,
but which the immediate heads of industry, whether in agriculture, manufacture, or
commerce, have more rarely exhibited.”165 
Earlier on in 1862, an eight-foot bronze statue of Wedgwood was erected in Wilton
Square, Stoke-on-Trent. 
The statue was designed by Edward Davis and depicted Wedgwood according to
the portrait made of him by Joshua Reynolds. The potter from Burslem stood tall,
holding the Portland vase in his hand. The antique vase evokes one of the major
intellectual and material efforts in Wedgwood's life. Being the boldest copy of an
original Roman vase ever attempted by the potter, the Portland vase came to be
identified with the firm's brand itself, as we find in the 1878 mark and is still today
impressed on Wedgwood bone china.166 The choice of portraying Wedgwood with
the  Portland  vase,  however,  opens  up  the  question  as  to  how  much  of  his
innovation, beyond the purely technical, was a product of his creativity and how
much  stemmed  from  diligent  imitation.  In  other  words,  Davis'  statue  renders
Wedgwood's  suspension  between  creative  ingenuity  and  deference  to  classic
antiquity,  as it was crafted and broadcasted through the filter  of d'Hancarville's
165 McLeod, 2007, pp. 306-309.
166 For a chronology of Wedgwood marks see: Geoffrey Wills,  Wedgwood, Chartwell, Secaucus,
1989, pp. 122-123.
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books and Enlightenment literature on the Greek and Roman world. This is the
theme  I  shall  focus  upon  in  subsequent  chapters,  from  the  point  of  view  of
Wedgwood's discursive construction and defence of authorship.
One of  the sources  of  Wedgwood's  inspiration was D'Hancarville's  Antiquities,
Etrusques,  Greques  et  Romains,  one  of  the  undisputed  bibles  of  18th-century
antiquarianism.  The  potter  scrupulously  copied  the  patterns  contained  therein,
helping  to  spread  that  Neoclassical  credo  which  was  eloquently  inscribed  in
Winckelmann's motto: “noble simplicity and quiet grandeur”.167
In  due  time,  however,  Wedgwood  would  also  produce  some  contemporary
souvenirs, which were also in classic style but portrayed the great protagonists of
his age: Pitt, Keppel, James Cook, Wedgwood's good friend Joseph Priestley, Dr.
Johnson and many others. Wedgwood relied upon a network of agents, sponsors
and  collaborators  employed  in  the  distribution  of  his  products.  Thanks  to  the
assistance of envoys, connoisseurs and dealers his ceramics gained an entrée to
many of the most important courts of the world, those of Russia, Poland, Spain,
Portugal,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Netherlands,  Turkey,  Naples  and Turin.  Around a
thousand parcels were sent to the Continental nobility in the attempt to reproduce
the domestic strategy of starting from the peers and hence conquer the favour of
the  bourgeoisie.  In  his  London  showrooms  Wedgwood  also  held  ticket-only
exhibitions  of  new  collections.  He  had  begun  renting  a  two-bedroom  flat  in
Charles Street, close to Grovesnor Square. More than a warehouse, Charles street
was a  room filled with wares in  storage and awaiting arrangement at  the sale.
However, Wedgwood soon began looking for a larger venue and found it on Great
Newport Street, in Soho. 
Finally, in 1772 Wedgwood and Bentley opened their showroom on Greek Street
while two years later a brand new one was inaugurated in St. James Square, off
Pall Mall, which Wedgwood had recognized as the best place to set up a shop in
London: “Pall Mall is the best situat[io]n in London. It is convenient for the Whole
167 Vickers, 1987, p. 131.
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of this Great Town, the avenues to it open, & everybody comes there some time or
other. […] We must have an Elegant, extensive, & Conven[ien]t shew room, with
store rooms, & some conveniencies for two servants at least.168 
St  James Square  appears  to  have  been a very  strategic  location  for  trading in
luxury goods. The following is a brief description of the square, as reported in a
topographical description of London and Middlesex, from the early 19th century: 
“Upon the north side and near the middle of Pall Mall is St James Square, having a
circular  bason  inclosed  within  an  octagonal  railing,  in  its  centre;  the  houses
surrounding this square are chiefly inhabited by nobility. The town residence of
the bishops of London a large inelegant pile of brick building occupies along with
its neighbour Norfolk House in which our present  sovereign was born,  all  that
portion of the eastern side of the square, intercepted between Charles Street and
Pall Mall. At the corner of York Street an avenue leading from this street to Jermyn
Street is the large house and manufactory of Mr Wedgwood in whose exertions
much of the late reformations of public taste is to be ascribed.”169 Business went on
well  until  1770-1772 when the  young firm encountered  a  troublesome period.
Bentley had difficulty supervising their clerks in London and the two partners had
to deal with the dishonesty of some of their employees. Moreover, Josiah's father-
in-law fell sick, which momentarily lost him his wife's collaboration. He began to
suffer from eye-train and was habitually afraid to lose his sight for ever.
However,  when  his  health  improved,  Wedgwood  managed  to  provide  fresh
impulse to his depressed business. When trade was at a low-ebb, he was aggressive
enough to keep prices up and wait patiently for better days.
New and challenging orders soon arrived. Lady Cathcart, Hamilton's sister, who
was married to the British Ambassador to Russia, made the rich Russian market
available  to  Wedgwood  with  some  important  commissions.  Thanks  to  the
168 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 23 May 1767. Katherine E. Farrer ed., Correspondence of Josiah
Wedgwood, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010 [1903], p. 142.
169 George A. Cooke, Topographical and Geographical Description of the County of Middlesex,
Brimmer & Co., London, 1810, p. 311.
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mediation of Cathcart, in 1773-1774, Wedgwood accepted a challenging task, the
production of the Green Frog Service, for Catherine the Great of Russia.
This was an outstanding service made of 952 pieces of table-ware and dessert-
ware, each decorated with different views of Britain.
The enamelling of this service kept Wedgwood's works at Chelsea occupied for a
whole  year.  Afterwards,  this  extraordinary  set  was  moved  to  Greek  Street
showroom, where it was adorned with 1,244 different views of British landscapes,
manor houses and gardens. When it was displayed to the public in Greek Street,
the  exhibition was attended by Queen Charlotte,  the  monarchs  of  Sweden and
Prince  Ernest  Mecklenburg.  While  the  financial  gain  was  certainly  not
proportionate to  the immense effort  to  realize  such a service,  the  prestige and
publicity were considerable. 
In order to maintain his sales, Wedgwood tried a number of original  materials,
which eventually led him to manufacture a truly British 'stoneware'.
He would thus arrive at an invention which marked another key-moment in the
history of British pottery - the Jasper.
The new material consisted in a kind of vitrified stoneware which could bear a
slight translucency. It was meant to imitate the Roman cameo glass, like that used
to re-make the Portland vase, but it was duller and less polished. The year 1780
was marred by the loss of Wedgwood's close friend and business partner Thomas
Bentley and represents a turning point in Josiah's life. He became closer to his
friend Erasmus Darwin, his family's physician. The business went on thanks to his
nephew Thomas Byerley,  while  the 50-year-old potter engaged more and more
with experimental philosophy. He was good friend with the chemist and member
of the  Lunar club  Joseph Priestley and in  1783 obtained the  fellowship of  the
Royal Society for the invention of a pyrometer.
Moreover,  politics,  national  and local,  remained another  of  Wedgwood's  major
activities throughout the 80s. In 1785 we find him leading the General Chamber of
Manufacturers, an organization of industrialists which were intent upon opposing
the  Irish  Trade  Treaty.  As  we  have  seen,  the  combination  proved  successful,
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although  the  new institution was  short-lived.  Nevertheless,  two years  later  the
foundation of the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade afforded Wedgwood
another chance to voice his political sentiments. It is well known that he produced
an  anti-slavery  cameo,  modelled  by  William  Hackwood,  which  became  a
fashionable item associated with the abolitionist movement. In 1789 he welcomed
the early phase of the French Revolution but his son Tom, with James Watt Jr,
would become more involved in it. He lived long enough to see the blossoming
love between his daughter Susannah and Robert Darwin, the son of Erasmus, and
died in 1795, after a short illness. His Jasper-ware were imitated at Sèvres and
even at Meissen, where they were called Wedgwoodarbeit, 'Wedgwood's work'.
From Engines to Vases, a shift in the context of intellectual ownership
In the first section I argued that James Watt's exploitation of the patent system
played a role in the shaping of his discourse on invention and inventive work. Watt
still represents one of the clearest example of the modern inventor-entrepreneur,
rationalizing his intellectual ownership largely within the grammar provided by the
patent law and, accordingly, construes his narrative on invention and inventors.
Watt was both one of the most important patentees and one of the most renowned
ideologues  of  the  patent  system  of  his  age,  his  intellectual  property  being  a
symbolic landmark for later advocates of patent law throughout the Anglo-Saxon
world.  This is evident from the papers delivered during the  Celebration of the
Beginning of the Second Century of the American Patent Law (1891). In his talk,
Hon. Samuel Blatchford,  Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, spoke extensively about Watt's patent for the separate condenser, summing
up the history of the discovery and the legal contest to defend its validity. The
author,  who considers the judicial decisions at Watt's trial to be “of the highest
value”, deems Watt as the man who: “substantially created the steam engine and
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gave to it  that usefulness and efficiency, the further development of which has
revolutionized  the  trade  and  manufactures  of  the  world.”170 During  the  same
congressional term, Robert H. Thurston, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at
Cornell University, praised Watt as “the ideal great inventor and mechanic”171 and
his partnership  with  Matthew  Boulton  represented  a  perfect  model  of  “the
combination of genius and capital”. According to Thurston: “[T]he good fortune –
a providence, we may well say – brought together the genius and the capitalist to
do their work, hand-in-hand, of providing the world with the steam engine. Hand-
in-hand they worked, and all the world to-day, and the race throughout its future
life, must testify gratitude for the inexpressible obligation under which these two
men have placed them, doing the work of the world.”172 The Scottish inventor
occupied a pivotal position in the history of patent law, as he came to embody that
crucial transitory phase during which the formerly denigrated class of 'projectors'
became the increasingly admired and celebrated class of 'inventors', and this social
and epistemological shift was “at least as consequential  as the far-better-known
shift  from 'natural  philosophers'  to  'scientist'”.173 By the  late  19th century those
inventors  who,  combining  inventive  ingenuity  with  entrepreneurial  flair,
contributed to the foundation of the British industrial empire, were thrusting aside
their  reputation as  'mere'  inventors.174 Those,  such as  Watt,  who could claim a
triumphant  entrepreneurial  history,  became  a  new  kind  of  Whig  heroes,
particularly suitable to challenge the Tory traditionally militaristic and aristocratic
hagiography,  which  had  dominated  the  age  of  anti-Napoleonic  warfare.  In
particular, Watt's representation as a self-made hero was instrumental to Scottish
Victorian  nationalism as  well  as  to  the agenda of  British liberal  reformers.  As
schemers and projectors were more often reputed as honourable men of science,
170 Celebrations of  the  Beginning  of  the  Second  Century  of  the  American  Patent  System  at
Washington City, D. April 8, 9, 10, 1891, Forgotten Books, 2013 [1892], p. 113
171 Ibid., p. 271.
172 Ibid., p. 278.
173 Adrian  Johns,  Piracy.  The  Intellectual  Property  Wars  from Gutenberg  to  Gates,  Chicago
University Press, Chicago, 2009, p. 258.
174 McLeod, 2007, p. 350.
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ingenious  patent-holders also became more distinguished and reputable.175 This
new tendency was celebrated in the 1905 biography of the Scottish inventor by
Andrew Carnegie, himself an industrialist and a patentee: “In nothing has public
opinion more completely changed than in its attitude towards patents. In Watt's
day, the inventor who applied for a patent was a would-be monopolist. The courts
shared the popular belief. Lord Brougham vehemently remonstrated against this,
declaring  that  the  inventor  was  entitled  to  remuneration.  Every  point  was
construed  against  the  unfortunate  benefactor,  as  if  he  were  a  public  enemy
attempting  to  rob  his  fellows.  Today the  inventor  is  hailed  as  the  foremost  of
benefactors.”176 Although much of Watt's narrative of invention was moulded by
the institutional context in which he developed his distinctively forensic rhetoric,
and the patent system has been one of the backgrounds against which Watt's work
has been most studied by contemporary scholars, we should bear in mind that the
exploitation of patent law was not the only possible strategy to defend intellectual
property.  On a  more  practical  level,  Watt  and his  business  partner  deployed a
manifold social technology in the attempt to establish and enforce their property
claims over the separate condenser, including espionage, marketing and political
networking. Discourse over invention was always bent to different practices and
the latter were adjusted to pursue contingent strategic interests.  Nevertheless, the
law worked as an institutionalized reference system to articulate a negotiation of
the concept of inventions and inventive work and, in the case of Watt, it proved to
be a camp for successful, albeit abiding and costly battles. At least when it came to
defending  his  own  patent,  Watt's  narrative  of  invention  was  shaped  by  the
necessity to prove it original, useful to the public and clearly attributable to its first
and original creator. Such an ideological and rhetorical grammar proved to be not
as  reliable  in  the  case  of  Wedgwood.  His  principal  intellectual  ownership was
175 Ibid,  pp.  27-39.  By no means  did  inventors  enjoy an  homogeneous reputation  as  men of
science. Samuel Smiles, Charles Babbage and William Whewell offer contrasting views of the
distinction between a scientific theoretical elite and the lower ranks of empirical mechanics. See
Ibid,  p.  353;  David  P.  Miller,  Discovering  Water.  James  Watt,  Henry  Cavendish  and  the
Nineteenth-Century 'Water Controversy', Ashgate, 2004, pp. 136-137.
176 Andrew Carnegie, James Watt, 1905, p. 117, EPUB digital edition.
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encompassed in that facet of I.P. laws that we now think of as design. The first
professional  group  in  Britain  to,  consistently  seek  a  legal  protection  of  their
designs  were  the  the  calico  artists  in  1787.  Their  petition  to  the  House  of
Commons lamented that “the petitioners and others have, with great industry and
expence,  severally  invented,  designed  or  engraved,  diverse  sets  of  new  and
original patterns for printing Linens and Callicoes, and Muslins, in Hopes to have
reaped the Benefit of such their own Labours, and the Credit thereof; but divers
Callicoe Printers, and other Persons, to save themselves the Expence of original
Designs,  have of late  too frequently  taken the liberty  of copying, printing and
publishing of great Quantities of base and mean copies and imitations thereof, to
the great Detriment of the Petitioners and other artists, and to the Discouragement
of the said Arts and Manufactures.”177 Thus the calico designers urged Parliament
to secure “the properties of the Petitioners for a limited time in the same manner as
the laws now being have preserved the properties of authors of books […] and the
inventors  and  engravers  of  historical  and  other  prints.”  In  order  to  meet  this
political  pressure,  an  Act  was  passed which  gave to:  “every  person who shall
invent design and print, or causes to be invented, deigned and printed, and become
the  proprietor  of  any new and original  pattern  or  patterns  for  printing  Linens,
Cottons,  Calicoes  or  Muslins”  the  “sole  right  and  liberty  of  printing  and
reprinting” their own design for the risible term of two months from the first day
of publication.178 Lahore argues that  the Act  de facto created a new branch of
industrial  property,  the  notion  of  design  being  derived  from  other  kinds  of
patentable contrivance but never assimilated to them. The parallel development of
design, copyright, and patents as means to defend different intellectual properties
would thus stem from a prejudicial division between art and industry.179 The case
of  British designers  is  indicative of  the  lower consideration they enjoyed as  a
177 Kathy Bowrey, “Art, Craft, Good Taste and Manufacturing: The development of Intellectual
Property Laws”, Law in Context, 15:1 (1997), 78-104, p. 83.
178 J.  C.  Lahore,  “Art  and  Function  in  the  Law  of  Copyright  and  Design.  The  Need  for  a
Reappraisal”, The Adelaide Law Review, 9 (1972), 182-209, pp. 182- 186.
179 Ibid., p. 367.
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social group, which conditioned the diminished degree of protection of their work.
This is particularly noticeable if we compare it with French protection of designs,
which were seen by many as the reason for the pre-eminence of Paris in every
department of industrial art.180  Hence, as McLeod points out in her study of the
British  patent  system: “The lack of any clear  definition of what constituted an
'invention'  and of  any mechanism for  isolating  the  novel  features  in  an  extant
instrument, machine or process were at the heart of many disputes. In industries
like ceramics, where design was the chief variant, this problem was at its most
acute. Most potters respected this and refrained from patenting.”181, In An Address
to  the  Artists  and Manufacturers  of  Great  Britain,  William Kenrick,  a  caustic
political  gadfly  and irreverent  observer  of  his  times,  describes the  unevenness
surrounding  the  legal  protection  of  intellectual  properties.  While  calling  for
equality in the safeguard of “the natural rights of Genius”182, the author comments:
“As an Author and an Artist of a certain class, an exclusive right, to profit by his
compositions and inventions, is secured to him by Statute for a considerable term
of  years;  as  an  Artificer or  artist of  any  other  class,  he  is  destitute  of  such
security.”183 Setting  his  position on a firmly  natural-law basis,  Kenrick argues,
somewhat similarly to Watt, that the rights bestowed to authors and inventors over
their creations are rooted in their respective toils and material investments. He also
remarks that this type of appropriation allow them to balance the impossibility to
subsist  by  mere  possession.  Hence,  it  is  clear  that  labour-based  theories  of
appropriation, applied here to intellectual property, could be rationalized as social
elevators at the disposal of a class of projectors, inventors, and early industrialists
who sought legitimation as the future driving force of the British economy. In fact,
according to the author,  British lawyers were restricted “by the narrow notions,
180 Ibid., pp. 186-187; Bowrey, 1997, p. 82.
181 McLeod, 1988, pp. 66-67.
182 William Kenrick, An address to the artists and manufacturers of Great Britain; Respecting an
Application  to  the  Parliament  for  the  farther  Encouragement  of  New  Discoveries  and
Inventions  in  the  Useful  Arts;  to  the  facilitating  future  Improvements  in  the  Produce,
Manufactures and Commerce of these Kingdoms, London, 1774, p. 2.
183 Ibid., p. 1.
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which confine property to a corpus or body”, as they “have recurred no farther
back  for  a  right  of  possession  than  prior  occupancy;  setting  discoveries  and
inventions  in  literature  and  science  on  the  same  footing  with  the  use  and
improvement of corporeal possessions.” The reference to prior occupancy, which
provided legitimation to the wealthy landed aristocracy is thus counteracted by a
“still  earlier  and  more  general  source”  of  property  rights.  Hence:  “Every  man
whom Providence sends into the world hath a natural right to live in it; and, if to
live in it, to the means of subsistence. In the present state of society, however, the
man who is born to no estate real or personal, finds the means of subsistence by
mere possession already engrossed by prior occupants; he is therefore of necessity
reduced  to  the  creation  of  new  means  of  livelihood;  a  right  to  all  corporeal
property being already secured to others, he must have recourse for subsistence to
the incorporeal property he is endowed with by Nature in the use of his personal
talents, he must live by his wits or his labour.”184 Should these natural rights be
denied, the poor would be “the natural-born Slaves of the Rich, and the possession
of corporeal property, however obtained” would offer: “a right to the possession of
all other: an affirmation which, I presume, no free-born subject of this country will
venture to make.”185 Furthermore, Kenrick contends that any distinction between
several  kinds  of  labour-derived  incorporeal  property  cannot  be  maintained,
opposing Catherine Macaulay's claim that authors should no be demoted to the
lower ranks of intellectual labourers: that is to say, as inventors in the useful arts.
In fact, Macaulay, who published A Modest Pleas for the Property of Copy Right
(1774), espoused the party who called for perpetual protection of authors' rights
over their works.186 It is to her that Kenrick responds bitingly when he argues: “I
184 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
185 Ibid.
186 A recent reconstruction of this debate is offered by Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right
to  Copy:  Charting  the  Movement  of  Copyright  Law,  Hart,  Portland,  2004,  pp.  149-168.
See also Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently,  The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law:
The British  Experience,  1760-1911,  Cambridge University  Press,  Cambridge,  1999,  p.  28;  
Mark  Rose,  Authors  and  Owners.  The  Invention  of  Copyright,  Harvard  University  Press,
London, 1993, pp. 105-107.
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know  not  how  this  ingenious  writer  will  make  good  this  assertion;  but  I  am
persuaded that, if the  authors  of such  new inventions  and  discoveries  did stand
upon the same footing, in regard to a legal security of a right of property in their
respective  productions,  as  authors  of  books  do,  they  would  not  complain  of
injustice or contend for a  perpetuity  in such right.  Every common capacity, says
this writer, can soon find out the use of a machine, which is not the case with a
book. I accede to the latter part of the assertion, because there are many books
whose use cannot be found out at all, as they are totally useless, if not hurtful: the
former part I deny, for as good a reason. Had this advocate for literary merit been
familiar with the labours of our mathematical, philosophical and even mechanic
artists, she would have known that there are many curious and useful machines,
with whose use the very makers of them are totally unacquainted.”187 Making his
case for stronger protection of the long-neglected intellectual ownership of artists
and artificers, Kenrick writes provocatively: “The genius of Newton was not of a
literary cast, nor does he raise our admiration or command our respect much as an
author, as he does in the capacity of an  inventor or  artist.” And yet: “the author
thinks eight and twenty years too short a term, in which to reap the benefit of his
labours,  while the  artist  or  artificer is  not  entitled,  by  any law in  being,  to  a
property  in  the  effects  of  his  ingenuity  for  a  single  day.”188 Notwithstanding
Kenrick's rather isolated concern for these lower-level intellectual labourers, which
might  be  read  as  one  of  his  polemical  barb  directed  at  the  elite  culture,  this
asymmetry in the legal framework of incorporeal properties was to last.189 In spite
of  'Hogart's Act' instituted in 1735 and the Copyright Act of 1787, which ensured
a measure of protection for cotton textile printers, it was only in 1839 that design
protection  was  extended to ceramics  and a  system for  registering  designs  was
187 Kenrick, 1774, pp. 7-8.
188 Ibid., p. 9. My italics.
189 On the relationship between artists and inventors in the 18th century see also: Dennis Diderot,
L'Histoire et le secret de la peinture en cire, 1755;  Liliane Hilaire-Perez, “Diderot’s views on
artists’ and  inventors’ rights:  invention,  imitation  and  reputation”,  British  Journal  for  the
History of Science, 35 (2002), 129-150. 
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established.190 Hence, these early forms of protection were further improved in the
period  1842-1883,  when the British Patent  Office issued diamond marks, with
apposite registration numbers, which made it easy to identify registered designs. 
The mark indicated the  class,  that  is,  the type of material  used, the number of
items  included,  and  the  date  of  registration. The  centre  of  the  diamond  also
displayed  the  abbreviation  “Rd”,  standing  for  “Registered  Design.”  However,
Wedgwood  did  not  enjoy  this  system  of  protection  and  his  understanding  of
intellectual property developed amid the growing awareness that his  claims for
authorship could not count upon legally enforced protection.  By focusing upon
Wedgwood's rhetoric, I intend to explore how his own discourse around invention
and  the  inventive  work  was  influenced  by  different  practices,  or  by  different
outcomes  of  similar  practices,  which  were  aimed  at  securing  his  intellectual
property  and  the  originality  of  his  contribution.  I  call  them 'similar'  practices
because Wedgwood did attempt to find protection under the umbrella  of patent
law,  but  he  was  significantly  less  successful  in  this  than  his  friends  in  Soho..
Thanks  to  restless  innovation  and  efficient  marketing  policies,  Wedgwood
nevertheless managed to establish  a  highly distinctive brand.  My claim is  that
Wedgwood's  rhetoric indicates  a  blurred notion of originality,  the  dividing line
between  the  original  and  imitation  being  nuanced  and  fluidly  redrawn by  the
author himself and by all the actors of his network. Wedgwood's originality, his
own intellectual ownership, had to be established by his aristocratic customers and
preserved by his employees' loyalty and discretion. The first played a key role as
wealthy commissioners and sponsors of the great potter. They adopted his wares as
an essential item in the aristocratic manor, opening up to the broader middle-class
market.  Wedgwood's  employees  were  expected  to  bend  to  the  needs  of  a  re-
organized system of  production which was vertical  and centralized,  both in  its
organization  and  ideology.  Therefore,  particularly  in  his  ornamental  works,
moulders, enamellers, painters, designers and artisans were required to hand their
190 McLeod, 1988, p. 67.
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authorship to the head of their community, who conceived of himself as a patriarch
and  deployed  the  material  and  literary  technology  of  paternalism.  Industrial
paternalism here will be approached from an ideological perspective, but the social
imagery which is transparent in Wedgwood's letters and pamphlets was intertwined
with a powerful social technology in regard to his workmanship, which has been
outlined in McKendrick's Wedgwood and Factory discipline (1961).191 Winning his
employees'  loyalty  was  the  first  requisite  to  extending  and  intensifying
Wedgwood's  control  over  them,  an  essential  trait  of  any  counter-espionage
strategy, as the crude force solution of battling his copyists legally was not likely
to be fruitful. But what was Wedgwood's relationship with the broken umbrella of
the patent system? Like his other rhetoric regarding inventive work, his stance on
patents  seems to  be  rather  fickle.  In  1791 he  expressed  to  Lord  Dundonald  a
seemingly trenchant opinion:  “I am not surprised at your lordship’s aversion to
patents. They are bad, and deficient for the purpose intended in many respects, and
as many foreigners may learn the discoveries for which the  patents  have been
granted at the expense of a few shillings and practice them immediately in other
countries whilst the hands of all British artists and manufacturers are bound during
the term of the patent. Considered in this light, patents are highly pernicious to the
community amongst whom the invention originated and a remedy is much wanted
in the patent office for this evil.”192 Such a declaration might prompt us to infer that
Wedgwood, like many others at the time, was a fierce critic of the patent system.
On  the  contrary,  his  opinion  seems  to  have  changed  over  time,  according  to
contingent situations. In 1767 Wedgwood had tried to take advantage of the patent
records as he asked a friend to get a copy of Count de Lacuaquais's specification
for the making of porcelain, “letting the cost be what it will”.193 He attempted to
take advantage of the same opportunities provided by the patent rolls, which he
would later denounce to Dundonald as a dangerous bug of the patent system. As
191 Neil McKendrick, “Josiah Wedgwood and Factory Discipline”, The Historical Journal, 4:1
(1961), 30-55.
192 Dutton, 1984, p. 26-27. My italics.
193 Bottomley, 2004, p. 186.
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Harris points out in his study of 18th century industrial espionage, it seems that
Wedgwood, along with many other industrialists of his age: “was not committed to
any  purist,  high  moral  ground  view about  industrial  espionage:  if  there  were
foreign  processes  and  technicians  that  would  be  valuable  to  us,  it  was
commonsense for us to procure them by means fair or foul.”194 In fact, as we shall
see, Wedgwood took out a patent for the encaustic colours of his antique vases, but
his 1769 patent crucially proved to be too weak a tool to enforce and give strength
to his intellectual ownership. 
Who has the secret of porcelain? Wedgwood's opposition to Cookworthy's patent
  On one occasion on which Wedgwood clearly managed to exploit  the patent
system  to  his  own  advantage,  skilfully  arguing  the  case  for  the  Staffordshire
potters against a partner of the Bristol china manufactory, Richard Champion. This
contest dates back to 1775, the year of Boulton and Watt's fundamental success in
lobbying  Parliament  for  an  extension  of  their  1769  patent.  By  this  time,
Wedgwood had grown interested in West of England clay trade. His main contact
there was Thomas Hyde of Poole, with whom Wedgwood planned to establish a
trade in white clay, to be dispatched along the Trent and Mersey Canal and brought
to his factory to be worked by his artisans, via Gainsborough. However, the use of
Cornish clay was restricted by a patent, William Cookworthy's exclusive rights
over a method of making porcelain from native English materials.  In 1774 this
patent was sold to Richard Champion, a dealer and ceramicist who would later
become a protégé of Richard Burke. Little concern was manifested from the part
of  the  earthenware  manufacture  of  Staffordshire,  until  Champion  applied  to
Parliament to obtain an extension of his privileges. Champion managed to have his
194 Harris, 2000, p. 478.
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patent  Bill  passed  by  the  Commons,  without  opposition,  but  the  Staffordshire
potters, captained by Wedgwood, were able to jeopardize his progress in the Lords.
On  the  5  March  1774,  Wedgwood  invited  Bentley  to  mobilize  their  good
connection: “Several Gentlemen you know I should have waited up[o]n if time
would  have  permitted  respecting  our  opposition  to  Mr  Champions  Bill.  In
particular our County Members, & all the Members from the several Borroughs in
Staffordshire,  &  I  am  afraid  they  will  be  offended  with  the  omission  of  this
Personal application. Sir Wm Bagot is in Town- pray see him. Likewise our good
Frd Ld Stamford – Ld.  Guernsey - & some others you may find in the Court
Calender.  -  Do  now  my Dear  Frd.  Get  into  your  Chariot  &  visit  these  good
Gentlemen & solicit their assistence on our great day. It will do you some good &
your  Country  a  great  deal.”195 There  ensued  a  paper  war  fought  by  means  of
pamphlets and petitions, each party attempting to exert the utmost influence on
Parliament. Thanks to the influence of one of Wedgwood's patron, Lord Gower,
Richard  Champion's  Bill  was  substantially  amended,  according to  the  requests
made by the earthenware manufacturers. In particular, Champion was requested to
submit  a  specification  including  the  exact  formula  of  his  porcelain  mixture.196
Nevertheless, in order to avoid patent protection, it was sufficient to use the same
ingredients in different proportions. Therefore, as Burton points out: “at the end of
the day Champion was left with his porcelain, and the Staffordshire potters were
free to invade Cornwall.”197 As we have seen, the contest between Champion and
the Staffordshire manufacturers had a public interface. Therefore, it underwent a
conceptualization  which  translated  private  interests  into  a  discourse  over
legitimacy,  property,  invention  and  the  public  good.  Wedgwood  played  an
important  role  in  this  quarrel,  as  he  effectively  formulated  the  case  against
Champion's  patent.  Writing  on  behalf  of  himself  and the  Staffordshire  potters,
195 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 5 March 1774, Katherine E. Farrer,  Correspondence of Josiah
Wedgwood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010 [1903], 3 vols., p. 64.
196 See Anthony Burton, Josiah Wedgwood, Andre Deutsch, New York, 1976, p. 145; Brian Dolan,
Wedgwood: the first tycoon, Penguin books, London, 2004, p. 239.
197 Burton, 1976, p. 146.
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Wedgwood  presented  a  Memorial to  the  House  of  Commons.  He  argued  that
pottery  had  been  a  flourishing  market  and  a  growing  branch  of  British
manufacturing.  However:  “the  further  Improvement  of  the  Manufactury  must
depend upon the Application and free Use of the various Raw Materials that are
the Natural Products of this Country.” Thus, from the very beginning, Wedgwood
claimed that the public interest could not but be against Champion's extension of
his monopoly. In fact: “That the Raw Materials now secured for a limited Time to
the Petitioner, may at the Expiration of the Patent assigned to him, be of great Use
to enable the Potters, throughout Great Britain, to improve their Manufactures into
the finest Porcelain; and thereby produce a Branch of Commerce of more national
Importance  than  any  of  this  Kind  hitherto  established.”198 Hence,  Wedgwood
points  out  the  major  difference  between  James  Watt  and  Richard  Champion's
application for an extension of their respective patents: “The Case of the ingenious
Mr.  Watt, and the Extension of his Patent, having been urged in Favour of Mr.
Champion's Application for the like Indulgence, it may be proper to observe that
the Cases are far from being similar, - Mr- Watt being the original Inventor of the
Machine for which his Patent was granted, and Mr. Champion the purchaser only
of the unexpired Term of a Patent granted to another Man, who does not appear to
have  any  Interest  in  this  Application.”199 Hence  it  is  interesting  to  note  that
intellectual ownership is clearly distinguished from the patent as a document and
as regards its related rights. In fact,  being only the purchaser  of Cookworthy's
patent, Champion owned the patent, with its terms and conditions (at the moment
of the transaction) but not the moral right to ask for its extension. After all, argues
Wedgwood,  the  patent  was  a  perishable  good  and  Champion  bought:  “the
remaining Term of the Patent at a proportionate Price.” The patent holder would
answer this objection in his A Reply to Mr. Wedgwood's Memorial relative to Mr.
198 Llewellynn Jewitt, Frederick William,  The Wedgwoods: Being a Life of Josiah Wedgwood;
with  Notices  of  His  Works  and  Their  Productions,  Memoirs  of  the  Wedgwood  and  Other
Families,  and  a  History  of  the  Early  Potteries  of  Staffordshire,  Virtue  Brothers  and  Co.,
London, 1865, p. 238.
199 Ibid., p. 238.
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Champion's Application for a Bill to prolong his Patent for making Porcelain.200
Champion would restate his claim by pointing to public utility and the justice of
compensation: “His hopes of success were based 'on two circumstances: the first,
the apparent utility resulting from such a manufacture carried to a perfection equal
to that of the Dresden and Asiatic. The second circumstance on which he grounded
his expectation was the sense which he hoped the House would entertain of the
justice of compensating, by some reasonable privilege, the great labour, expence,
and risque which had been incurred, not only in the invention of the material and
composition, but in the improvement of this important manufacture.”201 Therefore,
as should now be clear, the context of this quarrel imposes upon its actors the kind
of arguments which have to be made, as Watt did in his own texts, Champion here
demanded  acknowledgment  of  his  labour  and  individual  merits.  Hence,  while
answering Wedgwood's accusation that he lacked the necessary skills to exploit the
potential  of his  patent,  Champion would declare:  “Nor is  Mr Wedgwood more
excusable for his implication that a want of skill prevented the wok being brought
earlier  to  perfection.  Undoubtedly  the  difficulty  arose  from a  want  of  skill  in
working these new materials. This is a profound as well as civil remark of Mr.
Wedgwood's; but that skill was to be acquired only by care and expense, and that
care and expense are Mr. Champion's merits.”202 The petitioner also reassures his
competitors. His patent is not sic et simpliciter for raw materials; rather the patent
covers the mixture which he works to produce porcelain: “It is contended that Mr.
Wedgwood, and every manufacturer, should reap the fruit of their labour; all he
asks is, such a protection for his own as the legislature in its wisdom shall think it
merits.” The remark that Champion was not the original inventor of the patented
improvement:  “is  unjust,  because  he  has  been  many  years  concerned  in  this
undertaking: nearly from the time the patent was granted to Mr.  Cookworthy, in
whose  name  it  continued  till  assigned  over  to  Mr.  Champion.  To  deny  the
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid., p. 240. My italics.
202 Ibid., p. 241.
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advantage of any part of Mr. Cookworthy's merits to this assignee is to deny that
advantage  to  Mr.  Cookworthy  himself.”203 While  replying  to  Wedgwood,
Champions  defended  his  property  claims  by  remarking  his  merits  in  terms  of
labour  and  material  investment:  “Mr.  Champion  can  assert  with  truth  that  his
hazard and expence was many times greater that his hazard and expence was many
times  greater  than  those  of  the  original  inventor.  Mr.  Champion  mentions  this
without  the least disparagement to the worthy gentleman, who is his  particular
friend; he gives him all the merit which was due to so great discovery; he deserves
it, for finding out the means of a manufacture which will, in all probability, be a
very great advantage to this country; but yet Mr. Champion claims the merit of
supporting the work,  and,  when the inventor  declined  the undertaking himself,
with his time, his labour, and his fortune, improved it from a very imperfect to an
almost perfect manufacture; and he hopes soon, with proper encouragement, to one
altogether perfect.”204 However, in spite of his rare engagement in such contests
and notwithstanding his sensitivity to the legal battles and debates which involved
his Birmingham friends, Josiah Wedgwood was very soon disillusioned with any
possibility  of  successfully  defending  his  creations  within  the  patent  system.
Maxine Berg points out that patents could be useful in many respects. They could
represent  a  form of  advertising,  they  conveyed  a  social  status  and  a  gloss  of
technical  expertise  and modernity.  Nevertheless:  “competition  was so fierce  in
fast-moving  fashion  markets that  expensive  patenting  processes  formed  no
protection for intellectual property rights.”205 Josiah learnt this at his expense.
203 Ibid. My italics.
204 Ibid., p. 241.
205 Berg, 2005, p. 179.
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Imitators of imitations: Wedgwood's competitors and copyists
Like Watt, he registered a letter patent in 1769 in order to protect the process of
obtaining the encaustic paint he used to give a new look to his wares. In January
Wedgwood visited London to acquaint himself with the most fashionable goods in
the market.  He would report that Etruscan vases were still at  the peak of their
success, while marbling and gold were growing popular and in general there was
an “epidemical madness” for vases. Such a demand would last and Wedgwood was
hoping to meet it with his new encaustic colours. The figures on his wares were
painted by means of an antique-looking matte finish rather than the usual enamel.
Josiah's secret pigment was a mixture of several chemicals with bronze powder,
vitriol of iron and crude antimony.206 By the autumn of 1769, we find Wedgwood
characteristically torn between his strong entrepreneurial instinct to keep his secret
and the  need to  make  and sell  as  much as  possible,  in  an  attempt  to  contrast
imitation by means of superior timing:
“I want to talk very seriously to my Dear Friend about Encaustic Vases, pray sit
down, take a pipe, & compose yourself. If our potters once make the black body
they will mimick the painting as soon as they see it, this shews the necessity of
doing a quantity in as little time as possible. I will engage to supply you with Vases
enough for all the good painters in England. You say you can sell a Waggon load a
week, if you sell that quantity in the Season, you must have ten Waggon loads of
painters  to  finish  them.”207 Timing was  everything,  because  he  knew imitation
could not be eluded for long. Hence, ten days later Wedgwood would write again
to Thomas Bentley, recommending discretion. Advertising was important, but  also
necessitated caution. Thus Wedgwood advised his partner: “The Encaustic will be
imitated as soon as seen, let us therefore when once we begin, push it with all our
force […] I think you should make a point of shewing, & selling these yourself
206 Dolan, 2004, p. 227.
207 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 17 September, 1769. In Farrer, 2010, p. 273.
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only, lock them up, do not let Parker see them, remember Voyez is in Town, & the
Warehousemen should not have it in their power to shew a pair of these Vases for
sale.”208
 On 1 October 1769 he stated that: “Customers should not be distracted with too
great  a  profusion  of  variety,  I  shall  nevertheless  be  bringing  other  things  in
forwardness to succeed the encaustic which I look upon as our principal article for
the  ensueing  season.”  With  respect  to  “Rivalship”,  he  would  optimistically
reassure his friend: “we will cast all dread of that behind our backs, treat it as a
base,  & vanquish'd  enemy,  &  not  bestow  another  serious  thought  upon  it.”209
References to competitors, industrial espionage, and forgery are not infrequent in
Josiah's letters and John Voyez definitely features there as one of his most resolute
imitators. Voyez was a Frenchman who had been working in England for the most
of  his  life.  We know that  his  work grew more  important  when he  started  his
collaboration  with  Wedgwood  in  1768.  According  to  Moore,  who  dedicated  a
chapter of his book to this “man of mystery”,210 Voyez's first work was a glass
cameo portraying King George, produced in about 1766. His admirers claim that
this cameo was the forerunner of the material which Wedgwood would later call
jasper. However, it is certain that the relationship between the Frenchman and his
former employer deteriorated quite rapidly. In fact, this talented enameller worked
for Wedgwood for only one year, as a prominent artist at Etruria. At some point,
seemingly out of the blue: “his besetting sin overcame him, and he was riotous,
disorderly and drunken on the premises of the Wedgwood works, for which he was
sentenced to be flogged and imprisoned three months.” During these months, he is
said to have carved a large panel of ivory which he entitled: “Prometheus Ale-
bound!”.211
Voyez was not yet out of prison, when Wedgwood was faced with a dilemma over
208 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 27 September 1769. Ivi, p. 288.
209 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 1 October 1769. In Farrer, 2010, p. 297.
210 N. Hudson Moore,  Wedgwood and his Imitators, Frederick A. Stones Company, New York,
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the  best  way  to  deal  with  his  former  employee,  and  attempt  to  preserve  his
industrial secrets. His solution would reflect his usual inclination to compromise.
However “lazy” and unreliable Voyez could be, he argues: “to live in this world,
as matters & things are constituted, it is sometimes necessary to make a truce with
these sensations, whilst we manage a Rascal, our evil stars have thrown in our
way, to prevent repeated injuries which he might otherwise do us.”212
However, more problems with Voyez were  to come.
As soon as the riotous artist regained his liberty, Wedgwood came to know that he
had associated himself with another potter, a certain Palmer of Hanley.
The latter could neither make jasper nor fire it properly. Therefore, as Wedgwood
had foreseen, the Frenchman's skills became a danger to his past firm.
Besides himself being a valuable modeller, Voyez could also sell the knowledge he
had acquired while working in Burslem under Josiah's eye. Burton suggests that
Wedgwood even attempted to purchase Voyez's silence by paying his full salary,
provided that  he just kept  doing nothing.213 Apparently,  this  agreement did not
work,  as  we have  evidence of  Voyez  still  working  in  1780 and counterfeiting
Wedgwood's seals as late as the 1770s. We will find him mentioned again in some
of Josiah's letters from 1774. Now let us go back briefly to Wedgwood's patent,
which was registered in 1769, the same year as Watt's most important patent on the
separate condenser.
For one year, Josiah repeatedly advised his partner to be as discreet as possible, in
order to prevent any unnecessary leak of relevant information about their encaustic
vases.  It  was not long,  however,  before the bad news he had always expected
finally  arrived from London.  Hence,  the  founder  of Etruria  was informed of a
potter, H. Palmer, who was producing antique-style vases, painted with encaustic
colours. The latter  was a fine potter who had established himself  at  Hanley in
about 1780 to manage his enterprise with the help of his wife, the daughter of an
212 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 9 April 1769. My italics. In Farrer, 2010, p. 260.
213 Burton, 1976, p. 96.
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older potter, and his brother-in-law John Neale, who took care of the marketing in
London.
Owing to some financial hardship, the firm was taken over by Neale in 1776 and,
following a new partnership with Robert Wilson in 1778, it commenced working
under the name of Neale and Co. In 1787 it became Neale and Wilson and from
1800 Wilson's son turned it into C. Wilson.
 Josiah had been alerted about Palmer from as early as 1768, when he first knew
that a London china merchant was sending all the new patterns to Palmer, who
worked near Burslem, as soon as they arrived at Wedgwood's showrooms. He had
therefore warned William Cox, who acted as his trusted agent in London, to be
particularly  vigilant  with  visitors.214 The  early  20th  century  historian,
N. Hudson Moore cites Palmer as one of the most effective copyist of Wedgwood's
pottery.215 His story is indicative of the kind of commercial espionage affecting
Wedgwood's wares and design. Apparently, Palmer used to send his wife disguised
to buy some samples of the new patterns which regularly arrived in London from
the potteries at Burslem and Etruria. He also employed Voyez as his modeller in
order to reproduce the reliefs on Wedgwood's vases.
In 1770 Palmer and Neale appeared to have violated Wedgwood's patent on the
encaustic finish: “I expected no less than what you have wrote me respecting the
invasion of our Patent & I apprehend they will persist in it to the utmost so that a
trial  seems  inevitable,  &  if  so,  the  sooner,  the  better.”216 Notwithstanding
Wedgwood's early firmness, the patent system would turn out to be a very slippery
ground when it came to defending his design, the very essence of his invention
being questioned by this determined and sly competitors: “Another of his intended
pleas  is,  that  our  Patent  is  not  founded  upon  a  new  invention,  but  upon  an
improvement only, & they do not fear, if this should fail them, of proving that our
214 Dolan, 2004, p. 181.
215 Moore, 1909, p. 99.
216 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 13 Oct. 1770. In Farrer, 2010, p. 377.
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Patent  will  be  a  detriment  to  trade.”217 The  struggle  must  have  been  bitter,
Wedgwood’s antagonist “moving  Heaven & Earth”,218 and it grew so expensive
that the two parts, after showing signs of détente,219 would reach the conclusion
that “Mr P[almer] should be admitted a sharer in the P[aten]t & that it should be
left to reference what he should pay for his share of the P[aten]t.”220 This bitter
experience of the uncertainty of the patent law would be followed by several other
cases of unfair competition.
In  1774  the  name  of  John  Voyez  re-appears  again  in  Wedgwood's  epistolary
exchange. His Majesty's Potter had to deal with the unfair imitation of his seals by
Voyez who put “our names in full length in his seals.”221 The contest would again
be very uncertain, Wedgwood relying for informations on the testimony of one of
Voyez’s former servants,222 and Voyez showing his usual shamelessness: “When he
is ask’d by any Gentleman whilst he is selling his Seals, why he puts Wedgwood &
Bentley upon them. 'I borrow & lend with them', he says, 'when I am out of any
particular sorts, or they want any that I have, we borrow & lend with each other'.
So you see we are upon very friendly terms, & it might be a pity to interrupt this
mutual exchange of good offices by an Action of trespass. What do you think of it?
I do not know how far this kind of Forgery is punishable by Law but it is not very
pleasing, & should be in some way or other be contradicted’.223 Nevertheless, time
would once again mitigate his determination to fight his unfair competitors: “The
Lad [Voyez's former assistant] told me they had not put our Names upon their
Seals of some time; so it may perhaps be as well to let the Thief alone. I hate any
sort of contest, if it can decently be avoided, with a dirty Fellow; it being almost
impossible to keep ones self un-mired.”224 It was the laws' ineffectiveness when it
217 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 21 Jan. 1771, Ibid., p. 392.
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came to protecting what really mattered for Wedgwood, which prompted the potter
to defend his own creations, avoiding the expense of lengthy legal battles over the
legitimacy of patents. This is transparent in the way Etruria worked as a powerful
device for the creation, maintenance and defence of his intellectual property.
The factory embodies all the following features. On the one hand it was, along
with the showrooms, the aristocratic salons, the embassies, and the courts, a place
where  the  process  of  authorship  attribution  and  promotion  occurred.  It  was  a
'showcase'  factory  which  welcomed  a  select  elite  and  offered  an  immediate
impression  on  how  Wedgwood's  products  were  created  and  how  the  vertical,
highly  specialized,  productive  system  was  orchestrated  by  the  head  of  the
community, the great organizer behind the toil of hundreds of men.
But Etruria was also the place where loyalty was instilled, artists were forced to
abandon  any  pretensions  to  the  fruits  of  their  creativity,  and  the  flow  of
information was fragmented, department by department, each physically separated
from each other. Finally, Etruria was meant to appear ideally as an inexpugnable
fortress  impregnable  to  potential  spies,  although  its  imperviousness  was  often
tested. 
Suborned workmanship and the problem of limiting the circulation of knowledge
Maintaining secrecy regarding Wedgwood's own industrial processes was crucial
in order to gain the lead over his competitors and to produce something new to put
before the market so as to replace obsolete and widely imitated goods.
But as the case of Voyez taught him, industrial counter-espionage could work with
the cooperation of his employees.
On the other hand, keeping his workers loyal grew increasingly difficult,  as in
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1779 a violent protest arose across the manufacturing provinces, leading to lasting
unrest. This general state of lawlessness and depredation was partially due to the
ongoing  war  in  the  American  colonies,  which  effected  the  supply  of  young
workers at home.
On an  October  morning in  1779,  a  mob gathered  outside  Richard  Arkwright's
cotton  mill  in  Lancashire.  According  to  a  witness  who  reported  the  deeds  in
Parliament, the rioters were “armed in a warlike Manner”. They broke into the mill
and destroyed the spinning machine before setting the building on fire. On the
same day, Josiah happened to be in Lancashire. He had to rush back to Etruria,
from  whence,  on  the  9  October  he  wrote  to  Bentley:  “We  met  the  mob  on
Saturday, but I apprehend what we saw were not the main body, for on the same
day in the afternoon a capital engine, or mill, in the manner of Arcrites, & in which
he is a partner, near Chorley was attacked, but the owner with the assistance of a
few neighbours repulsed the enemy. Two of the mob were shot dead upon the spot,
one drown'd, & several wounded. The mob had no firearms & did not expect so
warm a reception. They were greatly exasperated & vowed revenge: accordingly
they  spent  all  Sunday,  &  Monday  in  collecting  fire  arms,  &  ammunition,  &
melting their pewter dishes into bullets.”225 According to Wedgwood, the riotous
crowd had  already  smashed  several  engines  and  “meant  to  serve  them  all  so
through the country.”226 Their fury was rooted in the economic crises caused by the
war  with  the  American  revolutionaries  and  by  their  fear  of  being  made
unemployed because  of  the  new technology.  When the  agitation  was over,  the
government nominated a committee to scrutinize the arguments of  the workers
and the industrialists.
The contests was won by the manufacturers who managed to convince the ad-hoc
committee  that  new  machinery  would  benefit  the  trade,  thereby  accruing  the
wealth of the country, including the workers.227
225 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 9 Oct. 1779. Ivi, p. 421.
226 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 29 Sept, 1779. Ivi, p. 420.
227 Dolan, 2004, p, 298.
91
In other words, machines were replacing workmanship but also created new jobs
for those who operated them and kept them working. In the case of Wedgwood's
own workmen, however, the prospect of mechanization was not so bright. On the
contrary, Wedgwood's employees felt they were losing their contractual leverage,
as their unskilled job was much easier to replace.
Moreover, a generation of artists and artisans was quickly converted into industrial
workforce, trained to deal with single parts or aspects of the final artefact. As a
consequence of this, workers were not let into the secrets of the entire process of
production and could hardly sell  complete information. Many of them believed
there was a conspiracy against them, as the General Chamber of Commerce called
for legislation to prevent the emigration of skilled workmanship abroad.228
In 1783 new riots involved Etruria more directly than ever. This time Wedgwood
was  away  from home  but  his  sons  gave  him a  full  description  of  the  events.
According  to  Joss  Wedgwood,  one  of  their  boat  loaded  with  grain  had  left
Manchester and a riotous mob followed it, aiming to capsize it:
“I think they had notice of it from our works, there were several hundreds of  men,
women and children who followed it to Long Port & there a man jumping into the
boat the boatman cut the rope & with the knife struck at the man, immediately half
the mob cried put him into the canal which they would certainly have done if some
gentleman had not interfered & got into another boat. Then they brought the boat
in triumph to this place & lodged the contents in the crate shop: this was between 3
& 5 o'clock this evening. About half past seven four men came up to the house &
asked for something to eat & drink as they were to sit up to guard the corn flour
&c. John went to them & told them a great deal my mother followed and said
some more & then they went off.”229 Once the riot was over, some of the leaders
were captured and one of them was sentenced to death. Later, Wedgwood printed
an address directed not at the rioters, but at their children, asking them to disavow
228 Ibid., p. 300.
229 Reported in Burton, 1976, p. 186.
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the actions of their parents. According to Burton he intended to “lecture the poor
on  their  behaviour”,  thus  showing  another  example  of  his  inability,  to  be
sympathetic  to  the  sentiments  of  the  poor.230 Notwithstanding  the  seemingly
friendly incipit of his Address to the young inhabitants of the Pottery, the content
of the pamphlet is anything but appeasing. As in his later pamphlet on suborned
workers,  Josiah wrote like  a  patriarch,  setting forth from the very beginning a
totally uneven interlocution with his ideal readers:
“My Young Friends! The very serious events which have just now taken place
amongst  us,  must  alarm every  one who has  any regard  for  the  welfare  of  his
country  or  good  wished  towards  the  deluded  people  themselves,  who  were
concerned  in  the  late  Riots:  but  young  minds  like  yours  receive  stronger
impressions, and are more affected with such uncommon appearances than older
people; at the same time for want of that experience which should accompany riper
years, you are more likely to be misled in judging of the part you ought to take
when  such  violent  measures  are  in  agitation  […]  I  therefore,  address  myself
particularly to you, because when you are placed in these unhappy circumstances,
seeing those who have fed and protected you from your infancy very forward in
promoting such disorders, it is not to be wondered at that you should approve their
actions,  and  be  prepared  yourselves  to  follow  their  example  upon  any  future
occasion.”231 
Wedgwood goes on to explain why the expence of provisions, which was said to
be  due  to  the  poor  harvest,  could  not  legitimate  any  uprising  aimed  at
expropriating the providers of the fruits of their labour. Violence and theft will not
induce the farmers to supply the poor neighbours in better degree. In fact: “[T]hese
certainly are not the proper means to redress the grievances complained of, and as
the corn grown in our own neighbourhood is not at all sufficient for our wants, we
should at least permit those, who supply us with this and other necessaries of life
230 Ibid., p. 187.
231 Josiah Wedgwood, Address to the young inhabitants of the Pottery, 1783, p. 3. A copy of this
pamphlet is held at the University Library, Cambridge, (9474.d.1144).
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from distant parts, to do it with safety to their persons and properties.”232 Leaning
on a definition of 'property' as the fruit of one's labour, Wedgwood claims that no
contingency  of  the  market  could  provide  valid  grounds  for  violence  against
persons and properties: “I say the laws Must protect us both, for if it was not so,
there would be an end of all government, an end of the state. - No man could be
secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour for a single day. -  No man
therefore would labour, but the stronger would rob and murder the weaker, till the
kingdom was filled with rapine and violence, and every man afraid to meet his
neighbour. The land would be untilled, for who would plough or sow without the
hopes of reaping for himself, and being protected in his property: famine, and its
companion pestilence, must follow, and sweep the miserable remains of the people
who had not murdered one another,  into an untimely grave,  the kingdom itself
falling a prey some foreign invader.”233
The sword of justice exists precisely to  prevent  arbitrary violence against both
people and their belongings. Wedgwood, therefore almost threatens that: “you may
be convinced of  the folly,  as  well  with respect  to  yourselves as  the  public,  of
resisting that power [of Laws] in the first instance, which must in the end prevail.
If any one doubts of this, I call upon him to name a time or place, in this or any
other  civilized  nation,  where  a  tumultuous  rising  of  the  people.  Obstinately
refusing to disperse, has not been quelled either by the civil or military powers of
the  state.  It  is  indeed  impossible,  from the  nature  of  things,  that  it  should  be
otherwise; for if order and obedience to the laws could not be restored, there must
be an end of that community.”234
In the same period and in the context of the protection of less tangible sorts of
property, Wedgwood authored another pamphlet, tackling the problem of suborned
workmanship:  Address to the Workers in the Pottery on the Subject of Entering
into the Service of Foreign Manufacturers.
232 Ibid., p. 7.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid, p. 10.
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In spite  of  their  declared  different  purposes,  Wedgwood's  two  Addresses show
some rhetorical similarities. Both pamphlets are generally concerned with the issue
of property and illicit expropriation. Both feature a patriotic rhetoric, resting upon
the  assumption  of  a  perfect  coincidence  of  private  interests  (either  the
manufacturers' or those of the poor and the workers) with the public good. Finally,
the  author shows a paternalistic  attitude with respect  to  his  ideal  interlocutors.
Thus, in the first instance he addresses the rioters' children, almost as if he meant
to replace their parents' fallen moral authority, in the second pamphlet he relates to
the “seduced” workmen of the pottery, meaning to persuade them to give up any
temptation  for  quick  profit  and  to  remain  loyal  to  their  employers  and  their
country. The text reads as if the author wanted to arouse the workmen's critical
acumen,  saving them from their  ignorance  and naïveté.  However,  should these
arguments  prove  insufficient,  Wedgwood  sponsors  the  brute  force  of  law and
describes the risks run by those who transgress.
The  message  is  crystal-clear:  British  workmen  should  consider  carefully  the
consequences of dealing with enemies of the Nation.
According to Harris, industrial espionage was intended as a kind of warfare in
which “patriotism was as much an essential element as in the overtly military kind,
and  it  behoved  all  who  had  national  interest  at  heart,  ministers,  magistrates,
merchants, industrialists, even workers, to join in frustrating the knavish tricks of
technologically acquisitive foreigners.”235 But like a wise head of the family with
his children, Wedgwood also writes with the apparent intention to preserving them
from  the  sly  seduction  of  his  international  competitors  and  from  the  bitter
disappointment which may ensue.
Again, there is no discrepancy between what is good for the Nation and what is
good for manufacture, including the workmen:
“As some attempts have lately been made to seduce you into the service of foreign
manufacturers”,  claims  Wedgwood,  “and I  am so  fully  persuaded  it  would  be
235 Harris, 2000, p. 478.
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contrary to your own interest, as well as that of your country, to accept such offers,
however tempting they may, by false colouring, be made to appear.”236 
Expatriates were pushed into the arms of foreign employers by the illusion of a
brighter destiny away from home. On the contrary,  argues Wedgwood: “It  may
with  great  truth  be  asserted,  that  higher  wages  are  given  to  manufacturers,
particularly to potters, and that greater care is taken of the poor when sick or past
labour,  in England, than in any other part of the world; notwithstanding which,
many of our people have, at different times, been enticed into foreign service by
flattering promises held forth to them having got the better of their discretion.”237
The victims of this swindle have generally been: “of the  looser kind, such as no
advantages could satisfy at home; but so far have they been from bettering their
circumstances by yielding to  a  rambling disposition,  that in the end they have
found  themselves  miserably  deceived  by  promises  too  extravagant  ever  to  be
fulfilled.”238
Therefore,  the  author  continues  with  a  suggestive  narrative  on  the  risks  of
emigrating under such false expectations and his story-telling assumes the style of
an  adventurous  romance,  starring  shipwrecks,  harsh  treatment,  struggles  for
survival,  everything  magnified  by  distance  from  the  homeland.  He  addresses
particularly cases of emigration to the American colonies and France, apparently
two of the most recurrent destinations for suborned British workers.239 The first
case mentioned is that of Mr. Bartlem, a skilled potter who went to South Carolina
and, once there, attempted to recruit some workmen and persuade them to join his
new venture. He managed to conquer some of them, so that: “They took shipping
at Bristol, and after more than a quarter of a year spent in storms and tempests
upon the sea, with many narrow escapes from shipwreck, they at last arrived safe,
236 Josiah Wedgwood, An Address to the Workmen in the Pottery, on the Subject of entering into
the  Service  of  foreign  Manufacturers,  1783,  p.  3.  Available  at  the  University  Library  of
Cambridge, (item no. 9 in volume Ddd.25.133).
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid. My italics.
239 Harris, 2000, p. 479.
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and begun a  work near  Charlestown.  This  adventure  being encouraged by the
government of that province,  the men puffed up with expectations of becoming
gentlemen soon, wrote to their friends here what a fine way they were in, and this
encouraged others to follow them. But change of climate and manner of living,
accompanied perhaps with a certain disorder of mind to be mentioned hereafter,
(which  have  always  made  great  havock  among  the  people  who  have  left  this
country to settle in remote parts) carried them off so fast, that recruits could not be
raised  from  England  sufficient  to  supply  the  places  of  the  dead  men.  In  Mr.
Godwin's own words to me, whose son was one of them, they fell sick as they
came, and all died quickly, his son amongst the rest.”240
Also the tragic fate of the Lymers is described as illustrative of what emigrants
could  encounter  far  from home.  It  is  another  emphatic  tale  with  an  unhappy
ending:  “Lymer,  at  the  solicitation  of  his  brother-in-law,  not  only  went  over
himself, but took with him his wife and two children, and all his effects. They met
with very stormy weather, and were at last shipwrecked near an island of which I
cannot  learn the name. The ship was entirely lost,  with all  the effects  of these
passengers,  but  they  themselves  happily,  and  very  wonderfully,  got  on  shore,
though  most  of  the  sailors  were  drowned.”241 But  disaster  was  only  slightly
deferred:  “After  the  first  flood  of  joy  was  over  for  their  deliverance  from
immediate  death,  they  soon found  themselves  in  a  most  comfortless  situation,
thrown by the waves upon an unknown island (unknown to them at least, both the
place and the people) and destitute of every necessary but the clothes that covered
them. In addition to their distress, Mrs. Lymer, who was near downlying when she
left England, brought them forth another little sufferer, for whom they had not the
least provision, but were left entirely dependant for all things upon the humanity of
utter strangers: who, nevertheless, being a kind-hearted people, supplied them with
clothes for their helpless infant,  and meat  and drink for themselves; otherwise,
they had escaped death at sea, only to meet him in a more terrible form by land.
240 Wedgwood, An address to the workers.., 1783, pp. 4-5.
241 Ibid.
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Young Allen,  one  of  this  unfortunate  company,  too  impatient  to  wait  for  Mrs.
Lymer's being in a condition to put to sea again, shipped himself in a vessel, which
he found there, bound for Carolina. The rest followed as soon as they were able,
but all the enquiries they could make after young Allen were in vain; neither he nor
the ship have been ever heard of from that day to this, so that he was certainly cast
away; and they were themselves, alas! Reserved only for a more lingering death.
Mr. Lymer, his wife, and the two children they took with them, all fell sick and
followed the rest of their countrymen”.
Wedgwood's pamphlet goes on to focus upon France, that other great seducer of
British skilled workers. The author argues that the French did not pay more than
the British, rather French manufacturers attracted skilled workers only to cast them
aside  as  soon  as  their  knowledge  was  transferred  to  local  workmanship.242
Wedgwood  rehearses  the  case  of  George  Shaw,  one  of  his  competitors  who
established himself in France and eventually went back to England as an agent to
recruit some skilled workers.
According to the author: “This man boasted much, as every one who expects to
succeed in such a business must do, of his masters, of his own good circumstances,
of the wages he receives, &c. - and offered to any men who would go with him
double the wages they can get here.”243
As the French potteries lagged behind the British,  argues Wedgwood,  it  is  not
possible that French employers could pay higher wages than him. Therefore, after
these scaremongering tales of death, swindles, and bankruptcies, Wedgwood seems
to have eliminated any motivation to seek wealth and success abroad:
“I might here call upon you to reflect on the fate of those, who could not content
themselves with the good things of their own land, a land truly flowing with milk
and honey; and exhort you to beware of falling into the like errors as you would
242 Ibid., p. 11.
243 Ibid., p. 10.
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wish to escape the like fatal consequences.”244
Nevertheless, however persuasive and rhetorically skilled Wedgwood might have
been as a pamphleteer, the image of international spies as seducers of ignorant and
naïve workers does not correspond entirely to reality.
On  the  contrary,  there  is  some  evidence  that  sometimes  workmen  took  the
initiative themselves. The following letter was addressed to George Bris of Douai,
in Belgium: “I understand you want some workman in the Different Branches of
the potting and I have it in my power to serve you if we can agree upon terms. I
can bring a turner, a presser and handler, a modeller and a man that can make as
good a China glaze and Enamel colours as any man in the country and both he and
me are painters either in blue or enamel, likewise his wife...If you chuse [sic] I will
come my self first and settle for one of us and come back a gain to England for
them. All the rest of us are married except my self and I will run the risk of any
thing happening from the masters in this country. You must excuse my not dating
my letter...for I do fear it  should be broken open...”245 As far as we know, this
missive was opened and presumably filed together with the intercepted letters on
illegal emigration. However, addressing workmen as if they were defenceless and
targeted by astute and predatory foreign agents, was a rhetorical feature of that
paternalistic ethos which was so evident from Wedgwood's first 1783 address to
the sons of the rioters.
For Wedgwood, one of the harbingers of welfare capitalism, industrial paternalism
was much more than mere discourse. It was a set of practices which embodied his
progressive Enlightenment values and, on the other hand, contributed to win the
loyalty of his subordinates. As Dolan puts it, his authority was “underwritten by an
individual paternalism, wherein his role was to teach obedience, humility, sobriety,
and right conduct.”246
244 Ibid., p. 9.
245 Richard Tames, Josiah Wedgwood. An illustrated life of Josiah Wedgwood, 1730-1795, Shire
Publications, Princes Risborough, 1995, p. 34.
246 Dolan, 2004, p. 266.
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Wedgwood was the  patriarch  of  a  close  community  of  workers.  To those who
remained loyal to him, he offered a neat house in Etruria Village, adjacent to the
factory, but he also provided their children with adequate schooling and even set
up a collective plan of health insurance to assist his employees and their families
in case of disease or death.247 Dolan sees all these measures as stemming from
Wedgwood's  genuine  moral  and political  views.  Social  housing,  education  and
welfare were important pieces of that great Enlightenment mosaic which, thanks to
rational  organization,  sought  to  realize  concrete  improvements  in  standards  of
living.  This  interpretation  is  suitable  to  Dolan's  typically  culturalist  portrait  of
Wedgwood as the 'entrepreneur to the Enlightenment'.
Nevertheless,  as  brilliantly  shown  by  Patrick  Joyce  in  his  study  of  Victorian
industrial  society,  paternalism  was  also  a  pivotal  cultural  component  of  class
domination  and  would  play  a  key-role  in  the  preservation  of  social  stability
throughout  the  19th century.  According  to  Joyce,  even  the  most  individualist
laissez-faire  ideology  was  perfectly  compatible  with  industrial  paternalism,  as
shown  during  the  first  half  of  the  century.  Notwithstanding  the  apparent
contradiction  between  laissez-faire  economy  and  paternalist  ethics,  “viewed  in
other terms, employer paternalism was the outcome of laissez-faire ideology and
not its logical opposite.”248 Joyce focuses mostly upon later Victorian England and
any consideration of 18th century labour relations is beyond his scope.
However this influential research reaches some insightful conclusions with regard
to  the  complex  relationship  between  seemingly  divergent  rhetoric,  and  world-
views:  “That  employer  paternalism in  practice  often  overstepped  the  limits  of
independence is clear. That this was very often done with immunity is testimony to
the extent to which the bulwark of independence erected before mid-century was
breached  in  the  following  decades,  as  a  fully  developed  factory  industry
consolidated its social effects. Just as often, employer paternalism overstepped the
247 Ibid., p. 269.
248 Patrick  Joyce,  Work,  Society  and  Politics.  The  Culture  of  the  Factory  in  later  Victorian
England, Methuen, Bristol, 1982, p. 138.
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strict  limits  of  laissez-faire.  Among  all  these  various   considerations  […] the
constant divergence between the principle of the ideologue and the practice of the
employer is perhaps the most striking.”249
It should now be clear, that what we may consider as the evidence with which we
can  reconstruct  Wedgwood's  as  well  as  Watt's  ideologies,  are  instead,  mostly
rhetoric  deployed  contingently  and  answering  specific  strategic  needs.
Thus  Wedgwood's  reoccurring  strife  against  piracy,  coexists  with  occasional
tension between opposed values,  for example,  secrecy as opposed to fame and
public good, or as we have seen, radically conflicting views on the patent law. 
But what do we know about Wedgwood's political views? How did he reconcile
his  political  beliefs  with  the  practice  and  the  rhetoric  of  paternalism?  Burton
claims that: “He was aligned, roughly, with the radical, dissenting group of which
Bentley was a member and Priestley a more extreme leader. Wedgwood was in
favour of the generalized libertarian sentiment found in Thomson. In practice this
libertarianism stopped short at the pot works gate. In his own factory, Wedgwood
was absolute ruler.”250
Wedgwood's  progressivism  was  apparent  in  the  circumstance  of  the  political
mobilization against slavery. The abolitionist party brought together Wedgwood,
Bentley, and their Lunar friends, particularly Day and Priestley. Anti-slavery had
been  ignited  by  Day's  Dying  Negro (1773),  and  pushed  forward  by  Wesley's
pamphlet Thoughts on Slavery (1774), as well as raising indignation following the
Zong massacre in 1781, when 131 enslaved Africans were deliberately thrown into
the sea by the owners of a slave-ship, who later claimed compensation from the
insurance company.
Uglow also  mentions  Adam Smith  among those  who shared  these  enlightened
feelings.251 However,  as  shown  in  the  course  of  the  recent  scholarly  quarrel
249 Ibid., p. 137.
250 Burton, 1976, p. 40.
251 Jenny Uglow, The Lunar Men. The Friends who made the Future, 1730-1810, Faber and Faber,
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between  Brown,  Wells  and  Elmslie,  the  relationship  between  slavery  and  the
Smithian economics is contentious to say the least.252
If Smith's sentiments on the relationship between the employer and his workforce
were obscure up to this point, Wedgwood's own  libertarianism, to use Burton's
term  and  perspective,  seems  plausibly  consistent  with  his  despotism  and
patriarchalism.  Therefore,  as  brilliantly  suggested  by  Davis,  just  as  Bentham
shows a “striking discrepancy” between the ideal of individual self-interest and his
“obsessive concern for social discipline”, this peculiar syncretism belongs also to
the early industrialists: “whose ideal of free market conditions gave no justification
for attempts to control the behavior and leisure time of their workers. In theory,
after all, an employer of free workers, unlike a slave owner, should be interested
only  in  purchasing  equal  units  of  labor  at  the  cheapest  possible  price.  Yet
entrepreneurs  like Richard  Arkwright  and Josiah  Wedgwood had already made
practical application of a principle recommended by Bentham: 'To be incessantly
under the eyes of the inspector is to lose in effect the power to do evil and almost
the thought of wanting to do it.'”253
Workers  could  be  treated  like  assets  in  the  knowledge  capitalism,  their  jobs
segmented and mechanized, and, as we shall see, they could also be asked to give
up their authorship and be fatally alienated from the product of their toil. But if
this implied their relative happiness, everything was ipso facto morally justified.254
Elsewhere  Davis  maintains  that  anti-slavery  was  “an  extension  of  the  noble
philantropic  tradition”  which  was  adopted  by:  “the  new  merchant  elite  who,
though  lacking  inherited  status,  could  at  least  prove  their  moral  worth  by
252 See  Marvin Brown, “Free enterprise and the economics of slavery”,  Real-World Economics
Review, 52 (2010), 28-39, Bruce Elmslie, “Did Smithian Economics Promote Slavery?”, Real-
World Economics Review, 53 (2010), 150-155; Thomas Wells, “Adam Smith’s real views on
slavery: a reply to Marvin Brown”, Real-World Economics Review, 53 (2010), pp. 156-160, and
Marvin T. Brown, “Adam Smith’s view of slaves as property: A response to Thomas Wells and
Bruce Elmslie”, Real-World Economics Review, 55 (2010), pp. 124-125.
253 David  B.  Davis,  The  Problem  of Slavery  in  the  Age  of  Revolution,  1770-1823,  Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 458.
254 Ibid. With respect to this, Davis quotes from Letter XXI of Bentham's Panopticon: “Call them
soldiers, call them monks, call them machines, so they were but happy ones, I should not care”.
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increasing the security of the less fortunate”.255
Indeed, paternalism was part of the  forma mentis of the dominant class, which
helping to legitimate and maintain the balance between social groups. Therefore,
when travelling through the French countryside, Arthur Young pointed out that:
“At an English nobleman's there would have been three or four farmers asked to
meet me, who would have dined with the family amongst the ladies of the first
rank. I do not exaggerate when I say that I have had this at least one hundred times
in the first houses of our islands. It is however a thing that in the present manners
in France would never be met with from Calais to Bayonne.” Similarly, describing
the kind of dinner organized by Horace Walpole, Lord Hervey relates: “We used to
sit down to dinner a little snug party of about thirty odd, up to the chin in beef,
venison, geese, turkeys, etc.; and generally over the chin in claret, strong beer, and
punch. We have Lords Spiritual and Temporal, besides commoners, parson, and
freeholders  innumerable.”  In  his  English  Social  History, G.  M.  Trevelyan,
considers this common attitude of British aristocracy towards the lower ranks as
one of the cushions which softened the edges of British inequalities: “if the French
noblesse had  been capable of playing cricket with their peasants, their chateaux
had  never  been  burnt.”  Nevertheless,  after  assembling  these  sources,  Porter
rhetorically asks how real was this “paternalism”,  and, quoting Burke,  remarks
upon his inner contradiction. Although the great magnates of the country enjoyed
representing themselves, in Burke's words, as “the oaks that shade the country”,
their patriarchalism was nevertheless counterbalanced by their brutal exploitation
and segregation of the poors from the political arena.256 
Early  industrialists  offer  another  example  of  this  attitude  with  respect  to  their
workmen, a rhetoric which was probably borrowed from the Georgian aristocracy.
Therefore,  although  early  industrialists  strove  to  impose  a  new  impersonal
discipline in their factories, they actually: “looked backwards sporadically to make
255 David B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, Cornell University Press, Cornell,
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use  of  feasts  and  holidays,  typical  of  the  old  order  in  cementing  personal
relationships.”257 In 1776 the Arkwrights and the Strutts had a feast in Cromford
which was attended by 500 workers and their children; Boulton organized a feast
for 700 on the occasion of his  son's  birthday,  whereas Wedgwood inaugurated
Etruria with an event attended by 120. In 1797, when Boulton inaugurated Soho
Foundry,  he  organized  a  dinner  with  his  workers  and  addressed  them with  a
cheerful speech. Once again the Master and their Workmen are depicted as having
harmonious interests,258 consisting in each doing each his duty according to his
position  in  the  perfect  machine  of  social  order.  According  to  this  world-view
equality was inevitably based on loyalty and discipline:
“I could not deny my self the satisfaction of wishing you a happy & joyous day &
of expressing my regard for all good honest &  Faithfull Workmen who I have
always... I now come as the Father of Soho to Consecrate this place as one of its
Branches,  I  also  come to  give  it  a  Name  & my benediction.  I  will  therefore
proceed to purify the walls of it by the sprinkling of Wine and in the name of
Vulcan & all the Gods & Goddesses of Fire & Water, I pronounce the name of it
Soho Foundry – May that name endure for ever & ever & let all the people say
amen amen. This Temple now having a name I will propose that every Man shall
fill his pitcher & drunk success to it. I will now call your serious Attention whilst I
give my Benediction to Soho Foundry. May this Establishment be ever prosperous,
ma it  five Birth to many usefull  Arts & Inventions, May it  prove beneficial to
Mankind &  yield comfort & happiness to all who may be employd [in] it. As the
Smith  cannot  do without  his  striker  so neither  can the  Master  do  without  his
Workmen. Let each perform his part well & do their Duty in that state to which it
has  pleased God to  call  them & this  they  will  find  to  be  the  true ground  of
Equality. One serious word more & then I have done. I cannot let pass this Day of
Festivity without  observing that these piles of Building have been erected in a
257 Sidney  Pollard,  “Factory  Discipline  in  the  Industrial  Revolution”,  The Economic  History
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short time without the Loss of one Life or any Material Accident. Therefore let us
offer up our gratefull thanks to the divine preserver of all things without whose
permission not a Sparrow falls to the Ground. Let us chaunt [sic] in our Hearts
Hallelujas for these divine Blessings and with our Voices let us like Loyal Subjects
sing God Save ye King.”259
When Boulton or Wedgwood refer to themselves as to “Fathers” of their huge
toiling families, what is at stake is not a mere figure of rhetoric, but a fragment of
that  truth, that meaningful  discourse which stems from and rationalizes a solid
social technology. Some of the many visitors to Boulton's factory perceived the
manifest concreteness of these relations between the tycoon and his workforce. 
In  around 1775 Jabez  Fisher,  a  young Quaker  from Philadelphia,  would  write
apropos of Soho that “the Front of this house is like the stately Palace of some
Duke”, and: “within it is divided into hundreds of little apartments, all of which
like  Bee  hives  are  crowded  with  the  Sons  of  Industry.  The  whole  Scene  is  a
Theatre of Business, all conducted like one piece of Mechanism, men, Women and
Children full of employment according to their Strength and Docility.”260 
The  employment  of  children  could  not  but  reinforce  the  image  of  the  early
industrialist  as  a  great  patriarch.  In  fact,  as  Davis  puts  it,  to  many  young
apprentices and workers, the factory manager represented the man who replaced
their parents' authority.261 Smiles points out that Boulton was frequently asked to
take gentlemen apprentices into his works, but was not inclined to employ them.
Instead, he preferred boys from the humble ranks: “I have built and furnished a
house for the reception of one kind of apprentices – fatherless children,  parish
apprentices,  and  hospital  boys;  and  gentlemen's  sons  would  probably  find
themselves out of place in such companionship.”262 
259  B. R. L. MS 3782/13/37/19.
260 Reported  in  Peter  Jones,  The  Industrial  Enlightenment,  Manchester  University  Press,
Manchester, 2009, p. 50.
261 Davis, 1999, p. 460.
262 Smiles, 2007, p. 159.
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In the case of Wedgwood the employment of children was related to the need to
meet  the  shortage of  highly specialized workmanship.  McKendrick  argues  that
“Out of the 278 men, women and children that Wedgwood employed in 1790, only
five had not specified post. These five were listed simply as 'Odd men', the lowest
in the hierarchy and the first to go in bad times. The rest were specialist.” Thus it is
erroneous to believe that the division of labour and the segmentation of production
necessarily led to diminished skills. In the case of Wedgwood's ornamental works,
this  reorganization  of  labour  certainly  entailed  a  “limitation  of  the  field  of
expression to particular tasks”, which was nevertheless counterbalanced by finer
skills in single aspects of production.263 
Wedgwood's  correspondence  from the  early  1770s  shows  how  the  potter  was
determined to meet the shortage of skilled workmanship, and in particular, the lack
of artists, particularly painters, draughtsmen, and modellers.
He was aware that: “few hands can be got to paint flowers  in the style we want
them. I may add, nor any other work we do. We must make them. There is no other
way. We have stepped forw[ar]d beyond the other Manufacturers & we must be
content to train up hands to suit our purpose. Where amongst our Potters could I
get a complete Vase maker? Nay I could not get a hand in the whole Pottery to
make  a Table plate  without  training them up for  that  purpose  & you must  be
content to train up such Painters as offer to you & not turn them adrift because if
you consider what they have been doing all their life, we ought not to expect from
them.”264 Old hands would be used to train new hands, not just as artists but to be
skilled interpreters of Wedgwood's own style. What Etruria needed was therefore a
school:  “I  have  a  waking  notion  haunts  me  very  much  of  late  which  is  the
beginning a regular drawing & modeling school to train up artists for ourselves. I
w[oul]d pick up some likely Boys of about 12 years old & take them apprentice
'till they are twenty or twenty one & set them to drawing & when they had made
263 McKendrick, 1961, p. 34.
264  J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 19 May 1770. Farrer, 2010, vol. 1, p. 347.
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some tolerable proficiency they sho[ul]d practice with outlines of figures upon
Vases”.265 By 1790 the number of apprentices employed at Etruria would amount
to  nearly  25%  of  the  workers.  There  is  some  evidence  that  Wedgwood,  like
Boulton, did not disdain employing young boys with difficult backgrounds. In a
letter dated 27 August 1771, he introduced two young orphans to Bentley, the sons
of  a  late  neighbour  of  his,  asking  whether  they  could  find  employment  as
assistants, “Colour-grinders” or apprentices. They were two brothers of 16, and 14
years old respectively, and one was said to be “Devilish ingenious”. Wedgwood
was willing to help: “But the whole is left to your discretion when you see the
Lads & if you cannot employ them or recommend them to any place I sho[ul]d be
willing to bestow a few shillings upon them as you see occasion.”266
On the contrary, like Boulton,  young highbrow candidates might raise concern.
The  reason  consisted  in  the  risk  of  allowing  a  breach  in  the  fortress  which
protected industrial (and commercial) secrets. On 7 September 1771, Wedgwood
replies  to  Bentley  about  the  opportunity of  employing a boy who boasted the
powerful recommendation of the royal family, no less. In spite of his fine sense of
politics,  Wedgwood  seems  to  hesitate:  “His  Majesty  does  us  great  honour  in
recommending the Boy he has brought up to our service & we certainly cannot
refuse anything from his Majesty's hands, otherwise I do not think it very desirable
to have a Boy with such connections in our work-shop to know the prices of our
work &c &c- you will by this hint know my train of ideas upon the subject but I
suppose you cannot avoid takeing [sic] him in & if so we must make the best we
can of him.”267 Young apprentices were supposed to fit in easily the strict hierarchy
of Etruria,  both when it  came to discipline in  the work environment and with
respect to their loyalty and discretion.
Wedgwood's patriarchalism was thus one of the modes into which he translated his
charismatic  leadership.  Paternalism  was  an  available  cultural  resource  which
265  J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 23 May 1770. Ibid., p. 348
266  J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 27 August 1771. Ibid., p. 424.
267 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 7 September 1771, Ibid., p. 426.
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constituted a way of thinking and voicing the relationship between classes. This
imagery and vocabulary also contributed to a discourse aimed at justifying some
limitation  in  the  sharing  of  knowledge on the  one side,  while  centralizing  the
attribution of intellectual ownership on the other. If industrial secrets, therefore,
could  not  be  sold,  from a  moral  point  of  view,  this  was  mainly  because  they
belonged to the head of the family with respect to whom family members could
not have but convergent interests.
From this  perspective,  the  aforementioned  syncretism  of  Wedgwood's  rhetoric
seems  eloquent,  torn  between  the  value  of  individual  responsibility  and  a
paternalistic attitude. Hence his speech at the General Chamber of Manufacturers
on the problem of suborned workmen: “we are sensible of the inestimable value of
civil liberty,  and that no restriction would be put upon it without an obvious and
sufficient cause, such as the welfare of the State […] it is not without some regret
that we feel ourselves compelled to point out to the legislature the necessity of
some  effective  regulation  to  prevent  the  emigration  of  our  artificers.  Their
unrivalled skill has excited the envy of foreign nations.”268
Patriotism  and  paternalism  are  two  of  the  ideological  discourses  with  which
Wedgwood's rhetoric is woven. In particular, industrial paternalism constitutes one
of  the  threads  of  his  discursive  cloth  apropos  of  factory  organization.  Thus
Wedgwood's patriarchalism offers one of the cultural translations of his reiterated
attempts to extend and optimize his control over his workers' lives, not least when
it  came  to  preventing  the  leakage  of  industrial  secrets  and  his  retention  of
intellectual ownership.
I  shall  now discuss  the  fluid  idea  of  intellectual  property  as  it  emerges  from
Wedgwood's correspondence with Bentley. I will argue that as Wedgwood acted
like  a  paternalistic  leader  in  Etruria,  he  sought  patronage  among  those  who
represented  the  traditional  elite  of  his  age,  that  is:  monarchs,  high-ranking
aristocrats and the gentry. Being the pivot of this web of personal relationships,
268 Reported in McKendrick, 1961, p. 50.
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which  were  essential  to  the  acknowledgement  of  his  work'a  originality and
uniqueness, he was concerned to ensure the survival of the intangible sediment of
his toil -  Wedgwood's unmistakable style.
Patronage, branding and a blurred distinction between invention and imitation  
 
  Lacking an efficient institutional umbrella for the protection of fashion goods,
the process of the attribution of novelty and originality with regard to patterns and
designs relied chiefly upon what customers believed was new and original. 
Hence in the case of Wedgwood, something was perceived to be à la mode, as long
as it won the favour of those who led fashion and could act as influential sponsors.
Fine  marketing  techniques,  involving  a  political  familiarity  with  the  elite  was
especially important to delineate a distinctive identity and build up a solid brand.
That  Wedgwood  was  an  outstanding  courtier  and  that  he  was  particularly
successful in winning the benevolence of the leading class is evident throughout
his  letters  and acknowledged by his  historiography.  McKendrick writes on the
importance  of  patronage  in  Wedgwood's  commercial  strategy,  while  Richard
Tames points out, in the conclusions of his short outline of Wedgwood's life, that
the secret of Wedgwood's success did not lie in a mere technical supremacy over
his  competitors,  who  were  always  very  quick  to  imitate  any  improvement
Wedgwood came up with, or in his managerial efficiency. “The plain fact”, argues
Tames: “is that Josiah Wedgwood regularly sold his goods at double the normal
price, frequently at treble. He knew the value of quality wedded to fashion and he
charged the nobility what he knew they would pay.”269
According to McKendrick, even William Adams, arguably the only British potter
269 Tames, 1995, p. 39.
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who could rival Wedgwood in terms of quality of wares, was forced to lower his
prices by 20% in order to remain competitive. Wedgwood was very sensitive to the
evolving taste of the aristocracy and he knew how to maintain a certain grip on the
nobles, so as to stimulate the middle class' instinct to follow. In the 1760s he got
closer  to  Sir  William  Meredith,  a  MP for  Liverpool,  who  both  procured  him
patterns to copy and put him in connection with potential highbrow clients. Shortly
after  its  foundation,  Etruria  became  a  renowned showcase  factory,270 receiving
regular visitors such as Lord Gower, Lord Spencer and the duke of Marlborough. 
Wedgwood's reputation among the British aristocracy was further boosted when, in
1765, he became “His Majesty's Potter”. The potter made the most of this title,
displaying it in large letters on his bill heads, advertisements, and on the signboard
of his London showroom. 
Two years later, in 1767, Wedgwood would cheerfully stated: “the demand for this
sd.  Creamcolour,  alias,  Queen's  Ware,  Alias,  Ivory, still  increases.  It  is  really
amazing  how rapidly  the  use  of  it  has  spread  over  the  whole  Globe,  & how
universally it is liked. How much of this general use, & estimation, is owing to the
mode of its introduction - & how much to its real utility & beauty? are questions in
which  we  may  be  a  good  deal  interested  for  the  governm[en]t  of  our  future
Conduct. The reasons are too obvious to be longer dwelt upon. For instance, if a
Royal, or Noble introduction be as necessary to the sale of an Article of Luxury, as
real Elegance & beauty, then the Manufacturer, if he consults his own inter[es]t
will bestow as much pains, & expence too, if necessary, in gaining the former of
270 This was also an important feature of Matthew Boulton's Soho factory, which received  foreign
dignitaries from all over the world regularly.
Hence, already in 1768 Boulton trumpeted this remarkable success with the  beau monde.  In
1767, he wrote: “I had lords and ladies to wait on yesterday, I have French and Spaniards today;
and tomorrow I  shall  have Germans,  Russians and  Norwegians...Last  week we had  Prince
Poniatowski,  nephew of  the King of  Poland,  and the French,  Danish, Sardinian and Dutch
ambassadors; this week we have had Count Orloff and the five celebrated brothers who are such
favorites with the Empress of Russia; and only yesterday I had the Viceroy of Ireland who dined
with me. Scarcely a day passes without a visit from some distinguished personage.” Berg, 2005,
p. 175.
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these advantages, as he would, in bestowing the latter.”271
Many of Wedgwood's letters to Bentley bristle with references to the commercial
importance of the right sponsorship.
 On the 9th February 1778 he wrote to Thomas Bentley on the most convenient
marketing for his new green hooped flower pots: “I think they will have a great run
if not put too high - But they want a name - A name has a wonderfull effect I
assure you - Suppose you present the Duchess of Devonshire with a set & beg to
call them Devonshire flowerpots. You smile - Well then call them Mecklenberg -
or  -  or  -  what  you  please  so  you  will  but  let  them  have  [a  fine  name].”272
Apparently the new flowerpots would anyway find their way in the market, but
Wedgwood had further occasions to insist on the importance of labelling them with
a great name: “Mr. Ward orders Devonshire flowerpots by dozens of a size & what
is  more  extraordinary  they  sell  these  without  the  advantage  of  the  Duchess’s
patronage or name. What will  they do when Mr. Ward is instructed to call  the
Devonshire flowerpots!” 
In June 1779 Wedgwood would write  to his  business partner about the role  of
fashion which “is infinitely superior to merit in many respects; & it is plain from a
thousand instances that if you have a favorite child you wish the public to fondle &
take notice of, you have only to make choice of proper sponsors. If you are lucky
in them no matter what the brat is, black, brown, or fair, its fortune is made”.273 All
these  sources  make  it  clear  that  Wedgwood  recognized  the  market  value  of
snobbery and the social importance of his wares among the middle class, targeting
his  audience  via  a  network  of  upper  class  patrons.274 Nonetheless,  seeking the
aristocratic  support  implied  a  certain sensitivity  for  hierarchies and aristocratic
manners and was not always so simple as naming a new ware after a high rank
271 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 17 September 1767. Farrer, 2010, p. 127.
272 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 9 February 1778. Ibid., p. 291.
273 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 19 June 1779. Ibid., p. 382.
274 Lee Blaszczyk,  Imagining Consumers: Design and Innovation from Wedgwood to Corning,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 6.
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noble.
Wedgwood’s work of fulfilling the “very superb commission”275 from the Empress
of Russia reflects the degree of diplomatic skill involved in the improvement and
maintenance of his  political  network.  The Green Frog service would become a
majestic artefact, including a total 1244 views of real British landscapes, gardens
and antiquities, each for each piece. Given the importance of the service and of its
commissioner, this massive dinner ware bore an intrinsic marketing importance,
but we might also consider it as a true diplomatic device. Since each piece had to
be matched with the view of a land or building often belonging to an aristocratic
family, one of the issue was to reflect the hierarchies in the material hierarchies of
between the piece: the larger was the dish dedicated to a view of England, the
larger was the visibility guaranteed to its aristocratic owners in one of the most
marvellous court of the world: 
“It is a Pity but we had more large Dishes in the service, as it is, it will seem, & be
in reality, too great a partiality for a Country Esqr. though he does happen to be
ones Neighbour, & a good man, to occupy so capital a situation as a large Dish
when there is but 2 or 3 in the whole service. If we can afford [it] one of them to
Ld. Gower will be as much as the bargain, for we have in my opinion been guilty
of a capital omission in not waiting upon His Majesty to acquaint him with the
Commds., we have recd. From the Empress & to know his Maj-s pleasure if he
would permit us to take any views from the R-l Palaces or Gardens – but it is
better late than never & I am firmly of opinion it ought to be done.”276 
Marketing and commercial strategy apart, the creation of new luxury products was
also accompanied by a rationalization of the concepts of originality and invention.
But  in  the  case  of  Wedgwood,  these  terms  appear  to  remain  relatively  fluid,
lacking the support of a more institutional code such as the patent law. 
If on the one hand Wedgwood always admitted his debts to ancient classic pottery,
275 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 23 March 1773. Farrer, 2010, p. 23.
276 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 1 December 1773. Ibid., p. 55.
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on the other hand his imitations were by no means assimilated to those of his
competitors. He only pretended to “have attempted to copy the fine antique forms,
but not without absolute servility”, he “endeavoured to preserve the stile and spirit
or  if  you  please  the  elegant  simplicity  of  the  antique  forms,  and  so  doing  to
introduce  all  the  variety”  he  was  able;  ’that  is  the  true  copying  the  antique,
improve  rather  than  copy.”277 Thus  Wedgwood  distinguished  himself  from  his
competitors and in 1769, following his refusal to provide Boulton and Fothergill’s
Soho factory with plain vases to be mounted, and Boulton’s consequent decision to
start producing them himself in Birmingham, the potter demonstrated great respect
and appreciation of his  new rival. He encouraged Bentley to “stand firm” and:
“support  this  threatened  attack  like  Veterans  prepar’d  for  every  shock  […]  If
Etruria cannot stand its ground, but must give way to Soho, & fall before her, let
us not sell the victorie too cheap, but maintain our ground like Men, & endeavour,
even in our defeat, to share the Laurels with our Conquerors.” Boulton could have
been a competitor to be feared and yet Wedgwood acknowledged that he would not
be:  “a mere sniveling copyist  like the antagonists  I  have hitherto had but  will
venture to step out of the lines upon occasion, & afford us some diversion in the
combat.”278 Along with these statements of Wedgwood’s, a brief passage from one
of Matthew Boulton’s draft letters to Elizabeth Montague kept at the archives of
the  Reference  Library  in  Birmingham,  seems  to  reveal  how  the  very  idea  of
originality and creative activity in the production of luxury goods was much more
blurred than in other branches of industrial competition. After thanking his good
friend and customer for helping him refine his taste, Boulton complains about how
much of his business prevents him from fully dedicating himself to elegance and
fashion. In fact: “it is not necessary to attend to elegance in such articles of my
manufacture  as  are  destine’d  for  Siberia  or  America,  or  even  some  parts  of
Germany, but rather to attend to the bad taste of these countrys and to adapt my
277 J. Wedgwood to E. Darwin, 28 June 1789. Farrer, 2010, p. 86.
278 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 27 September 1769. Ibid., pp. 285-286.
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self to every clime.”279 Adapting to the “clime” of every country was required to
sell fashionable goods just as it was necessary to keep up with the taste of the time:
“Fashion […] of the present age distinguishes it self by adopting the most elegant
ornaments of the most refined Grecian artists; I am satisfy’d in conforming thereto,
and humbly copying their style, and makeing new combinations of old ornaments
without presuming to invent new ones.”280
Nevertheless, we do not have here any explicit  reference to 'Neo-classicism', a
word which suggests more recent terminology. In fact, when copying the antique
style, Wedgwood meant to imitate the “true” or “correct” style. This did not leave
room for radical  innovation,  but it  also justified to  some extent a considerable
degree of emulative effort. In other words, imitation was inherent to innovation, in
an age when the political and aesthetic agenda reacted to Rococo through a re-
evaluation of its opposite values: simplicity and plain elegance.
We have seen how this cult of simplicity was induced and ultimately constructed
by contemporary literature, as testified by d'Hancarville's work. Wedgwood, as a
prominent creator of ornamental ware, assimilated and contributed to diffusing the
new trend. He perceived this shift as a general move towards aesthetic purity, for
which he was ready to give his own personal contribution. Classical theme were
thus the idiom spoken by Wedgwood's original art, a language which was instantly
recognisable to  all  but  the illiterate.281 It  is  not  surprising that one of his  most
celebrated works was a copy, in six exemplars, of the famous Portland vase.
For Wedgwood this technical and artistic challenge bore special significance. If he
made it, he could finally claim to have reached the same degree of perfection of
what he considered to be the quintessence of antique ornamental vases.
The Portland vase has  been displayed at  the British  Museum since 1810.  It  is
named after the Duke of Portland, who was its possessor from the late 18th century
279 B.R.L., MS 3782/12/23/237.
280 Ibid.
281 Robin Reilly, Josiah Wedgwood, McMillan, London, 1992, p. 297.
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until  1945.  This  dark-blue  glass  vessel  was  supposedly  found  in  the  tomb of
Emperor Alexander Severus, near Rome, in the late 16th century. It was owned by
the Barberinis, then sold to a Scottish merchant and sold again in 1778 to William
Hamilton, who included it in his prestigious collection.282 In 1784 the vase was
bought  by  the  Duchess  of  Portland  and  later  inherited  by  her  son,  William
Cavendish Bentinck, 3rd Duke of Portland. In March 1784, Hamilton had shown
the  vase  to  the  Society  of  Antiquaries,  exciting  the  curiosity  of  British
connoisseurs. This fashionable glassy vase was to increase its fame as it appeared
in L'Antiquité expliquéè by Bernard de Montfaucon. 
A relatively small vase – about 30 cm of height – it is nevertheless filled with
mystery, as its precise date of production it is still uncertain as is the meaning of
the while glossy bass-reliefs which decorate its surface.283
Given the cultural and commercial potential of the venture, it seems quite obvious
that Wedgwood showed interest in this outstanding artefact. By 1786 the potter
had resolved to embark upon a long and expensive series of experiments to imitate
the “exquisite vase”. As he had managed to borrow it from the Duke of Portland
for a year,  in June he wrote  an inspired  letter  to  Hamilton:  “I  cannot but  feel
myself  flattered  by  the  approbation  of  so  exquisite  a  judge,  who  has  himself
introduced among us that pure taste, these elegant forms, which my humble studies
have been in propagating and rendering permanent. You will be pleased, I am sure,
to hear what a treasure is just now put into my hands, I mean the exquisite Vase
with which you enriched these islands, and which, now that we may call it the
Portland Vase, I hope will never depart from it.”284
Wedgwood's study of the pattern of this most renowned vase persuaded him that
282 Laurence Machet, “The Portland Vase and the Wedgwood copies: the story of a scientific and
aesthetic challenge”, Miranda: Revue pluridisciplinaire du monde anglophone, 7 (2012), 1-31,
p. 2.
283 Ibid.,  pp.  9-11.  See  also  Lucy  Rogers,  “Why  can't  scientists  date  the  Portland  Vase?”,
The Guardian, 28 August, 2003.
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2003/aug/28/thisweekssciencequestions1
284 J. Wedgwood to W. Hamilton, 24 June 1786, Farrer, 2010, p. 42.
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he could copy its design. However, when he first had the item in his hands, he
realized the real extent of the enterprise. The Portland vase was made of glass,
while Wedgwood's copies would be of Jasper. Such a dull material did not allow
Wedgwood  and  his  collaborators  to  reproduce  the  peculiar  semi-transparency
which distinguished the original vase. In order to tackle the many problems arising
from the  reproduction  of  the  vase,  Wedgwood  summoned  his  best  artists  and
craftsman: Flaxman, Hackwood, and the head of the ornamental department Henry
Webber. By June 1787 the figures for the bas-reliefs were completed, but the body
of the vase turned out to be particularly hard to reproduce. After nearly a year, the
loan was about to expire and Wedgwood still struggled with infinite details. Many
copies cracked, many others did not meet his high standards. This extraordinary
imitative effort turned into a sort of obsession. Thus in 1790 he wrote to his son
Josiah Junior: “The cracks are exceedingly minute, nor visible when dry, even with
a magnifying glass, but when the piece is wetted, they become distinguishable just
before it is quite dry […] I wish you to look at the left leg of Pluto between the calf
and the ankle the latter of which is not seen, & compare it with a cast out of the
mould taken from the vase itself […] this part is said to be too broad.”285
Given  the  purpose  of  this  study,  that  is,  to  follow  the  path  of  two  different
rhetorical approaches to ideas of invention and inventive work, it is puzzling to
realize that an innovator like Wedgwood put such great energy and capital into
copying in detail a mysterious antique vase which happened to become, partially
thanks to his own toil, an icon of classical art. Nevertheless the overall technical
success  of  this  amazing venture marked the  full  maturity  of  Wedgwood's  own
style, as his productions had finally reached the utmost perfection.
But the problems at stake with regard to Wedgwood's intellectual property are not
limited to the issue of imitation versus invention.286 In fact, not only is the dividing
285 J. Wedgwood Senior to J. Wedgwood Junior, 9 May 1790, Farrer, 2010, p. 118.
286 The relationship between invention and imitation in 18th century British luxury goods has been
discussed by Maxine Berg, “From imitation to invention: creating commodities in 18th century
Britain”,  Economic  History  Review,  55:1  (2002),  1-30,  and  Helen  Clifford,  “Concepts  of
Invention, Identity and Imitation in the London and Provincial Metal-working Trades, 1750-
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line between new and old, imitation and invention, original and traditional seems
to be peculiarly nuanced in Wedgwood, but the attribution of authorship for what
was produced in Etruria seems peculiarly problematic.
As Uglow points out:  “For  Wedgwood and Boulton,  art  was the  stuff  of  their
manufacture:  the  appeal  of  their  goods  lay  in  the  combination  of  the  artist's
imagination, the craftsman's skill  and the latest techniques of reproduction. But
here – as in the coterie poetry of Lichfield, or the collective work on inventions or
experiments  –  the  issue  of  originality  and  'ownership'  often  arose.”287 
Not only could Wedgwood not rely upon an official document, which might confer
upon him the  title  of  “first  and original  inventor”  of  his  own pottery,  but  the
realization of his ware also required the skills and creativity of a large number of
artists. This large network of authors had to be somehow hidden so that his name
and his authorship could emerge as the only one to be celebrated: “You will see by
looking  under  the  shoulder  of  each  that  these  heads  are  modeled  by  Wm
Hackwood, but I shall prevent his exposing himself again now that I found it out. I
am not certain that he will be offended if he is refus’d the liberty of putting his
name to the models which he makes quite new, & I Shall be glad to have your
opinion  upon  the  subject. Mine  is  against  any  name  being  upon  our  articles
besides W & B, & if you concur with me I will manage the matter with him as well
as I can.”288 According to Uglow, the important commissions given to Hackwood
and his high wage were terms of a negotiation oriented at slackening his claims for
authorship.289 In spite of the large web of collaborators involved in the production
of Wedgwood's goods, the constitution of a solid trademark implied that many
artists and skilled artisans with much the same background as his were denied any
attribution  of  intellectual  ownership.  In  fact  Wedgwood's  branding  strategies
implied  a  strict  and centralized idea of authorship.  Meteyard290 wrote that “the
1800”, Journal of Design History, 12:3 (1999), 241-255.
287 Uglow, 2002, p. 324.
288 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 22 Dec. 1777. Farrer, 2010, p. 288. My italics.
289 Uglow, 2002, p. 327.
290 Meteyard, 1866, p. xx.
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artists who contributed to the perfection and beauty of the ornamental ware are far
more numerous than is generally supposed.” Besides Hackwood, and long before
Flaxman and Webber joined his staff, Wedgwood could rely upon a number of
reputed  free-lance  artists,  including  John  Bacon,  Pingo,  Theodore  Parker,  Mrs
Landre, Coward, Hoskins and Tassie. These individuals constituted the invisible
part of Wedgwood's network. 
His promotional strategies rested upon the combination of two “complementary
metaphors”.291
On the one hand, Wedgwood was aware of his position as a wealthy manufacturer
who acted as the coordinator of the work of many skilled artists and  and rained
new ones, at Etruria, according to the factory's artistic needs. On the other hand, he
was closely identified with their works thanks to his control of production and his
marketing skills. Hence, as Wedgwood's products were marketed as art: “then by
extension of the metaphor the maker is an artist.”292 
Although  his  own  language  might  seem  torn  by  these  “metaphors”,  for
Wedgwood, after all, those who finessed the art of pottery should be considered to
be inventors293 but their true invention was rather a style, or a brand, more than one
single creation. In other words, we have here what we may consider a shift in the
idea of intellectual  property from the uncertain field of single creations, which
were always imitable  and to  some extent  always imitations  themselves,  to  the
immaterial fil rouge which tied together all his creations to his own name: “I have
often wish’d I had saved a single specimen of all the new articles I have made to
be left as a sacred deposit for the use of Children & Children’s Children which
with some account of what  has been done & what may be done, some  hints &
seeds for future discoveries, might perhaps be the most valuable treasure we could
have. For ten years past I have omitted doing this, because I did not begin it ten
291 Morris Eaves,  The Counter-arts Conspiracy. Art and Industry in the Age of Blake, Cornell
University Press, New York, 1992, p. 40.
292 Ibid..
293 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 17 Jul. 1777, Farrer, 2010, p. 255.
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years sooner. I am now resolv’d to  make a beginning.”294 This “sacred deposit”
would be the material substratum of Etruria’s triumphant history. Its tradition and
reputation would be the only elements of continuity able to stand the test of time in
a market, that of fashion products, which was largely ruled by the incessant rhythm
of obsolescence. Wedgwood could not rest on the profits deriving from one letter
patent.  He saw himself  as a patriarch who sustained his concern thanks to  his
capacity to gain the endorsement of the most prominent  aristocrats  of the time
through  a  network  of  personal  relationships  with  agents,  virtuosi,  artists,  and
skilled artisans. Wedgwood’s main aim was to ensure the survival of his brand and
to preserve the success initiated by that fundamental chain of sponsors who helped
him build his reputation and elect him the luxury potter  par excellence. What is
expressed here is the dream of an enterprise which would stand the test of time and
outlive the focus and keeper of this powerful network of allies so as to evolve into
a lasting family business. The “sacred deposit” is precisely what would outlive the
patriarch. We might argue that Wedgwood’s strength was Watt’s weakness, and
vice  versa.  Like  Wedgwood  and  Boulton,  Watt  was  a  sensitive  and  skilled
politician. He was very often successful in getting the best out of his social capital,
but  he  did  so  mostly  in  order  to  defend his  rights  as  patentee.  His  privileges
derived  from  the  formal  acknowledgement  that  he  was  the  first  and  original
inventor  of  one of  the  most  iconic devices  of  his  age,  the  separate  condenser,
together with further minor improvements on the steam engine. His letter patent
could be shared, commercialized, donated. It was a concrete, tangible substratum
of his social prestige and his status as “ingenious man”. Given the agitated waters
in which his patent rested, his main concern was to hold tight to the rock of his
rights as  patentee.  The range of  problems emerging from the defense  of  these
privileges  required  defending the  social  importance  of  the  inventor  in  general,
whatever the extent of his political support. If the patent system was to work, it
had to provide protection of the rights of any inventor and to forestall the risk of
294 J. Wedgwood to T. Bentley, 3 September 1774, Ivi, p. 82.
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possible social isolation. The inventor is thus described as an infant, not only as a
result  of Watt’s ideology and agenda, and surely not because Watt was himself
politically isolated, but because the institutional context of his discourse required
the  promotion  of  the  inventor’s  rights  considered  as  an  abstract legal  entity,
potentially isolated,  defenceless  and consequently in  need of  public protection.
Hence  the  exigence,  as  argued  in  Thoughts  upon  the  Patents,  of  the  Royal
Society’s disinterested arbitrage, a sort of authoritative veil covering the complex
social technology underlying the attribution and conservation of Watt’s invention
in the hands of his proprietor. After  all,  as we have seen,  one of the recurring
accusations deployed by critics of Watt’s monopolies was that his letter patent was
successfully defended not through solid arguments but by “the mere Power and
Opulence” of the Birmingham partners.295 These political connections, therefore,
could  not  be  further  trumpeted.  On  the  other  hand,  Wedgwood’s  unsuccessful
attempt to protect his intellectual property within the framework of the patent law
would force him to develop diverse strategies of promotion and protection of his
design and trademark, but also freed him from the rhetoric deployed by the patent
holders. His alliances and his system of patronage could be paraded, engraved,
typified in the clay of his creations, and yet his reputation as innovator of British
pottery  maintained  a  contingent,  personal  character  deriving  entirely  from the
diplomatic skills of his persona and his prestige as an artist, man of science, and
entrepreneur.  Different strategies in regard to the protection of their intellectual
properties moulded various rhetorics by which the idea of invention and originality
were sketched out.
295  Robinson, Musson, 1969, doc. n. 35, p. 159.
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Historiographical Appendix
Selfish entrepreneur or modern 'scientist'? Twentieth-century
historians of science look at Josiah Wedgwood
“the scientist's claim to 'his'
intellectual 'property' is limited to
that of recognition and esteem..”
Robert K. Merton, The Normative
Structure of Science, 1942, p. 273.
Introduction
 
In the first two parts of this work I attempted to enucleate the literary technologies,
or  the  rhetoric,  which  moulded  James  Watt  and  Josiah  Wedgwood's  ideas  of
invention and inventive work. We have seen that their respective rationalizations
of  such  important  concepts  stemmed  from  contingent  strategic  contexts.  Thus
Watt's discourse on intellectual property, appears fundamentally influenced by the
philosophical and argumentative grammar provided by the patent system. Watt's
justification of his rights as patentee has been analysed in order to shed light upon
its natural-law assumptions and proto-utilitarian argumentative style. Natural-law
and utilitarianism still offer the theoretical backgrounds against which critiques of
I.P. rights, and justifications thereof, have been construed by  contemporary parties
engaged in this broader debate within Libertarianism. As Watt has recently become
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the  target  of  opponents  of  intellectual  monopoly,  the  controversy  between
libertarian economists which ensued became the occasion of instrumental parallels
between Watt's exploitation of the patent law and the issues at stake in I.P. rights in
our time. On the one hand, the meaning and destiny of Watt's ideas concerning the
nature of invention seem to be encrusted with his fierce defence of the patentees'
rights. On the other, Wedgwood's conception of invention and originality mirrors
the lack of institutional codification of industrial design and the unresolved tension
between the inventive and imitative efforts which distinguishes the production of
luxury goods in 18th century Britain.  Hence, Wedgwood's attempts to establish
and defend his own claims on intellectual property leaned mostly upon alternative
arguments  and  cultural  resources.  Owing  to  his  failure  to  secure  intellectual
property by means of patents, Wedgwood's discursive attitude towards invention,
authorship and originality relied upon his relationship with his customers, workers
and competitors.
The  vertical  organization  of  Etruria,  reflected  a  centralized  attribution  of
authorship,  while  loyalty  was  reinforced  by  means  of  the  social  and  literary
technology of industrial paternalism.
Industrial  paternalism,  nationalism,  and many of  the  themes which recurred in
Wedgwood's  rhetoric  about  inventions,  should  by  no  means  be  considered  as
radical ideological alternatives to Watt's own exploitation of the patent system. On
the contrary, what made their discursive practices differ, I have argued, were the
different incidental goals and contexts from which they stemmed.
Therefore,  Watt's  Thoughts  upon  patents,  certainly  the  most  articulated  and
complete available manuscript giving an insight into Watt's discourse on patents,
rationalizes the inventor's strategy to strengthen his rights and social position by
means of a never realized reform of the patent law. Watt's characterization of the
archetypal inventor as a lonely infant matches his claim for public protection, but
also represents his individualistic and cumulative idea of technological progress.
Finally, this rhetorical device mirrors his coeval  resolution to pursue individual
lobbying  in  Parliament  rather  than  joining  with  other  patentees  to  exert  their
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political  power.  On  the  other  hand,  when  Wedgwood  employs  the  rhetoric  of
paternalism, his discourse reflects his attempts to keep his workmen loyal, thereby
preventing the leakage of industrial  secrets.  Moreover,  depicting himself  as the
father of a large family, Wedgwood morally unifies the coordinated work of many
specialists and skilled employees, isolated from each other and yet kept together
by his ultimate design. If not an artist himself, Wedgwood was nevertheless the
author of his pottery, just as he was the sole agent in the factory who had the whole
process of production under control. His authorship, materially substantiated by
his under-protected mark, was a constant object of concern. The ethical portrait
which derives from Watt and Wedgwood's jealous relationship with the fruits of
their experimental and innovative research, as we shall see, made it contentious to
accept them into the pantheon of the great scientists of their age. 
Could  scientists  jealously  conceal  their  discoveries  and behave  secretively  and
competitively like artisans? Was this behaviour consistent with Robert K. Merton's
outline of scientific deontology,  as described by the principles of communism,
universalism, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism?296
Moreover,  the  dilemma  over  Wedgwood's  scientific  stature  entails  broader
epistemological and sociological issues, such as the relationship between science
an technology, basic and applied research, and the social intercourse between men
of science and technicians.
Here  I  shall  focus  upon  Wedgwood's  scientific  reputation  in  his  20th century
historiography. In particular, I will consider contributions by three authors: Robert
Schofield  and  John  Chaldecott,  who  defended  the  scientific  dimension  of
Wedgwood's research; and Rupert Hall, who attempted to draw a neat line between
technological and scientific knowledge, thereby downplaying the role of the latter
in  the  technical  innovations  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  and  severing  the
296 See Robert  K. Merton, "The Normative Structure of  Science",  in  Merton, Robert  K.,  The
Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1973 [1942]; and  Bruce Macfarlane and Ming Cheng,  "Communism, Universalism
and Disinterestedness: Re-examining Contemporary Support among Academics for Merton’s
Scientific Norms", Journal of Academic Ethics, 6 (2008), 67–78.
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connection between technicians, craftsmen, engineers, and their coeval scientific
world.
I  shall  not  deal  here  neither  with  the  problem  of  reconstructing  Wedgwood's
reputation as natural philosopher in life, nor support any judgemental stance on the
epistemic status of his contributions to natural philosophy.
Therefore, the aim of this appendix is not to provide an answer to the question of
Wedgwood's right to the title of 'scientist', but to focus more narrowly upon  the
way his research was considered by historians of science in the 20th century and
how  this  historiographical  case  was  interwoven  with  contemporary
epistemological and political debates.
The juxtaposition of prominent protagonists of British 18th century culture, such as
Wedgwood,  with  the  word  'science',  might  seem  unjustified  to  contemporary
readers.
Although the authors we are concerned with actually did pose this question and
tried to give an answer, recent historians have found it useful to approach this issue
with more sensitivity to the way science was defined in history. Notably, while
addressing the problem of whether we should consider Matthew Boulton one of
the 'scientists' of his age or not, Miller explains why this seems like an awkward
research question to contemporary historians. 
In fact, Miller points out, Sidney Ross' 1962 article Scientist: the Story of a Word
showed that the word 'scientist' did not exist before the 1830s, and  that, therefore,
it was anachronistic to refer to 18th century natural philosophers as to 'scientists'.
According to Ross, this was not merely nominalistic quibbling. On the contrary,
the transition from natural philosopher to scientist designates the social transition
from a group of amateurs and 'gentlemen of science' to a highly specialized and
professionalized social body. 
In the same year  as Ross'  article appeared,  a landmark book for the history of
science  was  published.  Thomas  Kuhn's  work  on  The  Structure  of  Scientific
Revolution  inspired  a  generation  of  historians  of  science,  challenging  the
Whiggish approach in the discipline, as typified by Koyré's research. 
124
Whiggish historiography was prone to characterizing the history of science as a
long and triumphant march towards truth and progress. Kuhn showed that it was
possible to understand the inherent  logic of a past scientific  theory only if  we
contextualize it within her own paradigm, that is the set of beliefs which supported
it. Thus there was nothing like an eternal and universal scientific method, but only
historically contingent theoretical backgrounds which are incommensurable with
each other. 
Whilst Kuhn's work proved very influential, it did not provide a methodological
framework for the epistemological re-evaluation of practical men such Boulton.
Since Kuhnian paradigms were interpreted as essentially theoretical, the notion of
'paradigm' contributed to consolidate a theory-laden conception of science.
As  a  result,  men  like  Boulton:  “could  no  more  be  scientist  within  Kuhnian
historiography than within Koyréan because they were men of practice and not of
theory.”297 
As we shall see, Wedgwood should be included among these “men of practice”
whose status as men of science would be discussed in the 20th century. The voices
directly  involved  in  this  debate  were  anything  but  unanimous,  differing  on
political, methodological, and theoretical grounds.
Their diverging positions are situated in the context of a renegotiation of what sort
of  ethical  and  intellectual  activity  ought  to  be  reckoned  as  'science',  and
consequently,  a  redefinition of  the  field  of  research of  history  of  science  as  a
discipline.
297 David P. Miller, “Was Matthew Boulton a Scientist? Operating between the Abstract and the
Entrepreneurial”, in Kenneth Quickenden, Sally Baggott and Malcolm Dick (eds.),  Matthew
Boulton. Enterprising Industrialist of the Enlightenment, Ashgate, Farnham, 2013, pp. 88-89,
Epub edition.
125
 The first reaction to a “scholarly attack”
In  an  article  published  in  1973,  Neil  McKendrick  summed  up  the  status
quaestionis on  Josiah  Wedgwood’s  contributions  to  science:  “One  school  of
historians seeks to apply (in one formulation or another) the word scientific either
to the process of technical change in the eighteenth century or at least to the mental
habits  of  those who effected  these  changes;  others,  the realists,  search without
success for precise examples of a technical innovation being derived consciously
from pre-existent theoretical knowledge of a non-trivial character. The nominalists
might claim Wedgwood’s "public experimental work" as clear evidence of one of
the leading entrepreneurs of the Industrial Revolution thinking like a scientifically-
oriented industrialist,  and they would be right  to  do so,  but  the realists  would
continue to search in vain for any sign of the successful application of scientific
theory or a technical problem.”298
At  the  time  when  McKendrick  was  writing  these  pages  the  historiographical
quarrel  over  Wedgwood’s  scientific identity  had  become a  relevant  case-study,
bearing a historical meaning which transcended the interest in his life and work
and provided the field of debate of opposing approaches to the concept of science
in general and to the intellectual dynamics which had contributed to the Industrial
Revolution in particular.
 During the 19th century, biographers of Wedgwood did not significantly question
the scientific stature of the potter,  taking for granted his established credibility
within the scientific community of his age.
Hence, Llewellynn Jewitt and Frederick William underline Wedgwood's “perfect
knowledge of the effect of heat in its various degrees, and his almost boundless
298 N.  McKendrick,  “The  Role  of  Science  in  the  Industrial  Revolution:  A study of  Josiah
Wedgwood as a scientist and industrial chemist”, in Mikulas Teich, and Robert Young eds.,
Changing  perspectives  in  the  history  of  science:  essays  in  honour  of  Joseph  Needham,
Heinemann, London, 1973, p. 292.
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knowledge of everything relating to his art, and to science generally”, indicating
his expertise, both practical and theoretical, as the basis of his success.299
In the same year  the more complete biography by Eliza Meteyard provided an
encomiastic description of Wedgwood's original contribution to pottery as of one
which was unrivalled in his time, from both the  artistic and  scientific points of
view.  Art  and  science  are  thus  presented  as  the  combined  driving  forces  of
Wedgwood's  slow progress towards perfection:  “the  artists  transferring his fine
visions to clay, whilst  the man of severe science steadied and watched the hand
that wrought.”300
Almost  thirty  years  after  the  publication  of  these  first  two  biographies  of
Wedgwood,  Samuel  Smiles  highlighted  Wedgwood's  excellent  scientific
reputation, which the potter enjoyed both at home and abroad, as illustrated by his
contributions  to  the  Philosophical  Transactions,  and  his  Chemical  Collections,
kept at the Royal Academy of Sciences in Uppsala, Sweden.301 Together with his
Lives  of  Engineers,  Smiles’s  study  contributed  to  the  reconstruction  of  the
biographical and intellectual profiles of key figures of the Industrial Revolution,
who were also depicted as some of the main characters in the modern construction
of  British  commerce.  These  “heroes  of  invention”,302 who  tied  technological
research  to  entrepreneurial  zeal,  were  to  mould  a  new  kind  of  scientific
knowledge. Their topics, methods, and practices became increasingly accredited in
the traditional centres of production and diffusion of natural philosophy, mirroring
the social upgrading of men who were often described as “of humble station” and
“self-educated”.
“One  of  the  most  remarkable  things  about  Engineering  in  England”,  argues
Smiles: “is that its principal achievements have been accomplished, not by natural
philosophers nor by mathematicians, but by men of humble station, for the most
299 Jewitt and William, 1865, p.198.
300 Meteyard, 1865-1866, vol. 2, p. 330. My italics.
301 Smiles, 1895, pp. 270-271.
302 See McLeod, 2007.
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part  self-educated.  The  educated  classes  of  the  last  century  [the  eighteenth
century] regarded with contempt mechanical men and mechanical subjects […] At
a  time  when  the  Court,  the  Camp,  and  the  Church  formed  the  principal
occupations  of  the  higher  classes,  engineering  was  thought  unscientific  and
ungenteel […] Nor did any of the great mechanics, who have since invented tools,
engines,  and machines, at  all belong to the educated classes. They received no
college education. Some of them could scarcely write their own names. These men
gathered  their  practical  knowledge  in  the  workshop,  or  acquired  it  in  manual
labour. They rose to celebrity, mostly by their habits of observation, their powers
of discrimination, their constant self-improvement, and their patient industry.”303 
Wedgwood’s life bears several  similarities with the typical 18th century
engineer  portrayed  by  Smiles.  He  came  from  a  family  of  humble  provincial
craftsmen. His schooling, at the school of Newcastle-under-Lyme, was to be rather
short and basic, and he would never enjoy any academic education.304 Whilst these
conditions  placed  him in  an  apparently  peripheral  position  with  respect  to  the
cultural  élites  of  his  time,  he  was  to  engage with  many influential  artists  and
natural  philosophers,  such  as  Joseph Banks,  Joseph  Priestley,  James Keir,  and
Alexander Chisholm. 
Wedgwood's obituary in the  Gentleman’s Magazine in 1795 was the eulogy of a
“mind enlightened by science”, for which he enjoyed “the esteem of scientific men
at home and throughout Europe”.305 He would eventually become one of the most
acknowledged  icons  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  and  a  natural  candidate  to
represent  the  bourgeois  dream  of  social  mobility  and  self-procured  success.306
Nevertheless,  according  to  Schofield,  contemporary  historiography  seemed  to
deny his scientific merits. This shift, he claims, occurred around the beginning of
303 Samuel Smiles, Lives of the Engineers, Vermuyden, Myddelton, Perry, James Brindley. Early
Engineering,  J. Murray, London, 1904, pp. xvi-xvii.
304 Dolan, 2004, pp. 19-30.
305 Reported in Robert E. Schofield, “Josiah Wedgwood, industrial chemist”,  Chymia, v (1959),
180-192, p. 180.
306 McLeod, 2007, p. 306-309.
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the 20th century.
Hence  in  1935  Robert  C.  Binkley  had  broken  the  Victorian  historiographical
framework which tied science,  technology, and economic revolution, dating the
beginning of the application of science to industry only after the mid-19th century.
Almost thirty years later, while criticizing this historiographical trend, Robert E.
Schofield deplored the “scholarly attack, aimed primarily at the general picture of
the Industrial Revolution”, which ended up denying Wedgwood’s “right to the title
of scientist”.307
McLeod focuses upon this  shift  in  the  estimation  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,
tracking it back to 1882, when Toynbee coined this term in English. MacLeod after
Toynbee's  influential  work:  “to  study  British  industrialization  was  normally  to
study the evils of capitalism and the degradation of the working people.”308 The
profit-oriented rationality which underpinned the British rush to industrialization
was counterbalance by a definition of 'Culture'  as a form of knowledge which
represented the humane alternative, a bulwark which resisted the rise of capitalist
cynicism.309
Similarly, at the time when Schofield wrote his article, he felt that one school of
historians downplayed the contribution of science to the Industrial Revolution and
their claims were based upon undoing the logical and epistemological connections
between scientific  thought  and technological  research.  Consequently,  men such
Wedgwood or Watt lost their scientific eminence and their inventions ceased to be
considered  applied  science.  Their  contrivances  became empirical  results,  while
their experiments, “however cleverly conducted”, were: “not science unless they
are guided by some sort of theoretical structure”.310 While sticking to a theory-
laden conception of science, Schofield attempted to reinstate Wedgwood among
307 Ibid., p. 180.
308 McLeod, 2007, p. 11.
309 Ibid. See also Stefan Collini, “The literary critic and the village labourer: 'culture' in twentieth-
century Britain.”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6:14 (2004), 93-116. 
310 Ibid.
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the  great  scientists  of  his  time  by  inquiring  after  the  theoretical  structure
underlying his experiments. In his opinion, Wedgwood’s experimental activity had
a  precise  theoretical  background,  which  is  plentifully  in  evidence  in  his
Commonplace  Books.  The  conceptual  framework  of  his  experiments  was  the
phlogiston  theory,  a  complex  theoretical  architecture  which  would  soon  be
abandoned by chemists, but at this stage remained a plausible explanation of the
phenomenona of combustion and oxidation.311 This passage effectively sums up
Schofield’s  position:  “If  we  are  to  accept  the  theory  of  phlogiston  as  being
genuinely  scientific,  then  we must  accept  the  industrial  use  of  it  as  being the
application of science to industry; indeed the fact that the theory could be used
industrially is a good test of its value as a scientific theory.”312 
In  this  respect,  Schofield’s  historiographical  approach adheres  entirely  to  what
McKendrick  would  later  define  as  a  realist  historiographical  perspective.
Wedgwood’s  intense  exchanges  with  some  of  the  most  eminent  scientific
personalities  in  Britain,  as  well  as  his  activities  within  important  scientific
societies, such as the Royal Society of London, his patronage of scientists Joseph
Priestley  and  John  Leslie,  and  his  five  contributions  to  the  Philosophical
Transactions, were insufficient proofs of his real stature as a man of science. What
made a potter become a 'scientist' was Wedgwood’s mastering the main theories of
chemical research of his age.
The same claim would later be supported by John A. Chaldecott, who argued in
1975 that Wedgwood’s research method might “justly be regarded as scientific,
using the term in its modern connotation.”313 In his presidential address, read at a
summer meeting of the British Society of History of Science at Leeds on 3 July
1974, Chaldecott shed light upon Wedgwood’s research in that field of physics we
call pyrometry, which is concerned with the measurement of high temperatures.
311 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
312 Ibid.
313 John A. Chaldecott, "Josiah Wedgwood (1730-1795): scientist", British journal for the history
of science, 8:1, (1975), 1-16.
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Chaldecott shows with literary evidence that Wedgwood’s failure to calibrate his
pyrometers,  translating  his  scale  into  fahrenheit  does  not  invalidate  the
epistemological  consistency  of  his  method.  According  to  Chaldecott,  the
imprecision  of  the  pyrometer  was  due  to  some  incorrect  assumptions  which
Wedgwood had simply inherited from the cultural resources of his age, such as the
belief that the boiling temperature of quicksilver was to be fixed at 600° F rather
than at 675° F, and that there was a linear relationship between his clay’s shrinkage
and the increase of temperature from 600° C to 1000° C.314 Wedgwood failed to
turn his pyrometer into a precise and reliable instrument, but Chaldecott highlights
that he did, in fact, do so only by applying the scientific notions available to him at
the time, and not because of his unscientific method. 
What  is  interesting about  Chaldecott’s  argumentation is  that,  whereas scientific
notions  and  assumptions  should  be  contextualized  and  placed  against  their
historical  background, scientific  method is  situated beyond these resources and
works as a standard historiographical parameter which is useful to evaluate what is
scientific in the modern connotation of the term.
What did science owe to ethics?  Josiah Wedgwood the craftsman
During the 1970s, the relationship between science and technology was dissolved
by Hall. His approach might be recognized as an example of realist historiography,
which nevertheless  reached opposite  conclusions  with respect  to  Schofield and
Chaldecott.  In  1974 Hall  published  What  did  the  industrial  revolution  owe to
science?,315 one of a number of articles in which he expressed his opinion of the
314 Ibid., p. 8.
315 Arthur R. Hall, "What did the industrial revolution owe to science?", in N. McKendrick (ed.),
Historical  perspectives,  studies  in  English  thought  and  society  in  honour  of  J.  H.  Plumb,
Europa Publications, London, 1974, pp. 129-151.
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relationship  between  18th-century  science  and  technology.  I  argue  that,  whilst
dismantling Wedgwood’s pretensions to the role of scientist from a logical point of
view,316 Hall actually confronts the great potter with the alleged ethical profile of
the 'man of science'. His arguments have much to do with an abstract concept of
the scientific ethos, perhaps more than with internal logical distinctions between
scientific and technological research. 
The dividing line between technical know-how and scientific knowledge might be
described more as a difference between modi operandi, rather than as different
formae mentis. One essential demarcation is the aim of the two kinds of research.
On the one hand, in Hall’s view, scientists' deontology implies a rate of disinterest
compared with technological research. Scientists are supposed to be open to the
circulation of knowledge, whereas technicians are often: “anxious to keep novel
processes  as  secret  as  possible,  and  to  prevent  their  dissemination  by  patent
protection”. Whilst “James Watt, for example, thought like a scientist, he behaved
as secretively as any traditional craftsman”.317 Being disinterested and neutral, the
true man of science does not interfere with the publicizing of scientific knowledge,
sharing a new theory with a community of peers. On the other hand, the technician
does not recognize his colleagues as his principal interlocutors and he tends to seek
his  feedback  elsewhere.  For  him  being  successful  means  obtaining  “popular
acclaim”318 for his discoveries. In his case, the market is a perfect referee. The
engineers and inventors of the Industrial Revolution were not driven by the “force
of scientific truth”, but by the “desire to derive quickly a sound and economical
answer to a design problem”.319 From these ethical  and deontological  portraits,
Hall derives one of his fundamental methodological principles. He claims that: “in
considering  the  history  of  technical  development”,  he  claims,  “it  is  no  more
necessary to enquire after rationality than, in similarly considering the history of
316 Ibid., p. 131.
317 "What did the Industrial Revolution owe to science? ", Ibid., p. 131. My italics.
318 Ibid., p. 132.
319 Ibid., p. 151.
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science,  to enquire after utility.”320 But the interests that motivate technological
research are inconsistent with the making of pure science, whilst science itself tries
to solve problems which are too abstract to be interesting to practical men.
 This means that science and technology are divided and that they constitute two
separate  working  areas,  both  in  their  intellectual  interests  and  practical
inclinations:  “If it is neither profitable nor realistic, then, to pursue through the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the gradual emergence of a single species of
dual  parentage,  Homo  scientificus,  pursuing  sometimes  the  purity  of  science,
sometimes its application to mundane affairs, one is left with a quite traditional
conception that science was concerned with one class of problems and technology
with another, and it remains to establish the relations between them.”321 
After drawing a dividing line between 18th century science and technology, Hall
enters into the core of his argumentation, showing that the two radically different
kinds of knowledge were also impervious to each other. He deals with some of the
major  icons  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  arguing  that  the  best  educated  and
sophisticated  engineers  might  have  mastered  the  language  of  science  “while
always actually working with particular facts and ideas. Any scientific theory may
envelop his actual immersion in particulars, right or wrong.”322 Wedgwood’s work
does not provide any evidence of a real logical exploitation of the phlogistic theory
in the technological research undertaken at Etruria. Wedgwood, writes Hall: “did
not – as quoted by Schofield – measure phlogiston in order to distinguish the clays,
he distinguished them by firing specimens and observing that one was consistently
darker  that  the  other.  His  phlogiston  language  was  no  more  than  a  way  of
rationalizing what was physically observable […] Being familiar with chemists’
terminology, he used it, but it had no technological (or logical) significance”.323 
From today’s standpoint, and taking into account the influence of Thomas Kuhn’s
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid., p. 135.
322 Ibid., p. 140.
323 Ibid., p. 141. Italics are mine.
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and  Paul  Feyerabend’s  epistemological  thought,  it  would  be  interesting  to  ask
ourselves whether a scientific theory is not necessarily a way of rationalizing what
is physically observable. But leaving aside this enigmatic passage, we may focus
once more upon what is more relevant in Hall’s point of view, that is: the practical,
we might say behavioural, opposition between the ideal man of science and the
technician. The true 18th-century scientist looks like the custodian of a kind of
knowledge which is cut off from the world of material interests. He is disinterested
enough to appreciate the typical abstraction of scientific problems and to share his
ideas  publicly,  fending  off  the  kind  of  anxiety  which  arises  from commercial
competition.
Hall was one of the undisputed fathers of British history of science. He was the
first curator of the Whipple Museum of History of Science at Cambridge, where he
also  lectured.  He  was  the  first  academic  taking  up  a  position  as  professor  of
history of science at Imperial College, London, and the President of the British
Society  for  the  History  of  Science  for  two  years,  from 1966-1968.  Hall  was,
therefore, an important character in the days when this young field of studies was
gradually become academically established. Delimiting the field of the history of
science implied a  certain definition of that  specific kind of knowledge we call
science, which was depicted as a highly distinctive intellectual enterprise. A liberal
humanist, and a protegé of Herbert Butterfield, Hall's work was aimed at shaping
science as a type of knowledge which transcended every other. By doing this, he
contributed to the Cold War Western historiographical  reaction to deterministic
readings  of  science  as  a  complex product,  such as  those  provided by Marxist
historians  of  science  of  the  previous  generation.324 At  Cambridge the  group of
historians who were more influenced by soviet externalism was represented by
Joseph Needham, from whom Hall always distanced himself. In his PhD thesis,
324 For an insight into the reception of Marxist history of science in Britain see: J. Needham's
foreword and P. G. Werskey's Introduction to Nikolai I. Bukharin et al.,  Science at the Cross
Roads. Papers presented to the International Congress of History of Science and Technology
held in London from June 29th to July 3rd, 1931 by the delegates of the U.S.S.R., Frank Cass &
Co., London, 1971.
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Hall  cites  Needham  as  one  of  the  historians  who  were  influenced  by  Boris
Hessen's “crude” historiography.325 As “perhaps the most interesting convert to the
Marxist  viewpoint”,  Needham argued for  an  externalist  approach to  history  of
science and technology which tied together scientific knowledge and technical and
economic processes.326
But Hall's reaction did not have a sole interlocutor.  His depiction of science is
situated  within  the  broader  resistance  to  Merton's  conception  of  the  moral
equivalence of the man of science as articulated in his 1942 essay. In this essay
Merton  delineated  the  proper  disciplinary  space  of  his  Sociology  of  Scientific
Knowledge (SSK), arguing that there was “no satisfactory evidence” to support the
thesis  that  scientists  were  “recruited  from  the  ranks  of  those  who  exhibit  an
unusual  degree  of  moral  integrity”.327 Establishing  this  moral  parallel  between
scientific  communities  and  the  social  world,  Merton  explains  ascribed  to  the
deviation  of individuals all  those behaviours which could not  find justification
within the norms of CUDOS, that is, those norms which regulate the deontology of
the scientific community as a whole.
Therefore, the research field of SSK is defined by the discrepancy between the
expected adherence to these abstract moral principles, which normally produces a
truly disinterested and objective kind of knowledge, and the moral ordinariness of
the single social actors involved in scientific research.
As a result of this a sociological approach to science made sense only as long as a
'vulgar error' was at stake, such as those errors – which lead, for example to false
theories - could be seen as 'deviations' from the normative structure of science,
which gave rise to interestedness, competition and concealment. This point of view
is rejected by Hall, who, rather than accepting the ideal of the moral equivalence
325 Anna-K.  Mayer,  “Setting  up  a  discipline,  II:  British  history  of  science  and  the  “end  of
ideology”, 1931-48”, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 35 (2004), 41-72, p. 50, footnote 17.
326 Bukharin, 1971, p. xxii.
327 Merton, 1973, p. 276. For a history of the concept of moral equivalence of the man of science
see  also:  Steven  Shapin,  The  Scientific  Life.  A Moral  History  of  a  late  modern  Vocation,
Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2008, chapt 2-3.
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of  the  man of  science,  considers  characters  such  as  Watt  and  Wedgwood like
deviants with respect to a standard scientific deontology.
 Moreover, if the history of science should look for literary evidence,328 as Hall
argues  in  On Knowing,  and knowing how to..,329 historical  attention  will  focus
upon  literate  men  and  the  scientist  constructed  by  this  historiography  will
inevitably have a flair  for writing. Another piece is added to the puzzle of the
scientific  ethos.  Nevertheless,  it  is  perhaps  beyond writing,  among mechanical
schemes and in the hardware which embodied a silent language, that we discover
the world inhabited by Wedgwood, Smeaton, Watt, Trevithick, Rennie, and by all
those ’obscure individuals who were the first inventors’.330 If pure science must be
separated from technology, it is also because the history of science, focusing only
upon literary sources, cannot be confused with the history of technology, which is
mostly based upon conjecture and analogy. In fact, for Hall, the history of science
is a history of thought, and scientific thought lives in the words of scientists, not in
the material world of instruments and laboratories.331
“It is a mere self-deception to suppose that one can recreate thought from things,
as for example those who have sought to fabricate a palaeolithic religion based
upon the evidence of cave paintings or, perhaps, an iron age astronomy on the
evidence of stone circles.”332
 The  realist  approach  to  Wedgwood  scientific  stature  presents  three  major
328 Hall, 1974, pp. 92-93.
329 Arthur R. Hall, "On Knowing, and Knowing how to..",  History of Technology, 3 (1978), pp.
91-103, reprinted in Arthur R. Hall, Science and Society: Historical Essays on the Relations of
Science, Technology and Medicine , Ashgate, 1994, ch. iv.
330 Hall, 1974, p. 132.
331 Hall, 1978, p. 93. This problem was addressed by Derek J de Solla Price: “A point which tells
particularly heavily for me, as a historian of technology, is this opposite polarity of science and
technology in their attitudes to literature, which is precisely what makes it terribly difficult to
write  the history of  technology […] The content of science is already embodied in papers,
whereas that of technology first has to force itself into written form […].” According to de Solla
Price,  if  on  the  one  hand  technology  is  “papyrophobic”,  on  the  other  hand  science  is
“papyrocentric”. Derek J de S. Price, “The parallel structures of science and technology”, in
Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds.), Science in Context. Reading in the Sociology of Science,
Open University Press, Stony Stratford, 1982, pp. 164-176.
332 Ibid., p. 96.
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problems.  First  of  all,  as  we  observed  in  the  case  of  Hall,  Schofield  and
Chaldecott, a realist interpretation of Wedgwood as a man of science has provoked
radically  opposed  replies.  Furthermore,  with  respect  particularly  to  Hall’s
interpretation,  the  line  he  drew  between  science  and  technology  is  largely
contestable.333
In  1980 Joseph  Agassi  defined the  classic  demarcation  between  scientific  and
technological research as “a problem of distributing medals”334 and he saw to the
interpretation  of  the  relation  between  science  and  technology  as  a  continuum.
What he calls “basic or fundamental research” is exactly “in between science and
technology, in the sense that it operates not only with explanations and refutations,
it also must operate with corroborations”.335
The nominalist camp: r  econnecting technical and scientific matters
The nominalist school mentioned by McKendrick in the incipit of this appendix is
perhaps exemplified by Musson and Robinson’s book Science and Technology in
the  Industrial  Revolution (1969).336 Nevertheless,  these  scholars  did  something
more  than  apply  the  adjective  ’scientific’  to  the  mental  habits  of  the  most
acclaimed technicians of 18th century England. They wrote a detailed account of
the scientific and social networks which included practitioners and inventors such
as Wedgwood and Watt. The third chapter, which may be considered the core of
their research, begins with some considerations of British scientific associationism,
333 An interesting summary of the debate on the relationship between science and technology in
historiography  is  provided  in:  Peter  Dear  and  Sheila  Jasanoff,  "Dismantling  boundaries  in
Science and Technology Studies", Isis, 101:4 (2010), 759-774.
334 Joseph Agassi, "Between Science and Technology", Philosophy of Science, 47:1 (1980), p. 96.
335 Ibid.
336 Albert  Musson,  Eric  Robinson,  Science  and  technology  on  the  industrial  revolution,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1969.
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on the Warrington Academy, and on the role of itinerant lecturers in the promotion
of scientific culture in the English provinces. Personal connections and epistolary
exchanges  show  a  broad  circulation  of  theoretical  knowledge  and  technical
expertise. Associationism is  interpreted as evidence of affiliation to a scientific
community.  This  community  leads  an  open dialogue with  society  at  large  and
occasionally widens its horizons to include new figures who are able to master
scientific language and bring new kinds of knowledge, encrusted with the practical
problems emerging from progressing industrialization. For Musson and Robinson,
this  network  of  epistolary  relationships,  friendships,  and  professional
collaborations, the flourishing societies and dissident academies, do not merely c
inflate  the 'scientific'  label.  Rather,  they describe the shaping of a wider social
basis involved in the creation and propagation of scientific knowledge. Such social
phenomena  are  essentially  related  to  the  practical  and  bourgeois  character  of
science during the Industrial Revolution.337 
In this perspective, we no longer need any justification for Wedgwood’s right to
the title of 'scientist',  since the scientific  community of his  time entertained an
intensive scientific exchange with him, discussed his publications, and used its
instruments.  Musson  and  Robinson’s  attention  to  scientific  associationism was
criticized  by  some  as  an  arbitrary  and  misleading  juxtaposition  of  scientific
research and technological progress.338 In their research, it is neither an abstract
concept  of  scientific  knowledge,  nor  even  an  ethical  portrait  of  the  'man  of
science', which provides a frame of reference to measure Wedgwood's intellectual
stature.  It is,  rather, that men like Wedgwood or Watt radically altered science,
transforming its priorities and reshaping its ethos. This profound commitment to
social history reminds us of the social dimension of scientific knowledge, and of
how  science  grows  in  close  relation  to  the  sphere  of  political  and  economic
phenomena and to extra academic networks of scientific associationism.
337 Ibid., p. 142.
338 ’Science and Technology in the Industrial Revolution’, by E. Robinson; A. Musson. Review
by: Morris Berman, Journal of social history, vol. 5, no. 4 (1972), pp. 521-527.
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A few  years  after  the  publication  of  Robinson’s  and  Musson’s  book,  British
historiography focused upon new debates around the relationship between science
and society.  The new trends within  SSK in general  and,  more particularly,  the
School of Edinburgh opposed a contemplative conception of knowledge, studying
science from a new and more ambitious  perspective.  The empirical  validity of
Merton's  norms  was  questioned,  and  this  led  to  a  new  manifesto,  a  Strong
Programme339,  according  to  which  sociology  could  not  be  limited  within  the
bounds of error and false theories. On the contrary, scientific knowledge, whether
it proved true or false, was nothing more than a social product and imbibed many
conventions related to its social and historical situation. The bulwark of 'matters of
fact' was being corroded by this new form of social constructivism, and by the idea
that science was produced by morally and materially isolated men. From a material
point of view, authors such as Steven Shapin, Margaret Jacobs and Larry Stewart340
focused  upon  bringing  to  light  the  invisible  technicians  who  substantially
contributed to the making of natural knowledge in the modern history of science.
They investigated the place of the production of modern natural knowledge and
found  it  in  laboratories  and  workshops,  doing  away  with  any  purely
epistemological, theoretical distinction between abstract and applied knowledge.341
In  other  words  they  reconstructed  the  complex  network  of  actors  who  were
directly involved in the making of scientific knowledge, reinstating the intellectual
property  of  a  number  of  tacit  workers,  who  had  been  neglected  by  previous
historians.
From a moral point of view, social studies of science contributed to erode the myth
339 See David Bloor,  Knowledge and Social Imagery, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1991
[1976], p. 3.
340 Steven Shapin, “The Invisible Technician”, American Scientist 77:6 (1989): 554-563, Margaret
Jacobs and Larry Stewart,  Practical Matter. Newton's Science in the Service of Industry and
Empire,  1687-1851,  Harvard  University  Press,  Boston,  2004,  Larry  Stewart,  “Assistants  to
Enlightenment: William Lews, Alexander Chisholm and Invisible Technicians in the Industrial
Revolution”, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 62 (2008), 17-29.
341 See also Simon Schaffer, “Glass works: Newton's prisms and the uses of experiment”, in David
Gooding, Trevor Pinch, Simon Schaffer (eds.), The Uses of Experiment. Studies in the Natural
sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
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of scientific disinterestedness.
  Hence in  Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (1977), Barry Barnes wrote
specifically on the interconnections between science and material interests.342 In
Barnes’  book,  knowledge,  including  scientific  knowledge,  was  described  as
essentially  motivated  by  the  interest  in  prediction  and  control.  Science  was
anything but disinterested and neutral.343 The new historical research inspired by
the  Strong Programme shed light  upon the  scientific  contributions  of  invisible
technicians,  understanding the  reasons for  their  historiographical  oblivion,  and,
broadly  speaking,  it  focused  on  that  “social  technology  that  incorporated  the
conventions experimental philosophers should use in dealing with each other and
considering knowledge-claims”.344 The SSK would also inspire new perspectives
on James Watt and, less directly on his friends of the Lunar Society, including
Wedgwood.  Their  long-debated  scientific  work  was  now  approached  from  a
naturalistic point of view. It was no longer necessary to understand whether Watt,
or  Wedgwood  could  be  considered  scientists  according  to  abstract  ethical  or
epistemological  criteria.  What  mattered  was  the  understanding  of  their
accreditation in life and what practical effects their scientific reputation had, for
example,  in  regard  to  their  various  commercial  successes.  Rather  than  setting
Wedgwood’s scientific work against a realist epistemology, this research interest
implied  a  new  consideration  of  scientific  community  using  the  methods  of
sociological  research.  In  an  article  published  in  2000,  David  Philip  Miller
considered the problem of Watt’s reputation, claiming that, however we evaluate
Watt’s  scientific  stature,  his  scientific  accreditation  might  have  been  “of
considerable  commercial  importance  to  Watt  and  Matthew  Boulton”.345 What
interested Miller was, first of all, Boulton’s and Watt’s skills at constructing their
342 Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge, London, 1977.
343 Ibid., p. 86.
344 Shapin and Schaffer, 1985, p. 25.
345 David P. Miller,  “’Puffing  Jamie’:  The commercial  and ideological  importance of  being a
’philosopher’ in the case of the reputation of James Watt (1736-1819)",  History of  Science,
38:1=119 (2000), 1-24, p. 3.
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reputations and their images as philosophers, and secondarily the practical effects
of  this  very  peculiar  kind  of  authority.  His  fascinating  research  reached  the
conclusion  that  Watt’s  scientific  respectability  might  have  loomed  large  as  an
instrument to defend his invention in the context  of his  legal  struggles against
those  who  were  considered  to  be  the  pirates  of  his  patent.  The  scientific
community was a complex social group and being part of it had much to do with
peculiar mechanisms of integration and with the individual’s construction of his
own  credibility  as  a  scientist.  Being  a  'philosopher'  basically  meant  having
successfully constructed oneself as such, contributing to a social portrait which
could  be  painted,  renovated,  or  totally  undone  by  subsequent  historiography.
Miller’s  monograph on  the  “chemical  Watt”346 provided  new grist  for  thought
along this historiographical perspective. The author tracks Watt’s reputation and
work  as  a  chemist  back  in  time,  showing  how  and  why  his  successive
historiography ended up privileging Watt’s images as mechanical engineer and as
philosophical engineer. The construction of Watt’s scientific reputation had much
to  do  with  his  self-fashioning,  his  friends’  testimonies,  and  his  son’s  and
successors’ contributions to the memory of the inventor from Greenock. If some
practical  men  strove  hard  to  construct  their  reputation  as  disinterested
philosophers,  this  was  also  because  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  particularly
during the Banksian regime, imposed upon them the ethical code of disinterest.347
Conducting  disinterested research  was  essential  to  gaining  scientific  credibility
within one of the most influential scientific societies in the world. On the other
hand, owing to its significant authority in scientific matters, this prestigious society
might be used as a powerful means of accreditation and the relationships between
its  members  would  turn  out  to  be  very  useful.  Miller  suggests  that:  “a  more
conspicuous presence  among  the  philosophers  might  also  be  useful  in  gaining
access to those who might testify in court. Indeed, when Boulton and Watt finally
despaired of  other measures  to deal  with pirates of their  engines  and took the
346 Miller, 2009.
347 Miller, 1999, p. 187.
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matter  to  court  in  1794-95 (Boulton & Watt  v.  Bull),  half  of the ten witnesses
whom they called to testify in their  favour  were F.R.Ss who had no particular
experience of erecting engines but also had no financial interest in the outcome of
the case. There are signs that this "independent" testimony by the FRSs carried
some weight.”348 
By the end of 1785, all the members of the Lunar Society had become fellows of
the Royal Society. Miller claims that their election might have been the result of a
joint venture “connected with real and anticipated battles concerning patents and
patent law reform”.349 Nevertheless, it is still not clear whether Wedgwood was
moved by the very same reasons as were some of his lunar friends. Although he
was a vigilant observer of the legal battles and the political debate concerning the
patent  system, he often preferred compromising with his  many imitators rather
than facing long and uncertain legal disputes. 
The real reasons for Wedgwood’s accreditation in the scientific community and the
social  technology which  sustained his  reputation  as  a  man of  science  are  still
largely shrouded in mystery. What seems clear from a brief outline of Wedgwood's
historiographical  fortune  in  across  the  20th century,  however,  is  that  what
McKendrick defined as the nominalist perspective is now perhaps the dominant
approach. The nominalist school has been reinforced by the development of the
social studies of science, the crumbling of the barrier erected between technology
and science and the gradual and constantly challenged affirmation of the idea of
the moral ordinariness of the man of science.
348 Ibid, p. 195.
349 Ibid., p. 193.
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